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Abstract
This is a study of the processes through which the former Togoland Trust 
Territory has come to constitute an integral part of modern Ghana. As the section 
of the country that was most recently appended, the territory has often seemed 
the most likely candidate for the eruption of separatist tendencies. The 
comparative weakness of such tendencies, in spite of economic crisis and 
governmental failure, deserves closer examination. This study adopts an 
approach which is local in focus (the area being Likpe), but one which 
endeavours at every stage to link the analysis to unfolding processes at the 
Regional and national levels.
Part One of the thesis deals with the background to, and the trajectory of, the 
Togoland unification movement which surfaced after 1945. Both the appeal of the 
movement and its inherent limitations are attributed to the legacy of uneven 
development bequeathed by a minimalist colonial state. Having presented an 
overview of the movement, the third Chapter examines the intersection between 
local politics and the strength of opinion on the unification question in Likpe. The 
generational differences between the contending parties, which are related to 
educational indices, help to explain not only the victory of the Convention 
People's Party, but also the triumph of the integrationist ideal. Furthermore, it is 
possible to account for the greater receptivity of the Central Togo minorities in 
the light of the marks left by British administrative policy.
Part Two assesses the impact of the deteriorating environment of the 1970s upon 
political consciousness in the Volta Region. The failure of the secessionist 
movement is examined, as is the contention that most rural communities 
preferred simply to retreat from the centre. Particular attention is paid to cross- 
border smuggling, which has been little studied, and to the political ramifications 
thereof. This section draws both on extensive interviews amongst the Bakpele, 
whose experience of these events is most distinctive, as well as on official 
documentation.
Part Three considers the efforts of the Rawlings regime to more closely integrate 
centre and periphery, whilst returning to a nonstatist model of governance. The 
revolutionary phase and the subsequent change of direction are both examined 
through the prism of Likpe. An analysis is made of government efforts to stamp 
out smuggling with the active cooperation of border communities. The final 
Chapter evaluates local reactions to the political reform programme, which 
turned out to be supportive yet at variance with the official perspective.
The introductory and concluding Chapters endeavour to tease out the 
implications of the study for the wider debate concerning the interaction between 
state and civil society in contemporary Africa.
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Chapter One:
Introduction: The Issues and the Setting
"... large and small African states alike see themselves as 
nation-states like the countries of Europe and Asia, occasionally 
with a disarming matter-of-factness. But in Africa, as in almost all 
of the developing world's younger states, there is a great 
discrepancy between claims ana reality. Most of them have 
successfully managed the process of state-building, even if they 
have had to rely on one-party systems and military dictatorship as 
a last resort. But in many cases nation-building has not matured 
beyond infancy"1
"Peasants avoid it, urban workers despise it, military men destroy 
it, civil servants rape it and academicsponder the short- and long­
term results."2
1.1. Clearing the Decks: The Debate About State and Society
An enquiry into the politics of 'national integration', a primary concern of the 
1960s, may seem anomalous at a time when the trend is apparently towards 
disintegration across much of Africa. Apart from the ravages of economic crisis, 
the recrudescence of secessionism and civil war threaten the integrity of a 
number of states. On the critical list are Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, while many others may be 
counted as serious casualties.^ Moreover, the surfacing of regionalism in hitherto 
stable countries such as Senegal warns of a possible contagion effect. The present 
condition of Africa has engendered such pessimism that one British newspaper, 
of reputedly liberal persuasions, recently suggested that the situation might only 
be redeemed through a resumption of colonial rule - if only the continent had 
something to offer.'1 The doomsday scenarios do, however, ignore the fact that 
the majority of African states have cohered remarkably well in spite of the strains 
to which they have been subjected. This thesis seeks, by means of a local study, to 
examine the vector of forces that have held state and society together in Ghana, a 
country that has experienced more than its fair share of political turmoil and 
economic dislocation.
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Any such study could do worse than consult a standard historical work,
published as far back as 1963. In A Political History of Ghana, David Kimble
drew attention to the subtle processes through which people from the Colony,
Ashanti and (to a more limited extent) the Northern Territories acquired a sense
of common identity in the context of colonial ru le / He highlighted the
integrative effects of the churches, the press, voluntary associations, modern
communications and education. In spite of concerted efforts by the Gold Coast
authorities to impede the articulation of a national consciousness, colonialism
inevitably created the conditions for new ways of thinking about the world and
the place of the colonized within it:
"It was the existence from 1902 onwards of a common territory, 
with clearly defined boundaries, governed by a single British 
authority, that provided the physical framework within which the 
claim to Gold Coast nationhood could develop"®
There is a temptation to dismiss this book as a product of its time. Conceived in
the wake of independence, it is arguably teleological in its approach to
nationalism and overly concerned with the affairs of a small educated elite. Yet,
Benedict Anderson has shown has shown that it is the colonial elite which was
usually the first to 'imagine' itself as belonging to a more embracing national
community, by virtue of its mobility and proximity to the s ta te /  Besides, with
nobody quite realizing it, the latest contributions to an ongoing debate have
returned to the original point of departure - or somewhere close to it. In order to
clarify the objectives of this thesis, it may help to retrace some of the foosteps.®
During the formative years of African studies not everyone was as optimistic as 
Kimble. In fact, the majority of political scientists were more impressed by 
structural faults which they traced to the core of the 'new states'. The flaw did not 
appear to lie with the state apparatus which, with the exception of Guinea and 
the former Belgian Congo, had been transferred in relatively good working 
order. The real source of danger was believed to lie in the fissiparous character of 
'traditional' structures. On the one hand, the economies of Africa were divided 
into small modem enclaves and large subsistence sectors. On the other hand, 
writers observed that loyalties were usually vested in the clan, the village and the
12
'tribe' rather than the nation.^ If ’tradition’ was the problem, then the 
’modernization’ of social, economic and political structures was perceived as the 
solution. The task of political science lay in establishing the synchrony of these 
interlocking processes. Writers like Huntington and Apter, for example, 
pondered the political stresses created by the breakdown of traditional society 
and the emergence of new social categories.^
The newly independent regimes often located their objectives within a similar 
framework. One justification for the creation of the one-party state was that it 
was supposed to fence off arenas in which ethnic appeals might be exploited. 
Another was that it enabled energies to be channelled into the resolution of 
pressing developmental issues. Not every observer swallowed the bait, but many 
were prepared to give modernizing regimes the benefit of the doubt. Similarly, 
African governments often expressed a desire to accelerate the process of 
economic development. As Killick has shown, the Nkrumah regime received the 
advice of many eminent development economists who believed that a ’big push’ 
was essential for the achievement of self-sustained development. ^  In the 
absence of other sources of capital, it fell upon the state to invest directly in 
production, and especially in manufacturing which was regarded as the motor of 
economic development.
By the end of the first decade, disappointment with the record of African regimes 
led to closer scrutiny of the claims that had been made on their behalf. One-party 
states were shown to be no more stable, given the incidence of military takeovers, 
or any less prone to the strains of ethnicity. The Convention People's Party was a 
paradigmatic case. Following the evaporation of the party in the wake of the 1966 
coup, analysts began to question whether it had ever really enjoyed mass 
support. The assessment was that the CPP had always been a 'rag-bag' of local 
interests, which had been bound to the centre primarily through expectations of 
patronage. As soon as competitive politics was suspended, the ruling party 
ceased to lubricate local networks and thereby forfeited much of its popular
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a p p e a l . O n e  positive consequence of these revelations was that researchers 
momentarily revived an interest in the dynamics of community politics.*8 
Equally, the ambitious economic plans of the Nkrumah regime were subjected to 
a withering critique and their failings contrasted with the 'economic miracle' in 
neighbouring C6te d'Ivoire.*"*
During the 1970s, mounting disillusionment fostered a concern with the 
pathologies of state power. Since the same errors were endlessly repeated, it 
seemed appropriate to search for structural determinants of political action. The 
ascendancy of neo-Marxist dependency theory was one result of the intellectual 
re-tooling that took place. Proponents of this approach began by taking issue 
with the central tenets of modernization theory. They argued that the persistence 
of traditional society was a myth given the prolonged penetration of global 
capitalism, and that the real barriers to economic and political integration were 
imposed by external dependency. On the one hand, unequal exchange and/or 
the domination of foreign capital foreclosed the options for autonomous 
development. On the other hand, dependency promoted the sedimentation of a 
comprador class around the apparatus of the state, which was positioned so as to 
cream off a portion of the surplus that was externally expropriated. Issa Shivji 
punctured much of the enthusiasm for the Tanzanian brand of state socialism, 
when he depicted the Arusha Declaration not as a victory for peasants and 
workers, but for a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'.*^ Although there was some debate 
concerning the progressive potential of the African 'petite bourgeoisie', the 
consensus was that it had so far shown itself incapable of exerting its autonomy 
from international capital.*8 A by-product of the debate over the post-colonial 
state was the re-interpretation of ethnicity. Anthropology had already 
demonstrated that 'tribes' were not primordial givens, but were often created 
amidst the insecurity of the urban environment.*'7 Radical political economy 
pursued the point, arguing that 'tribalism' was an appeal which was often 
exploited by sections of the aspirant class in the heat of battle for mastery of the 
state.*8 This explanation worked most convincingly for Nigeria, in which context
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it was also deployed by mainstream political scientists.^ The implication was 
that the threat to national unity issued less from the inner logic of social 
structures than from the nature of the post-state and the class that controlled it.
Towards the end of the decade, the persuasive value of the dependency 
paradigm began to wane, while neo-classical political economy staged a revival. 
The Berg Report, commissioned by the World Bank, set the tone when it 
maintained that the African crisis was a consequence of injudicious policy 
choices rather than the iniquities of the world econom y.^ Yet this did not 
explain the recurrence of ill-chosen policies, a conundrum which Robert Bates set 
out to solve. On the premise that adverse pricing policies accounted for the weak 
performance of African agriculture, Bates re-examined the interests which were 
serviced by the s ta te d  He concluded that the coalition of forces which had 
assumed power at the time of independence helped condition the subsequent 
orientation of the state. In Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire, where the ruling party had 
firm roots in the countryside, government policy tended to protect rural 
producers. But in most cases, where the hub of political activity was in the towns, 
there was tendency towards urban bias. Apart from their own interests, such 
regimes were more likely to capitulate to urban demands for cheap food and 
employment, which necessitated the manipulation of agricultural prices. In a 
separate article, which is in some tension with this thesis, Bates broached the 
question of ethnicity. Treading some familiar ground, he linked its incidence to 
competition for resources which were often concentrated around the apparatus 
of the s ta te d  The similarity between the writings of Bates and the dependency 
school are in some ways striking. Whereas their predecessors had regarded 
traditional society as the immovable obstacle, they both located divisive 
tendencies at the level of the state.
In the course of the 1980s, the ground shifted yet again. This time, the context 
was a deflation of the Ivorian and Kenyan success stories and a marked 
deterioration of the political and economic environment across the rest of the
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continent. The state appeared a less convincing villain, as African societies 
appeared to re-assert their autonomy from the centre. A turning point was the 
re-interpretation of the Tanzanian experience by Goran H y d e n . 23 His central 
thesis was that the peasants had never properly been captured since they had 
never been separated from control of land. This meant that they could reproduce 
themselves autonomously of the state. Hyden claimed that repeated efforts to 
control peasant production in Tanzania had been stymied by a withdrawal into 
an economy of affection. More provocatively, he asserted that the task facing 
African regimes of all ideological persuasions was remarkably similar, namely to 
fully subordinate the peasants to new relations of production.^ Since the 
publication of these views, much attention has focussed on the ability of Africans 
to exercise their 'exit option' In a comparison of, Ghana and Guinea, for 
example, Azarya and Chazan map out different levels of disengagement from the 
state: ranging from suffer-manage strategies and physical migration to the 
creation of parallel economies and enclosure within alternative institutions.^ 
Jean-Frangois Bayart has retained the state as focus of attention, but has 
nevertheless stressed the frailty of its control.^ He describes the creation of a 
'political space' over which those who rule seek to assert their hegemony. At 
different times, African societies (occupying a multiplicity of 'time-spaces') 
engage with, challenge or disengage from the state as it suits them. The most 
extreme position has been advanced by Jackson and Rosberg, who argue that it is 
only the norms of international relations, which are unsympathetic to secessionist 
movements and positively hostile to territorial aggrandizement, that have 
ensured the survival of African boundaries in their present form. 28
Although the revisionist literature exudes an air of novelty, in key respects it 
denotes a reversion to earlier models of African politics. For example, in a more 
recent article, Hyden has insisted on the survival of a peasant mode (read 
'traditional society'), characterized by the production of use- rather than 
exchange-values.29 He has also assimilated ethnicity to his usage of the moral 
economy concept, so that 'tribes' are once again rendered as refractions of a
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peasant consciousness.^® And in the final analysis, his advocacy of the market as 
a means to capture the peasantry bears more than a passing resemblance to a 
central tenet of the modernization school.^ Hyden is by no means alone. The 
discrete 'time-spaces' occupied by African societies within the Bayart model also 
have a familiar ring to them.
Where recent accounts differ is, of course, in denying the capacity of the state to 
integrate atomized social segments. An uneasy feeling that some vital joints have 
been unscrewed partly explains an ambivalence towards current processes. 
Although one can detect a hint of satisfaction that the state has finally been put in 
its place, political scientists cannot easily forget a fundamental precept which has 
reigned supreme since the time of Thomas Hobbes, namely that the state 
f performs essential functions.^ Yet, many of the concerns derive from the logic of 
' the model as much as they do from reality. Indeed a fundamental problem is that 
the debate has tended to outstrip the empirical evidence. Those countries which 
seem in worst shape are the least likely to sustain effective research programmes 
or to receive close attention from expatriate scholars anxious to achieve optimal 
results during a sabbatical break.
In spite of the significance attributed to parallel economies, the present literature
raises more questions than it answers. What it does invalidate is the notion that
peasants are incorrigibly wedded to subsistence. Producers who carry cash crops
(such as cocoa, coffee and groundnuts) across borders and who stock up with
scarce consumer items are surely not exhibiting a marked preference for
use-values. The difficulty comes with interpreting the virulence of hoarding,
smuggling and the black market more generally. From one angle, the latter may
be seen as a direct challenge to the state and often the boundaries which it seeks
to uphold. This approach is exemplified by Azarya and Chazan:
"Our contention is that, in most instances, these activities are 
construed in the eyes of the actors as responses to government 
policies and not to general, economic, social or physical forces."1^
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This is not the only possible construction. If the state is as remote as is sometimes 
claimed, then peasants are likely to regard smuggling simply as going about their 
business. To suggest otherwise, assumes that peasants accept the pretensions of 
the central authorities. The fact of the matter is that smuggling has been subjected 
to so little close research that it is difficult at this stage to make many 
generalizations.^
Of course, when illegal actions are carried openly and repeatedly, then central 
authority may be held up to ridicule. Yet it should not be assumed that an 
inability to enforce price controls or to check smuggling is a sign of uniform 
weakness, or that anybody reads it as such. Surveillance is often the thing that 
African states are good at. Thus Bayart quotes one Zairian official as follows:
"If, despite the crisis, there is one thing that is in good working
order, that is our intelligence service!*35
Furthermore, it is difficult to disentangle the workings of the second economy 
from the activities of the state. Janet MacGaffey argues that the second economy 
in Zaire has furnished opportunities for accumulation outside of the state, but is 
also quite clear that access to the state confers special advantages.5  ^Similarly, 
Kasfir has observed the close association between magendo and the vagaries of 
power in Uganda.5^ What emerges from his critique of Green is precisely how 
little is known about the ubiquitous parallel economy.
Secondly, little attention has been paid to the consequences of state decay for the 
preservation of national unity. Although Hyden forecasts a heightening of ethnic 
cleavage, the logic of earlier research suggests the opposite as the state becomes a 
less exciting prize.55 Nevertheless, a retreat into a plethora of local arenas merely 
replaces the spectre of ethnic confrontation with the equally worrying prospect of 
steady fragmentation. But once again, the evidence for withdrawal is surprisingly 
limited. Chazan has applied an exit model to Ghana, but without tabling any 
substantial empirical support. Given that an earlier corpus of local studies 
exposed a dependence upon the state, it is as well to exercise caution. Part Two of 
this thesis will present evidence that is at some variance with her interpretation.
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One of the attractions of the Bayart model, apart from the fact that it is extremely 
open-ended, is that it reconciles aspects of the revisionist interpretation with the 
'statish' realities encountered by the average researcher. Bayart quietly restores 
an element of social cohesion into the equation through the concept of civil 
* ' . This refers to a matrix of institutions which exist outside of and in an
business groups and a range of voluntary associations, each with their own 
priorities and modes of discourse. Although Bayart suspects that civil society is 
currently too fractured to set the agenda, it is significant that he portrays African 
political systems as substantially greater than the sum of their communal parts. 
This begs the crucial question of where civil society began.
At this juncture, one is back at the point where political scientists parted 
company with Kimble. Over the past thirty years, a fascination with ethnic 
diversity and local particularity has obscured the extent to which Africans also 
participate in national communities. These are reproduced through the 
operations of the state but also through civil society. This includes the press, 
radio, churches, schools, banks, the postal system, and - not to be under­
estimated - the national football league. The implication is that an erosion of 
state power need not of itself portend the fracturing of society, at least in the 
short term. In countries where development is fairly evenly spread, the level of 
cohesion is likely to be that much greater, not least because regional elites will 
have an equivalent stake in the nation. Yet it would be wrong to be assume that 
national consciousness is the exclusive preserve of these elites. Two researchers 
who enquired into identity along an 'artificial' West African frontier recently 
concluded:
"That national identity is at least as important in the Nigeria-Niger 
border region of Hausaland as ethnic identity makes plain that 
recent reports of the death of the African state are indeed 
premature. ^
ambivalent relationship to the state It embraces the churches, trade unions,
Ghana has occupied a special place in academic debate over the decades, having 
undergone the whole gamut of experiences. Ghana has spawned elections, coups,
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a mutiny and a short-lived revolution. It has also enjoyed years of comparative 
prosperity, a longer period of acute economic hardship and a more recent period 
of painful reconstruction. The fabric of the nation and even the structures of the 
state have somehow endured all of this without a serious threat of breakdown. 
This thesis aims to shed some light upon this reality, using an approach that is 
distinctive in three respects. First of all, it takes the form of a case-study from the 
Volta Region. When so much basic documentation is unobtainable, local evidence 
is an essential means both of reconstructing the past and making sense of the 
present. As far as possible, an attempt has been made to straddle the divide 
between macro- and micro-levels of analysis. A great deal of local material which 
has no wider political significance has reluctantly been omitted. Yet this cuts both 
ways, since viewing politics through a local prism requires one to screen out 
events which might nevertheless be considered of importance on a national 
canvas. Secondly, this is an exercise in political economy in the sense that it deals 
not only with modes of consciousness, but also with the material conditions 
which have given rise to them. Finally, the thesis adopts a fairly long-term 
historical perspective, for the obvious reason that both identities and structures 
are forged over decades rather than months or even years. It remains at this 
juncture to say something more about the area of research.
1.2. The Scope of Research
1.2.1. The Locality
At the time of defining a research topic, it was necessary to isolate a region for 
closer study. The Volta Region was the obvious candidate, since it has long been 
regarded as the soft underbelly of the Ghanaian state. Like most other African 
frontiers, the border with Togo bisects a number of ethno-linguistic zones, the 
most well-known of which is populated by the Ewe. Over time, the Ewe seemed 
more willing than most to question the legitimacy of this 'line drawn on a map'. 
Furthermore, the Region has acquired some notoriety (largely undeserved) for
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the proliferation of smuggling activity. Finally, the Volta Region has been 
subjected to comparatively little research by comparison with Ashanti or even 
the North.
The selection of a case-study proved less straightforward. After three months 
based in Accra, punctuated by visits to the Region, Likpe was identified as the 
most suitable location for field research. The final decision owed something to 
accident as well as to design. National security was a sensitive issue towards the 
end of 1985, which made it inadvisable to display too avid an interest in the 
border. Since Mate is not only a border village but also the headquarters of Likpe 
Traditional Area, research at this site was less likely to arouse suspicion. 
Buem-Borada would have served almost as well, and indeed a comparative 
study seemed briefly to have its merits, but the excellent research environment in 
Likpe finally settled the matter. A second reason was that, in the course of 
examining the daily newspapers for 1983, Likpe surfaced in reports and 
editorials in connection with smuggling. This hinted at promising material for 
closer research. Finally, Likpe possessed added interest by virtue of the public 
figures it has produced. During the 1970s, Major-General Utuka was a prominent 
member of the Supreme Military Council. At the time of writing, both the 
Foreign Secretary, Dr, Obed Asamoah, as well as the Vice-Chairman of the 
opposition Movement for Freedom and Justice, Ray Kakrabah-Quarshie, come 
from Likpe. At an early stage, it was realized that the careers of these local sons 
might serve as a device by which to trace the links between centre and 
community through time.
The choice also harboured its problems. Although Likpe is a cocoa growing 
community (an important consideration when it came to estimating levels of 
cross-border traffic), it is not strictly-speaking part of Eweland. Other Ghanaians 
tend to perceive the Volta Region as populated by an Ewe majority in the south 
and an Akan minority in the north. But the ethnographic map is considerably 
more convoluted than that. In the second decade of this century, R.S. Rattray
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identified a number of splinter groups He observed that some of these 
originated in the Gold Coast, while others were indigenous. Diedrich 
Westermann subsequently referred to the latter as Togo remnant groups', 
implying that they were autocthonous, unlike the Ewe who had migrated 
westwards from Notsie in the early eighteenth century.^ In practice, linguistic 
categories and oral traditions are often at odds with each other, Kropp Dakubu 
and Ford list the following Ghanaian languages as part of the Central Togo 
cluster (the preferred term): Adele, Lefana/Lelemi (Buem), Sekpele (Likpe), Siwu 
(Lolobi and Akpafu), Sele (Santrokofi) and Bowiri.^ Yet Rattray recorded that 
the Buem-Lefana originated in Ashanti, the Bowiri in Cape Coast and the Likpes 
in Atebubu. The reality is that, while some groups like the Akpafu appear largely 
autocthonous, most are an amalgam of peoples who entered the region at 
different times. Distinct traces survive in the form of dialect variations and the 
diverse oral traditions of individual clans and villages.^ These minorities, which 
have scarcely been noticed by modern researchers,^ are quite distinct from their 
larger Akan and Ewe neighbours. Some of the minorities that are interspersed 
with the Ewe (the Agotime, Avatime, Logba, Nyangbo and Tafi) have absorbed 
cultural influences from their neighbours. Others which are located north of 
Hohoe (Likpe, Akpafu, Buem-Lefana, Bowiri, Lolobi and Nkonya) have been less 
affected by the Ewe, but substantially so nonetheless.
What began as a research snag soon developed into an important sub-theme of 
the research. Together, the Bakpele (the name which Likpe people prefer) and the 
other minorities have been numerous enough to help direct the course of political 
development in the Region. Yet they have barely been mentioned in previous 
studies. This thesis aims therefore to fill a gap. Individually, these minorities are 
too small to stand alone and have therefore tended to associate with larger ethnic 
blocs. The quite startling shifts of identity over time provide valuable insights 
into the political economy of ethnicity. In particular, they illustrate the situational 
(as opposed to primordial) character of African ethnicity which has been so well 
documented by Crawford Young with specific reference to Zaire.^6
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Table 1.1:
Profile of the Volta Region Minorities
Name Place of Origin Numbers in 1960
Agotime Adangbe n.a.*
Akpafu indigenous 5,370
Avatime Ahanta 7,920
Bowiri Cape Coast 3,280
Lefana (Buem) Ashanti 15,900
Likpe Atebubu 7,140
Logba indigenous 2,090
Nkonya Accra/Cape Coast 11,050
Nyangbo Aburi 1,940
Santrokofi indigenous 2,230
Tafi indigenous 1,350
* Note: the census figures include Agotime with the figures for the 
Adangbe as a whole, who numbered 237,440 in 1960.
(Source: M.B.K. Darkoh, "A Note on the Peopling of the Forest 
Hills of the Volta Region of Ghana", Ghana Notes and Queries. XI,
1970; D. Smock and A. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism, p.283)
Likpe Traditional Area comprises ten villages: Mate, Bala, Avedzeme, Todome, 
Bakwa, Agbozome, Koforidua, Kukurantumi, Abrani and Nkwanta. The first 
four represent early settlements, the second four represent more recent 
breakaways, while Nkwanta is a stranger village. Until comparatively recently, 
the chief of Mate was simultaneously the Paramount Chief (or Okakple), but a 
separate Matehene has since been created. Each of the original settlements has its 
own wing chief, who is formally senior to the sub-chiefs of the newer villages. 
The chief of Bakwa, who comes under the wing of the Todome chief, in turn 
appoints an odikro to manage the affairs of Nkwanta. All of the chiefs are entitled 
to sit on the Likpe Traditional Council, which has few formal powers but serves 
as a clearing house for matters of mutual concern. The political structure of Likpe 
is notionally pyramidal, but in reality power is highly dispersed - a point that 
will be underlined in the body of this thesis. This is as true of the individual
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villages, where the incumbent chief has to strike an accord with the asafoatse 
(leader of the youngmen) and the dan heads. Likpe has always been 
administered as part of a more extensive administrative unit. District boundaries 
have been a bone of contention and have undergone many alterations over time.
Most of the Bakpele claim affiliation to either the Roman Catholic or the 
Evangelical Presbyterian Church, each of which traces its roots back to the era of 
German colonial rule. With the exception of the Likpe Secondary School, all the 
village schools are managed by one of these churches with assistance from 
central government. Most recently Likpe, like much of Ghana, has witnessed a 
proliferation of smaller religious sects which cater to the unfulfilled spiritual 
needs of their flock. Yet the comparative wealth of the established churches, 
especially the Catholics, has ensured their continuing relevance to members of 
the community.
The economy of Likpe has been dominated by the fluctuating fortunes of one 
crop - cocoa - which has provided the means through which the Bakpele have 
satisfied a thirst for consumer goods and for education. The spread of cocoa has 
fundamentally transformed patters of food production and consumption, with a 
steady displacement of yams and rice by less nutritious cassava. Cocoa has also 
brought an influx of labourers from Togo and even further afield. Cocoa has also 
boosted the fortunes of Hohoe as the leading commercial centre, a fact which is 
not always popular, The Bakpele villages are connected to Hohoe by means of 
dirt roads that pass through east and west Likpe en route to Kute and Jasikan. 
Those who need to visit the hospital (there is a clinic in Bakwa), or to purchase 
goods travel to Hohoe rather than to Jasikan, which is smaller and less accessible. 
Although the Ewe speaking villages on the Togolese side of the border are not 
cognate, circumstances have often encouraged trade and even marriage across 
the frontier. This has ensured the salience of the boundary to government and 
people alike.
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Table 1.2:
The Population of Likpe in 1970
Settlement Village Neighbouring Farms Total
Abrani 1,254 745 1,990
Agbozome 942 - 942
Avedzeme - - -
Bakwa 1,156 67 1,223
Bala 1,170 88 1,258
Koforidua 549 59 608
Kukurantumi 1,420 - 1,420
Mate 2,069 - 2,069
Nkwanta 377 1,201 1,578
Todome 454 264 718
Total: 9,391 2,424 11,815
(Source: Ghana, 1970 Population Census of Ghana)^
1,2.2. Methodology and Structure
In the course of research, a wide range of written and oral sources was consulted. 
Before embarking on fieldwork, and on return from Ghana, extensive use was 
made of United Nations records covering the Togoland Trust Territory as well as 
the relevant Colonial Office files. Both of these sources (which have been utilized 
by previous researchers on the unification movement) provide valuable 
information on the high politics of the pre-independence period. But they convey 
little of the atmosphere of the area. Within Ghana, both the Accra archives and 
the Regional archives in Ho contain a wealth of more locally specific data. 
Unfortunately, the official record peters out around 1960, around which time files 
ceased being deposited in the Archives. It was, however, possible to substitute 
other sources of data, many of which have been little used. Documents housed at 
the Stool Lands Boundary Settlement Commission and with the Ministry of
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Agriculture in Ho furnished information on the Regional economy. Only a 
fraction of the material has entered the text. A thoroughly unexpected source of 
data was the personal archive of Nana Soglo Alio III who has kept copies of 
correspondence with District and Regional authorities for two decades. There is 
perhaps no clearer symbol of the continuing relevance of the state than these 
collections of neatly filed letters. Although I did not receive complete access to 
these files, the information that was gleaned was most useful. Finally, it was 
possible to reconstruct certain events through a close reading of the national 
press.
Most of the one-year period actually spent in Likpe (out of a total of fifteen 
months) was devoted to interviews with chiefs, political activists and ordinary 
men and women. The object was to probe attitudes towards smuggling, the 
boundary and national politics, as well as to elicit details concerning the local 
economy. Most interviews were conducted with specific questions in mind but 
remained fairly open-ended.^ Towards the end of the research, a questionnaire 
was devised in order to draw on a wider pool of people. After a trial run, which 
required the rephrasing or omission of certain questions, 320 individuals were 
interviewed. Following the exclusion of part of the batch, for a variety of reasons, 
291 responses remained. These provide a reasonably comprehensive picture of 
the political and economic history of the community. The results have been 
deployed mostly as supporting evidence in pursuit of specific lines of argument. 
Due to government sensitivity, it was unfortunately impossible to conduct 
similar research on the Togolese side of the frontier.
The thesis divides into three sections. These demarcate distinct phases in Bakpele 
history, but also correspond more or less accurately to the trajectory of the 
Ghanaian state^Part One spans a period from the end of the Second World War 
until 1969 and examines the factors that lay behind the emergence and the 
eventual demise of the Togoland unification movement. Part Two analyses the 
impact of the crisis upon Likpe during the 1970s and catalogues the variety of
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individual and collective responses to personal hardship and collective 
disappointment. Part Three covers the efforts of the Rawlings regime to establish 
a new modus vivendi between the state and rural society in the period between 
1982 and the end of 1986.
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(26.8%) was the lowest in the country where the average increase was 42.6%. 
What is more surprising is that Biakoye recorded a meagre increase of 14.7%, 
Since there is no evidence of a falling birth rate or abnormal rates of infant 
mortality, the most likely explanation is a high rate of out-migration - even in 
spite of the urban crisis and the Nigerian expulsions of 1983.
48. Unfortunately, many of the transcripts were stolen along with other research 
materials in 198b.
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Fart One: The Integration of British Togoland, 1945-1969
As a geographical entity and as a focus of national identification Ghana is, like 
most other African states, a fabrication of the colonial period. At the time of 
independence in 1957, national unity appeared characteristically fragile, even if 
state structures were credited with a greater degree of efficacy than in most of 
Africa. British Togoland had been appended most recently (some preferred 
'annexed') in controversial circumstances. The Volta Region, comprising 
Southern Togoland and Gold Coast Eweland, was therefore the part of the 
country which seemed most likely to peel off at a later date. In spite of the 
travails of modern Ghana, this has never come to pass. In order to understand 
the resilience of national structures, it is important to pay close attention to the 
historical record. Much as the ability of some buildings to survive an earthquake 
is related to the design and the materials used, so African states bear the imprint 
of their colonial architects and builders. Part One of this thesis therefore traces 
the processes through which the former United Nations Trust Territory was 
integrated with the Gold Coast colony. The evidence from Likpe is used at times 
to illustrate the broader trends and at other times to capture the nuances. Chapter 
Two takes a fresh look at the political economy of the Togoland unification 
movement. Chapter Three follows this up with an analysis of unification politics 
in Likpe and it environs. Chapter Four deals with the eclipse of the unification 
movement during the 1960s, thus setting the scene for Part Two.
Chapter Two:
"So Much For Mandates!": The Political Economy of the Togoland Unification
Movement Revisited:
In the mid-1950s, the apparently smooth transition of the Gold Coast towards 
independence was interrupted by the formation of regionally-based parties 
demanding constitutional safeguards against the centralizing tendencies of the 
Convention People's Party (CPP). The Ashanti-based National Liberation 
Movement (NLM), the Northern People's Party (NPP) and the Togoland
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Congress (TC) forged an alliance, which continued briefly after independence in 
the form of the United Party. The TC had a wider range of options available to it 
than its allies by virtue of the special status of Togoland as a United Nations 
Trust Territory. It could legitimately insist on complete separation from the Gold 
Coast or limit itself to campaigning for a federal constitution. The focus shifted 
over time. Although the TC aspired to a position of leadership throughout the 
Trust territory, its support was effectively limited to Southern Togoland. In the 
northern sector, the NPP managed to entrench itself on either side of a nominal 
frontier with the Northern Territories. However much the NPP feared southern 
domination, and despite its participation in the opposition front, its over-riding 
concern was to avoid repartitioning the North, The TC was, by contrast, 
ambivalent on the desirability of maintaining links with the Gold Coast.
This first Chapter reappraises the origins and inspirations of the unification 
movement. Firstly, it exposes some of the objective factors that underpinned 
conflicting perceptions of where the best interests of the territory lay. It then 
proceeds to examine the political dynamics of the movement and the challenge 
posed to it by the CPP in the 1950s. The primary focus is upon the domestic 
political arena rather than the complex manoeuvring within the United Nations 
which has been central to previous accounts.* Furthermore, the Chapter is 
interpretative and therefore omits some of the dense narrative detail which has 
been displayed elsewhere.^
2.1. British Policy Towards Togoland, 1920-1939
The manner in which the British approached their mandate in Togoland 
(following the expulsion of Germany during the First World War) left an 
indelible imprint on the territory. Whereas they could have treated Togoland as a 
distinct unit, they chose instead to divide into into a Northern and a Southern 
section, each of which was then appended to an existing administrative unit of 
the Gold Coast. The six Northern districts that were created by Proclamation in 
1923 were placed under the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories.^ In
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the south, the Ho District and the Kpandu sub-District were placed under the 
Commissioner of the Eastern Province. This disrupted many of the links that 
already existed between north and south and placed an obstacle in the way of 
latter moves towards reunification.
From the British point of view, such an arrangement was the most economical, a 
consideration which was always weighed heavily on the 'official mind'. But 
sections of the local administration also harboured greater designs. These can be 
traced back to British interest in this part of West Africa in the late nineteenth 
century. An expanding sphere of influence had been rudely threatened by the 
German declaration of a protectorate over Lom6 and its hinterland in 1884. The 
ensuing competition for territory was ultimately resolved without recourse to 
conflict. Britain agreed to relinquish her claims over the Ewe divisions of Krepi in 
return for gains elsewhere under the Heligoland Treaty of 1890.4 Subsequent 
competition in the north ended in 1899 when Britain and Germany partitioned 
the neutral zone that they had agreed on eleven years previously. Although the 
eastern boundary of the Gold Coast had been amicably settled, there was some 
disquiet about the northern sector where the frontier split the Mamprussi, Gonja 
and Dagomba peoples and assigned Yendi, the capital of Dagbon, to the German 
sphere.
The outbreak of the First World War and the joint Anglo-French invasion of 
German Togoland presented a fresh opportunity to redraw the boundaries. The 
allies agreed on a preliminary division for the duration of the War, which was 
favourable to the Gold Coast. In the north, the whole of Dagomba was placed 
under British jurisdiction, as was most of Eweland and the capital of Lom£ in the 
south. Any permanent claim which Britain might wish to stake was strengthened 
by demonstrations of support from the local inhabitants. A Foreign Office report 
recorded the 'joyful greeting' which was extended to the British forces when they 
entered Yendi, together with the request from the Ya Na that the Dagomba 
people be reunified under the British flag.^ Similar expressions of loyalty issued
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from the Ewe commercial elite of Lom£. In 1914 Governor Clifford of the Gold 
Coast regarded these gestures as useful ammunition to be deployed 
subsequently in support of British claims. He wrote that:
"It should be noted for future reference that any attempt once more 
to divide the Dagomba country in a manner which is opposed to 
the ethnological distribution of the native population will be keenly 
resented by the chiefs and people both in the Northern Territories 
and in the Sansanne-Mangu district of Togoland. The foregoing 
remark applies with equal force to the feelings of the natives in the 
Peki and Misahohe districts and to the Awuna population of the 
Keta and Lomeland districts."6
At the end of the War, the Gold Coast authorities had to settle for less than 
Clifford considered desirable. The acquisitions in the north were made safe, but 
there were limits to the claims that could be advanced since Britain required 
French acquiescence to her designs in East Africa. Furthermore, Togoland was 
regarded within the Foreign Office as of little intrinsic v a lu e / The French, on the 
other hand, claimed a pressing need for Lome because their existing port 
facilities at Cotonou were inadequate. The Lom£ merchants and Chambers of 
Commerce in Britain warned that a further partition of Eweland would cause 
intolerable hardship and resentment amongst the local population/ In the event, 
wider strategic considerations prevailed and the Milner-Simon Agreement of 
July 1919 assigned much of Eweland, including Lom£ and the commercial centre 
of Palim£, to France. Eminent public figures in Britain and the Commander of the 
British Forces in Togoland lobbied for abrogation of the Agreement. Yet with the 
exception of some minor boundary adjustments, the act of partition survived 
intact until a renewed challenge was mounted in the 1940s/
The Anglo-French Agreement was followed by the award of League of Nations 
'B' Mandates in July 1921. The principle behind the Mandates was one of 
trusteeship rather than outright territorial acquisition. Nevertheless, the local 
authorities regarded the new administrative arrangements as a convenient device 
to eliminate a frontier that should never have been erected in the first place. This 
was particularly true of the north where pre-colonial ties were consciously
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resurrected. In the south, it was doubtful whether the Ewe had ever thought of
themselves as a single people. If they had, the 1919 partition was manifestly
iniquitous. Yet the authorities were keen to stake out a moral claim to the parts of
Southern Togoland that they had recently acquired. The Government
anthropologist, R.S. Rattray, investigated a Peki claim to have exercised
leadership over the other Krepi divisions in pre-colonial times. Since Peki
belonged with the Gold Coast, this might justify integration with the colony. The
Peki case was repudiated by most of the Ewe communities and the minorities of
British Togoland. Rattray was nevertheless able to make a case on the evidence
that the Krepi divisions had once accepted British flags and had concealed them
during the period of German rule. His report concluded on a confident note:
"The case for our right, politically and morally, to take over this part 
of Togo is in the opinion of the compiler of this short treatise, a 
strong one. iU
If such a right did exist, then Britain was also justified in treating her section of 
Togoland on a virtual par with her colonial possessions. The Permanent 
Mandates Commission accepted the merits of administrative union with the Gold 
Coast and thereafter asked few questions beyond demanding an annual report 
on social and economic conditions in the territory.
British colonialism was notoriously parsimonious and the Gold Coast was no 
exception, even though the Guggisberg years produced a temporary burst of 
activity. If the Mandated Territory was to be governed as a part of the Gold 
Coast, it was axiomatic that it should also contribute its share of the revenue. 
Since direct taxation was too difficult to administer and highly unpopular, most 
taxes would have to be derived from import and export duties. Despite French 
protests, therefore, the authorities insisted on interposing a customs barrier 
between British and French Togoland, accompanied by the full schedule of Gold 
Coast duties. At a stroke, trade between the eastern and western sectors of the 
former German colony was subjected to new tariffs. Many a community 
discovered that normal commercial intercourse had been redefined as smuggling 
virtually overnight. The Gold Coast authorities were not opposed to cross-border
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trade in principle. On the contrary, they coveted the revenue which the Customs 
Department might collect. For this reason, they sought to persuade the French to 
allow imports and exports to pass through Lome on concessionary terms. This 
was regarded as essential because, in the words of one Report,
"The outstanding feature of the country east of the Volta is that
from the standpoint of trade it faces eastwards."11
The authorities fully expected that the French railway and port facilities would 
continue to service the needs of southern Togoland, with the Gold Coast state 
merely creaming off taxes on exports and imported goods.
The eastward orientation was a legacy of German colonial rule. The Germans had 
embarked on an extensive programme of infrastructural development, central to 
which was the construction of a national rail network, in order to make their 
colony viable and indeed profitable. Between 1905 and 1911, Lome was linked to 
Anecho, Palime and Atakpam£ by three new railway lines. In addition, 760 miles 
of motorable roads were constructed between 1900 and 1914.1^ In 1884, the 
British and the Germans had agreed upon a common set of duties, but in order to 
finance development spending on this scale the Germans found it necessary to 
impose higher rates of duty in 1894. Gold Coast officials expressed satisfaction at 
the resultant increase in smuggling,1 ^  but the gamble eventually paid off. The 
total volume of trade expanded, while even the remoter parts of Togoland were 
drawn into a common commercial nexus centred on the railheads which were in 
turn tied to the port at Lom£. Communities in immediate proximity to the Palime 
railhead reputedly became so deeply immersed in the cultivation of cocoa and 
oil-palm that they virtually abandoned food cultivation.1"1 Indeed, Palime 
became the focal point for most of what became the Ho District in British 
Togoland.
The Gold Coast authorities were aware that the severance of Palime from its 
economic heartland threatened to make the railway unprofitable.1^ The French 
were therefore vulnerable to pressure. However, the Ho District was itself 
completely dependent upon the railway for the shipment of its cash crops and 
access to consumer goods. The early years of the Mandate were characterised by
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efforts on either side to expose and exploit the weaknesses of the other party. The 
French refused to grant a "bond-in-transit" to imports bound for British Togoland 
and imposed additional duties on cocoa, so as to pressure Britain into waiving its 
duties at the frontier. The impact of high French tariffs upon British Southern 
Togoland was most severe. Towards the end of 1921, Major Jackson, then the 
Commissioner of the Eastern Province wrote that:
"... if the present position of Togoland could be realized and 
compared with previous years, one could not deny the fact that the 
inhabitants of our zone, who always looked up to and wanted 
British Rule, are now faced with the fact that they are forced to pay 
20% more for their personal wants when procurable, and receive 
3 /- per load less for cocoa (due to the Export tax) or, in other 
words, are placed at a total disadvantage of 45% (taking the present 
price of cocoa at 12/- per load) in comparison with their kith and 
kin in the French Zone,"16
By 1922, Jackson was lamenting the fact that all but one of the firms had closed
their stores in British Togoland, preferring to let the farmers make their own way
to Palime as they invariably did,1^ There was, however, an overall decline of
production for the market, especially in Buem where the farmers no longer found
it worthwhile to harvest their cocoa. This in turn depressed state revenues, which
was precisely the opposite of what had been intended. The British authorities
were aware that the French could point to their discomfort as evidence for the
unviability of their section once divorced from the railway.1®
Some short-term relief arrived in 1923 when the French granted imperial 
preferences to cocoa from British Togoland. But the authorities were increasingly 
reluctant to pin their hopes on Palime. Borrowing a leaf from the German book, 
they built new roads from Ho to Adidome and Senchi, where ferries linked the 
Territory with the Gold Coast and thus reconnected Buem with an alternative 
market. In 1929, the Kpeve-Hohoe road was extended to Jasikan and Worawora, 
reaching Kadjebi in 1938. Thereafter, the emphasis shifted to the construction of 
feeder ro ad s .^  There were, however, narrow limits to the resources which the 
administration was prepared to commit towards closer economic integration 
with the Gold Coast. In 1922, Major Jackson spelled out the principle which was
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to determine policy throughout the period of the Mandate and later the 
Trusteeship:
"From the financial point [of view], the Mandated Area of Togoland 
is costing the Gold Coast a very large amount annually, whereas 
the Revenue is very small, therefore until such time as we introduce 
means of increasing Trade generally, it is not advisable to expend 
large amounts in Togoland which could with advantage be 
expended in other parts of the Colony."20
This statement echoes a famous dictum on the Northern Territories. The cocoa
growing areas of the Ashanti and the Western Province were felt to be more
deserving, whereas Captain C.C. Lilley (then the District Political Officer)
declared himself unimpressed by the efforts of the Buem cocoa farmers.2^
According to Kwaku, Togoland received only 0.4% of expenditure on Public
Works during the Governorship of Guggisberg, at a time when the basic
infrastructure of the Gold Coast was put in place.22 Herein lay a historic 'Catch
22': without more vigorous economic activity the authorities were reluctant to
spend money and yet it was difficult to open up the territory without a more
elaborate infrastructure. Typically, road construction lagged far behind the cocoa
frontier as it moved northwards: thus it was not until 1951 that the road to
Kadjebi was extended to the most productive areas of Papase and Ahamansu.
Despite the tight spending limits, some infrastructural development did help to 
reorientate the economy of southern Togoland. During the 1930s there was a 
rapid expansion of cocoa production in the Buem forests north of Jasikan, which 
stimulated a wider recovery. Trade also began to gravitate away from markets in 
French Togoland and towards the Gold Coast. As early as 1929, it was reported 
that development in the Ho District had virtually killed trade in P a lim e .2^ New 
commercial centres arose within the Territory, such as Jasikan, Kadjebi and most 
importantly Hohoe. By 1929, there were as many as nineteen expatriate 
commercial firms operating out of Hohoe, many of which were based in the Gold 
Coast.2^ There was also a plethora of petty traders and cocoa brokers, who 
penetrated the villages and spared the farmers the effort of travelling on foot to 
Palim£. At the same time, the cost of transporting produce to the latter became
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prohibitive, because lorries were forced to return empty as a result of double 
duties levied upon French imports.
As late as 1938, Captain Lilley, the District Commissioner credited with the most
intimate knowledge of Southern Togoland, asserted that it was only the
boundary that permitted rivals to Palim£ within the British sector:
"Should French and British Togo ever come again under one 
Government, Hohoe (like Kpedze) will lose all its importance as a 
commercial centre. Cocoa will go straight through Palim£ [railhead] 
where I am sure that Government will nave its inspection."25
This ignored the fact that by the 1930s a more organic relationship was
developing with the Gold Coast, even despite the absence of a bridge over the
Volta River. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show how the Gold Coast accounted for an
expanding share of commerce from British Togoland during the 1930s.
Table 2.1;
Cocoa Exports From British Togoland (tons)
Year Total Via Palime Via Gold Coast
1932 8,649 5,546 3,193
1933 6,956 5,227 1,729
1934 10,489 4,575 5,714
1935 13,722 7,958 5,764
1936 15,734 9,003 6,731
1937 12,316 3,668 8,648
1938 16,451 5,750 10,701
(Source: Colonial Office. Togoland Annual Reports, 1938, p.72)
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Table 2.2:
Produce Passing Over Senchi Ferry, 1931-38 (tons)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
2,058 5,187 4,627 6,883 6,633 8,064 9,970 12,258
(Colonial Office. Togoland Annual Reports, 1938, p.19)
Again, when food supplies from French Togoland were severed during the 
Second World War, Gold Coast traders were able to tap the markets east of the 
Volta so successfully that they spread food shortages to the Ho District as well. 
Thus, in 1945 it was reported that:
"Demands in coastal markets are so large that large quantities of 
foodstuffs from this district are exported almost every day to Keta,
Accra and Koforidua markets by local traders and others from 
other parts of the country,"26
As the bonds with the Gold Coast were drawn ever tighter, the economic
cohesion of the former German colony began to dissolve. This does not mean, of
course, that all trade over the frontier ceased. A substantial proportion of the
cocoa and coffee crops continued to be shipped legally through Palim£ into the
1950s because France continued to waive duties on cocoa imports from the two
Togolands. There was also a great deal of illicit trade which ebbed and flowed
depending on prevailing economic conditions. At one level, the recurrence of
smuggling can simply be interpreted as the survival of patterns of trade that
existed before 1919, but this risks oversimplification. It should also be noted that
partition made certain lines of trade profitable for the first time. British
restrictions on the importation of guns and spirits, for example, provided a ready
source of income for individuals who were prepared to risk smuggling these
items across the border from French Togoland, Furthermore, the very vitality of
the Senchi nexus opened up new opportunities for the trafficking of consumer
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goods into the French zone. The salient point, though, is that the territory now 
faced west.
Another aspect of British rule was that it facilitated more regular interaction 
between Togolanders and people from the Gold Coast. The German missionaries 
of the Bremen Mission had operated in both Gold Coast Eweland and southern 
Togo before 1914. After the war, the Bremen Mission was expelled and the 
United Free Church of Scotland assumed nominal control of its activities. After 
1927, the Ewe Presbyterian Church (E.P.C.), as it was renamed, was run entirely 
by Ewe Ministers and operated both in the Gold Coast and in the Trust 
T e r r i t o r y T h e  E.P.C. and the Catholic Church both provided a common 
framework within which believers in the Gold Coast and southern Togoland 
could interact. The Paris Mission, which carried out the work of the former 
Bremen Mission on the French side of the border, also maintained close relations 
with the E.P.C. The two met in a General Synod every three years, but the link 
was inevitably more distant than between the Gold Coast and British Togoland 
branches of the Ewe Church,
The British administration did not operate any schools of its own, and so 
depended on the churches to perform this function, although it offered a subsidy 
to those schools that complied with official guidelines. Southern Togoland had a 
total of 83 assisted and 37 non-assisted schools by the outbreak of the Second 
World War.2® It was not until 1950 that the Territory acquired its own secondary 
school, which meant that students wishing to further their education were forced 
to enrol in the Gold Coast. Those who acquired an education could then seek 
paid employment, occasionally in Government service but more commonly 
working for the trading firms. The creation of new Native Authorities in the 
1930s opened up fresh opportunities for those who had acquired a basic 
education. The Hohoe agent of John Holt at the time of the 1937/38 holdup laid 
the blame for peasant restiveness at the door of recent returnees:
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"Of course, the majority of the BMT chiefs are not intelligent, but 
there is always a power behind the Stool- either a Stool father who 
has been educated in Accra or a stranger occupying the post of 
Registrar to the Chief. These Registrars are clever and anti-white, 
belonging to the type of bush lawyer."2^
The first generation of Togolanders to be fully literate in English did indeed take
much of its political inspiration from the Gold Coast. Something similar was
happening in French Togoland, where the Government insisted on the use of
French at all levels in the educational structure. Steadily, the self-image of elites
on either side of the frontier began to diverge. Coleman captured this process
succinctly when he wrote that:
"the differences in policy of the Administering Authorities have 
operated over the past 40 years here as in other colonial territories 
to weaken or destroy whatever tenuous bonds were developed 
among the Togoland peoples as a result of the German experience... 
'Westernization' is a misnomer for the acculturation process; it 
would be far mare accurate to refer to 'Gallicization' and 
' Anglicization'
Of course, mobility was not confined to the semi-elite alone. Through the 1920s, it 
was still common for Togolanders to migrate in search of work on the Gold Coast 
cocoa farms, although increasingly the forests of Buem offered a paying 
alternative.^* Migration disseminated an awareness of prevailing conditions in 
the Gold Coast and the similarity of experiences.
During the 1930s, farmers staged a succession of cocoa holdups in the Gold Coast 
to protest against pooling agreements between the expatriate firms.^2 Whereas 
support for the 1930/31 holdup was limited, three years later the farmers in the 
territory organized their own action and in 1937/38 sales came to a virtual 
standstill. The latter holdup attracted the support of both farmers and brokers 
and was co-ordinated through the chiefs who communicated with their 
counterparts in the Gold C oast.^  Finally, the many Togolanders who were 
recruited at the time of the Second World War acquired a set of shared 
experiences with their Gold Coast counterparts which they fed back into the 
towns and villages of the Territory,
42
2.2, The Politics of Unification, 1939-1956
2.2.1. The Ewe Unification Phase
The role of the Second World War in the spread of African nationalism is a stock
theme in the historical literature. In the case under consideration, the conclusion
of the War was followed closely by demands for the reunification of the Ewe
people. Where the Ewe case differs is in its failure to respect territorial
boundaries. Reunification implied the removal of frontiers between the Ewe in
the Gold Coast, British Togoland and French Togoland. Thus, the movement
seemed to represent the triumph of pre-colonial solidarities over artificial
colonial boundaries. D.E.K. Amenumey and Claude Welch provide a more
nuanced interpretation, but they both see the movement as in some sense
'natural'. Amenumey makes the point that demands for Ewe reunification did not
date from the 1940s, but can be traced back to the original act of partition in 1890.
He cites Ewe protests against the division of 1919 as further evidence of an
incipient Ewe nationalism at this early s ta g e d  The fact that these protests later
subsided is attributed by Welch to Anglo-French co-operation which minimized
the real inconvenience of the frontier. In his view, all this changed when the
Vichy administration in Lome sealed the frontier with the Gold Coast and British
Togoland. The boundary then became a hindrance once again and stimulated the
formation of the first pan-Ewe political organization. Welch writes that:
"The wartime suffering of the Ewe of French Togoland hastened the 
growth of Ewe nationalism. The leading figure in the early 
development of the Ewe movement was Daniel Chapman, senior 
geography master at Prince of Wales College, Achimota. In January 
1945, C h ap m an  held a cocktail party at his nome attended by many 
prominent Ewe, in the course of which the possibility of assisting 
the Ewe of French Togoland arose... To bring wider publicity,
Chapman wrote the Ewe Newsletter, whose first issue appeared in 
May 1945."35
There is some independent support for this interpretation of events. Sylvanus 
Olympio, representing the All-Ewe Conference (AEC) at the United Nations
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Trusteeship Council in 1947, testified that this organization had been formed as a
response to hardships occasioned by the frontier, especially between 1940 and
1 9 4 2  36 gome border communities themselves complained to the United Nations
about harassment, as in the following petition from Fiokpu in French Togoland:
"Nos regrets c'est que la plus grande partie de nos terrains est dans 
la Zdne Anglaise sur laquelle nos plantations de cafe, de cacao, 
d'igname, ae manioc, de mais s'y trouvent. Par notre separation des 
douanes il nous est difficile d'y aller. Meme si nous apportons des 
nourritures, les douaniers nous saisissent et nous maltraitent. Pour 
cette cause nous ne voulons plus etre s6par6s par les limites, ni par 
les Douanes. Et ndtre desire est de supmimer les limites c'est-d-dire 
les Douanes du Mono jusqu'd la Volta. 37
It should be noted, however, that the border had a differential impact upon and
within Ewe communities. Those most adversely affected were larger traders and
lorry owners who had no option but to trade through official border posts.33
When the borders were closed or restrictions were placed on border movements,
their livelihoods were directly threatened. They also smarted under the exchange
controls which were imposed after the conclusion of the War. It comes as no
surprise, then, that the commercial elites were at the forefront of protests about
the frontier - as they had been in 1919. The frontier was almost certainly less of an
imposition upon the majority of rural people if only because it remained highly
porous. Thus, in 1949 one observer stated that:
"... it must be recalled that... the permeability of the frontier between 
the two Territories, together with the relaxations already 
introduced, is in fact greatly reducing the real inconveniences 
arising from the frontier.at least in so far as persons other than 
traders are concerned. "3y
The Anglo-French response to AEG complaints was to promise measures to 
alleviate the practical hardships that resulted from the frontier.^3 One such 
measure was the establishment of a Conventional Zone, which would have 
removed the customs frontier between the Togolands. A Working Party was set 
up in 1949 and travelled widely in the three territories, collecting opinions about 
the present state of the frontier and the possibilities of setting up such a Zone, 
What most struck members of the Working Party was how little the frontier
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really mattered as a physical obstacle. Hence the following note penned by a 
member of the Party, following a meeting with Anlo chiefs and citizens at Keta:
"They looked at the whole question from a political point of view 
instead of from a practical problem of customs frontiers. They are 
not really inconvenienced by the customs frontier?"41
Indeed, the Party was informed that there were many people who made a
livelihood from smuggling and who were in no rush to see the frontier removed:
"The Reverend Baeta mentioned that there were some Ewes who 
were interested in maintaining the present customs frontier because 
of the livelihood they made out of smuggling. One smuggler said to 
him. 'He hoped that the customs frontier would remain untiLhe had 
made sufficient profit to finish the house he was building.'"42
In the early 1950s, a range of imported goods was in short supply, such as
bicycles and iron sheets in French Togoland, which kept these interests alive.4^
The findings of the Working Party were confirmed a few years later by the 1953
United Nations Visiting Mission, which concluded that the Ewe unification issue
transcended concerns about the frontier:
"The Mission is of the opinion that the frontier problem is not an 
economic one, but is a political problem and the Mission is fully 
alive to the psychological effect which the existence of the 
boundary has created in the minds of the population.... In fact, the 
frontier problems are of secondary consideration and of no great 
significance. The real problem is that of the existence of the frontier, 
itself and will depend on the solution of the unification problem."44
Sylvanus Olympio also shed some light on the real objectives behind Ewe
unification when he rejected the Anglo-French proposals of 1947. His case was
that a weakening of frontier restrictions could never suffice because any
boundary between the Ewe would interfere with their aspiration to live as one
people:
"It does not solve the basic problem. In order to ensure the orderly 
and true progress of the Ewe country, we must have a common 
educational system, the same political organization throughout the 
land, and economic unity. This, in our opinion, can be brought 
about only by the complete unification of the country under 
oneadministration."4^
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This was a quintessentially nationalist statement, emphasizing the 'spirit' of the 
Ewe people rather than more mundane considerations. Arguably, the frontier 
was no less of a burden for that. The crux of the matter is whether the Ewe did 
indeed conceive of themselves as a single people: in other words, did such an 
'imagined community' in fact exist?
2.2.2, From Ewe to Togoland Unification
Sylvanus Olympio and the others conceded that a separate Ewe state would not 
be viable and that unification would have to take place within a more inclusive 
political framework. The AEC leadership was dominated by Anlo Ewes such as 
Daniel Chapman who believed that the solution lay in the union of French 
Togoland with the Gold Coast and the British Trust Territory. Typically, they 
envisaged Britain continuing as the administering power. This is significant 
because it reveals how deeply attached the Anlo leadership was to membership 
of the Gold Coast nation - a further reminder of the manner in which boundaries 
can create their own identities. Opinion in French Togoland was more divided. 
The position of the Comity de l'Unite Togolaise (CUT), led by Sylvanus Olympio, 
was close to that of the Anlo leaders. The CUT leaders had no liking for the 
French administration that had governed since 1919, but to satisfy some of their 
compatriots they declared themselves prepared to submit the choice of 
administering power to a plebiscite.^ This became the official policy of the AEC 
after 1949. The French for a time suspected the Ewe unification movement as a 
front for British expansionism, but once the latter had eschewed any interest in 
French Togoland, they narrowed their sights on the CUT.
A section of the elite which was pro-French formed a rival Parti Togolais du 
Progres (PTP) in 1946 and, with active French collusion, displaced the CUT from 
elective offices in the early 1950s. The PTP opposed the very principle of Ewe 
unification. The most it would accept was the reunification of the two Togolands, 
and even this was to be tolerated on condition that France was installed as the
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administering power. At first glance, the PTP stance may appear anachronistic, 
since it was no less Ewe than the CUT. Indeed Dr. Pedro Olympio, its leader, was 
the cousin of Sylvanus Olympio. It is more comprehensible once one takes into 
account that the constituency of the PTP comprised those who were most 
dependent on the French administration. Whereas wealthy traders gravitated to 
the CUT, the PTP attracted the civil servants and evolu£s more generally. Their 
greatest fear was that they might become a Francophone minority within a 
reunified Eweland, which would place them at an inherent disadvantage in the 
competition for employment. The Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord 
(UCPN), which was allied to the PTP, brought in the northern chiefly 
establishment. Apart from a desire to protect their own status, they had no 
interest in a further expansion of the Ewe population. After 1951, then, the 
environment in French Togoland was most unfavourable to the unification cause.
For our purposes, what is more significant is that the Ewe unificationists were 
also delivered a rebuff from within British Togoland. As early as 1943, a Togo 
Union had been formed to lobby the Resident Minister in West Africa about 
conditions in the Trust Territory. In 1947, a new Togoland Union (TU) was 
established in response to the growing debate over the fate of the Ewe and the 
two Togolands. Its stance was diametrically opposed to that of the AEC It 
advocated the reunification of the two Togolands, but strongly objected to any 
political arrangement that would include the Gold Coast Ewe, There were efforts 
to reconcile the AEC and the CUT with the TU on a number of occasions between 
1948 and 1950, but these were not successful.^ In 1950, the TU insisted that the 
AEC should be excluded from an enlarged Consultative Commission since its 
leaders were not natives of Togoland.^® The TU even went as far as to negotiate a 
short-lived agreement with the PTP in May 1950, which committed both of these 
parties to a common front against 'Ewe Tribal c o n s p ira c ie s 1. ^  Such behaviour 
earned the TU the accusation of treachery to the Ewe cause from no less a figure 
than Daniel Chapman.50
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The simplest explanation for the attitude of the TU would lie in the 
apprehensions of the non-Ewe minorities. As early as 1948, the signatures of the 
chiefs of Buem, Likpe, Avatime and Santrokofi are to be found on TU 
documents.5* However, Ewes were equally prominent in the party. The single 
most salient factor was the imprint of uneven development that had been left by 
the workings of the Mandate. Support for the TU arose not out of a sense of 
isolation from the Gold Coast, but from the very intimacy of contact. 
Significantly, discord first manifested itself openly in the institution which most 
symbolized the unity of the Ewe, namely the Ewe Presbyterian Church. In 1948, 
an attempt was made to unseat Reverend Christian Baeta from his position as 
Synod Clerk, on the grounds that he was channeling scholarships towards his 
fellow Anlo Ewes. At the same time, most Anlos and Pekis were voted out of 
office in the Ewe Presbyterian Teachers' U n io n .5^ Teachers from Togoland 
believed that postings and scholarships, which were necessary for people from 
the Territory to further their education outside, were being monopolized by 
people from the south. Gerald Awuma, who was especially active in the TU at 
this time, blamed his own dismissal from the Ho-Kpandu district education 
committee upon the machinations of the Gold Coast Ewe. His personal 
experiences reinforced his suspicion of a creeping southern invasion:
"All the key positions in the Government, the Schools, Commerce, 
and even the Native Administration, are filled with adventurers 
from Gold Coast Eweland, who, in nearly all cases, are so 
overbearing and intriguing. Should the inborn Togolander then be 
judged unreasonable when he rightly concludes that the Gold Coast 
Government, the Missionary Societies and the Merchant Houses 
seem to have conspired to support the Gold Coast Ewes in their 
intrigues and trickeiy to set up a Totalitarian Tyranny in Togoland 
and dominate, supplant and oppress the Togolander in his own 
home?"53
The earliest official accounts were unanimous in the view that the TU 
represented a small number of teachers and that it possessed merely nuisance 
value. By contrast, the AEC was accredited with a genuine following. Even the 
Anglo-French Memorandum of 1947 acknowledged that the AEC petitions 
represented the views of the mass of the Ewe people.5** This assessment was
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rapidly discredited. In some areas, it was the entry of the youngmen into politics 
which appears to have altered the balance. This happened in the vicinity of Ho in 
1950:
"Asogli has always been a stronghold of the All Ewe Conference, 
and the majority of the chiefs and elders in the State give their full 
backing to this party. The young men of Dome on the other hand 
began to give active support to the Togo Union two years ago and 
now the whole of Ho excepting Bankoe is nearly 100% Togo 
Union... In addition to this the young men from Dome have been 
very active in gaining supporters from amongst the Asafo in the 
outlying Divisions and as a result many of the young men in all the 
Divisions are actively opposed to the political opinionsof their 
Chiefs and elders."^
Elsewhere, it was the conversion of the Ewe chiefs which brought communities
into the TU fold, all but displacing the AEC from large areas of Togoland.
The success of the TU leaders lay in exploiting a range of political appeals. 
Amongst the most emotive was the memory of past Anlo treachery. In the 
eighteenth century, the Anlos had forged an alliance with Akwamu, both of 
which were client states of an ascendant Asante. The Akwamus had established 
an hegemony over the northern Ewe (or Krepi) chiefdoms and when Peki led 
them in a successful revolt between 1829 and 1834, the Anlos had come to the aid 
of their old ally.56 Shortly thereafter, the Buems and their neighbours rose in 
revolt against Kwahu Dukoman, another client state of Asante. In 1869, the 
Asante, Anlos, Akwamus and Kwahu Dukomans joined forces in a bid to restore 
control over Krepi and Buem during a train of events which culminated in the 
British capture of Kumasi in 1874. The widespread devastation wrought by the 
Asante east of the Volta is remembered to this day. The participation of the Anlo 
Ewes in the 'unholy alliance’ later provided fertile ground for TU activists. The 
Pekis may have been the heroes of the hour, but their subsequent claim to 
overlordship was resented.
Incidentally, the British had themselves dismissed the notion that the Ewe were a 
single people at the time they were seeking to justify the Milner-Simon
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Agreement of 1919. This view was later invoked to ward off Ewe unificationist
demands. In the definitive words of Captain Lilley:
"The international boundary has in no wise divided the 
Ewe-speaking people as a tribe. Though the Ewe-speaking people 
may have originally been a connected tribe, they have never been 
sucn since the exodus from Nimija [Notsie]. Since that time they 
have been independent clans."57
Historic animosities were reinforced by the high visibility of people from Anlo 
and Peki in the Trust Territory. Many educated Togolanders harboured a 
resentment against southerners, who were accused of poaching the few jobs that 
were available, a grievance that dated back to the partition of German Togoland, 
In 1922, there were complaints that Gold Coasters had been employed in the 
lower ranks of the bureaucracy at the expense of Togolanders, because of 
language considerations. In French Togoland, German-speaking clerks were 
similarly displaced by Francophone Africans from neighbouring Dahomey.5® In 
each case, the malcontents gravitated towards the Bund der Deutschen 
Togolander, which alarmed the two administering powers by advocating the 
restoration of German rule. A new generation of school-leavers did not face the 
same linguistic barriers to employment, but the inadequate educational facilities 
in Togoland gave Gold Coast Ewes a head-start. This was true not only of the 
lower reaches of the bureaucracy, but also of employment with the firms. 
Southerners also controlled much of the retail trade and owned most of the 
transport in Togoland.5^ Finally, they accumulated a great deal of the wealth 
generated by the cocoa economy. Despite Article V of the Mandate, which 
prevented the alienation of land to non-natives of British Togoland,^ the 
authorities were powerless to check the widespread sale of land in the forest 
areas north of Jasikan. Most of the cocoa farms were planted not by people from 
Buem, but by outsiders, many of whom migrated from French Togoland and 
Gold Coast Eweland. In 1931, there were 1,279 strangers living in Buem Division 
(out of a total population of 16,000): 710 came from elsewhere in the Ho District, 
463 were Anlos and Pekis, and 106 came from west of the Volta, In 1938, it was 
estimated that Peki farmers alone accounted for between 20% and 25% of land
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p u r  c h a s e  s .  62 What most disturbed the local population is that the cocoa money 
was siphoned out of the community by migrant farmers who felt no ties of 
allegiance to Buem. Thus, whereas the period of the Mandate had witnessed 
greater prosperity, contrary to the negative picture painted by Kwaku, the fruits 
thereof were unevenly distributed.
2.2.3. ’Ablode1 Versus ’Cipipification'
After 1950, the TU was able to transcend narrow communalistic appeals. The 
shift was facilitated by a schism within the party, which precipitated the exit of 
some of the fiercest critics of the Gold Coast Ewe. The split was occasioned by the 
Gold Coast constitutional reforms that followed the publication of the Coussey 
Report. The Native Authority Ordinance of 1949 had created a Southern 
Togoland Council, along the lines of the Joint Provincial Council in the Colony, 
and this had already sent its first representative to the Legislative Council in 
February 1950. Under the new constitution, Southern Togoland could elect three 
members to the Legislative Assembly, two from rural constituencies and one 
from the Southern Togoland Council. The leadership of the Togoland unification 
movement were divided over what their response should be. The founders of the 
TU, notably Gerald Awuma and Kofi Dumoga welcomed representation as the 
surest means to guarantee the interests of the territory. Another group who, 
according to Dumoga had recently infiltrated the party, advocated a boycott of 
the political structures. S.G. Antor, in particular, argued that involvement in Gold 
Coast institutions would make it even more difficult for British Togoland to 
extricate itself and to reunify with French Togoland. In December 1950, the 
executive of the party withdrew recognition from Dumoga following his 
agreement to serve on a Working Committee of the Enlarged Anglo-French 
Consultative Commission. The final break came when Gerald Awuma, Joseph 
Kodzo and F.Y. Asare were duly elected to the Legislative Assembly in 1951. 
They were effectively expelled from the party and both Dumoga and Awuma 
alleged that their lives had been threatened.63 The irony is that they entered the
51
ranks of the CPP at very time that their foes in the Anlo leadership were doing 
so.
Antor was now free to steer a different course. In an attempt to widen the appeal 
of the party, he toned down its 'youngmen' image and paid greater attention to 
the chiefs and the farmers. The appeal to traditional authority was a shrewd 
calculation since chiefly influence was considerable even if the institution was 
not as deeply rooted as in Ashanti and parts of the Northern Territories. In 
December 1950, the Togoland Congress (TC) was launched on a platform of 
non-participation in the Legislative Assembly. Antor claimed that the Congress 
had evolved out of the deliberations of the chiefs, who had grouped themselves 
into a Society of Natural Rulers and had then invited the TU, the Togoland 
United Nations Association, the Togoland Youth Association and the Togoland 
National Farmers Union (TNFU) to join them. British officials were, however, 
convinced that Antor had stage-managed the whole affair.1
A further realignment of political forces took place in January 1951 when, at a 
meeting held in Agome-Palim£, the TC and the CUT agreed to work together. 
Their compromise formula recognized the aspirations of the Gold Coast Ewe, but 
resolved that the first priority should be the reunification of the two 
T o g o la n d s .65 For Ewe unificationists like Olympio this compromise was 
unavoidable because of the British refusal to discuss the future of Gold Coast 
Eweland. The linking of a reunified Togoland with the Gold Coast at a later date 
would fulfil unificationist objectives. For Antor and his colleagues, the first stop 
was the intended as the final destination, although they declared themselves 
willing to consider the possibility of a union with the Gold Coast at a later date. 
Commenting on this compromise a few years later, Coleman observed that:
"... the alliance of the A.E.C., C.U.T., and the T.C. to fight for 
Togoland unification has indeed been a very strange one - the 
former using it as a means to achieve Ewe unification, amongother 
things, and the latter as a means to prevent Ewe unification.1^ 6
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Between 1950 and the plebiscite of 1956, the TC repeatedly accused the British of 
having cynically engineered the absorption of British Togoland. The creation of a 
new Trans-Volta Togoland Region, which fused Southern Togoland with Gold 
Coast Eweland, was not welcomed as a step towards Ewe unity, but seen as 
merely one more ruse to render integration irrevocable. There was undoubtedly 
some truth to this, as the secret record of British dealings at the United Nations 
make c l e a r  67 Antor distrusted Nkrumah and the CPP almost as much as the 
British officials. The CPP had been slow to take an interest in the Trust Territory. 
Although the party had been formed in 1949, as late as 1951 it had a membership 
of only 14 in the town of Ho.68 As the Gold Coast progressed towards 
independence, however, Nkrumah feared that a failure to resolve the Togoland 
question might delay the final transfer of power. The CPP initially advocated a 
federal relationship with the Gold Coast, but as it gained confidence it began to 
press for the complete integration of the territory within a unitary state. The 
aspirations of the Ewe unificationists were to be met by the absorption of French 
Togoland at a later date, A number of individuals who had been active in the 
AEC, such as Daniel Chapman, accordingly shifted their allegiance to the CPP. 
Antor and his colleagues protested at CPP meddling in Togoland politics and 
accused the leadership of harbouring imperialist designs on the territory. 
Interestingly, Governor Charles Arden-Clarke concurred, merely adding that in 
his view imperialism was "not necessarily a bad thing".^9
As the struggle for control of Southern Togoland unfolded, it became entangled 
with political developments in the Gold Coast proper. The formation of the NLM 
and the NPP in 1954 provided the unification movement with allies who shared a 
common distrust of Nkrumah, 7® The issue of cocoa prices was almost as emotive 
in parts of Togoland as it became in Asante. Antor complained that the Territory 
was subsidizing the Gold Coast through taxes levied by the Cocoa Marketing 
Board. Yet the TC and the TNFU did not campaign for a free market, as has often 
been alleged, but for the creation of a separate Togoland Produce Marketing 
Board.71 This early endorsement of state interventionism is significant and needs
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to be viewed in the light of two other considerations. The first was that the 
development of the Trust Territory had clearly lagged behind that of the 
southern Gold Coast. That much was admitted by Governor Alan Burns in 1942:
"I have just returned from a hurried trip through Togoland where I 
was struck by how little had been done to develop the Mandated 
Territory. In the Gold Coast itself the roads are, generally speaking, 
very good: in Togoland they are very bad. In the Gold Coast 
telegraph and telephone communication is provided at every 
important centre: m Togoland no such facilities exist. In some cases 
even the work done by the Germans, has been allowed to 
deteriorate. Although there is nothing in writing on the subject, I 
understand that Hodson, fearing (before the present war) the 
possibility that the Mandated Territory would be given up, 
deliberately discouraged any expenditure on development and 
refused to approve o f  some much-needed works."72
By 1950, the situation had not noticeably improved. When citizens of Togoland 
visited the Gold Coast they could not fail to notice the disparities. Many 
Togolanders, like their counterparts in the Northern T erritories,7^ regarded 
public spending as the most effective means to narrow the gap. Secondly, 
taxation of cocoa was less of an anathema since large parts of the territory did not 
produce cocoa, while in the forest belt many of the farms belonged to strangers. It 
seemed only fair that they should contribute towards development in the 
territory. It is also worth repeating that the leadership of the party was largely 
composed of a salariat whose aspirations might loosely be called 'petit 
bourgeois'. Antor himself had taught in Hohoe and in schools throughout the 
Gold Coast before entering politics.74 Kodzo Ayeke had worked with the 
Customs Department and as a teacher. Their material interests and their 
world-views were not always those of the average peasant farmer. However, this 
did not prevent the TC from exploiting the price issue or from trying to mobilize 
rural support through the TNFU. As in Ashanti, Nkrumah was accused of 
bleeding the cocoa farmers for corrupt purposes.
The party remained deeply ambivalent on the issue of how the existing 
relationship with the Gold Coast ought to be amended and this became steadily 
more apparent as Ghanaian independence approached. The NLM leadership was
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in favour of maximum devolution of power to the Regions, while the NPP 
favoured a measure of regional autonomy. The TC leaders were conscious that 
the achievement of unification with French Togoland had always been the raison 
d'etre of their party. Moreover, this ideal still had a resonance amongst the 
generation that could remember the unity that prevailed in German times. Yet 
they were equally aware that many Togolanders had forged close ties with the 
Gold Coast, which made it unwise to insist too forcefully upon secession. The 
extent of confusion was exposed in 1954 when Antor was criticized for assuming 
his seat in the Legislative Assembly, thereby calling into question the separatist 
principles of the party7$ Increasingly, the TC leadership looked to the federal 
formula as a means to reconcile continuance of the Gold Coast connection with 
Togoland unification. Thus, S.G. Antor, Kodzo Ayeke and Reverend F.R. 
Ametowobla affixed their signatures to the opposition Proposals For a Federal 
Constitution in 1955, The Proposals enumerated certain Federal responsibilities 
and reserved all other powers for the Regions. The document also proposed that 
Togoland receive 10% of cocoa revenue, as against 35% for Ashanti and 27,5% for 
the Northern Territories, which was more or less equal to her share of 
production/^ In 1956, the TC found itself adopting contrary positions almost 
simultaneously. For the purposes of the plebiscite in May the party urged voters 
to choose separation from the Gold Coast, bringing the party into conflict with 
the NPP. But in the July elections, the TC rejoined the NPP in the opposition 
camp, and endorsed Kofi Busia as joint leader. Their objective in this instance 
was to capture a share of political power at the centre.
The CPP, which held most of the cards, did not have to engage in such political 
acrobatics. It openly acknowledged that Togoland had not received its fair share 
of resources in the past, but argued that neither outright separation nor 
federalism would help to correct the imbalance. That could only happen if there 
was a strong central government managed by a party that was in tune with the 
aspirations of all parts of the country. One of the ironies of dyarchy is that it was 
Nkrumah rather than the colonial administration that benefitted from the change
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of accent to 'welfare and development' after the War. Nkrumah inherited the first 
'T" colonial development plan, but the took most of the credit. The apparent
liberality of the dyarchy constrasted with the extreme frugality of the inter-war 
years and contributed in no small measure to the creation of the Nkrumah myth. 
Striking a slightly less noble pose, Nkrumah could also promise tangible rewards 
in return for political support. In order to demonstrate good faith and to place the 
considerable Government reserves on display, Nkrumah made available a special 
grant of £1 million for development in Trans-Volta Togoland in 1953. This money 
was to be spent in co-operation with the Trans-Volta Togoland Council.^ 
Nkrumah further promised that his Government would implement a series of 
important development projects, most notably the construction of a bridge over 
the Volta at Adomi and a trunk road linking Senchi with Bawku in the north. ^  
These highly symbolic projects were supposed to cement the bonds of unity east 
and west of the Volta.
The TC accused Nkrumah of political chicanery and in 1953 claimed to have 
intercepted a 'Most Secret1 document, in which the British and Nkrumah plotted 
to win over Togoland by showering it with development funds/^  Whatever the 
authenticity of the document, the Nkrumah administration in practice made little 
effort to conceal its tactics. Its political message was blunt: whereas the 
unificationists could only complain about past neglect, the CPP was in a position 
to offer Togolanders an immediate and tangible improvement in living 
conditions. The CPP was also able to capitalize on the feelings of deprivation that 
ran deep in a number of the non-Ewe areas, where most of the cocoa was grown 
but where amenities were especially scarce. To that extent, the CPP picked up on 
the TU tradition. Finally, as the TC courted the chiefs, the CPP turned to the 
youth whose own aspirations were focussed on education and employment 
prospects then opening up in the Gold Coast.
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When the parties met on the electoral battle-ground, their forces were evenly 
matched. In the 1954 contest, the CPP and the TC won three seats each in 
constituencies which lay wholly or partly within Southern T o g o l a n d .^  Two 
years later, the tally was unchanged, although the CPP increased its share from 
48.1% to 52.6% of the poll. Prior to that, the parties had campaigned for their 
preferred options in the 1956 plebiscite. On this occasion, the voters were asked 
to choose between union with the Gold Coast and separation from it pending the 
ultimate determination of the future of the Territory. On this occasion, the CPP 
was greatly assisted by the fact that the United Nations had decided not to count 
the votes of the Northern and Southern sections separately. The integration 
option received the assent of 79% of voters in the North. In the South, the 
separation option carried the day with 55% of the vote. When the totals of North 
and South were added together, however, the result was a clear majority of 58% 
in favour of integration.^^ (See Table 2.3)
In the next Chapter, where the focus narrows so as to take political events in 
Likpe into view, further consideration will be given to these results. The reactions 
of the leadership and the rank-and-file of the Togoland Congress to defeat in the 
plebiscite and incorporation into Ghana is addressed in Chapter Four.
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Table 2.3:
The 1956 Plebiscite Results By District Council Area
Area Integration Separation Total
(a) Northern Togoland:
Mamprussi 17,870 3,429 21,299
Dagomba 28,083 6,549 34,632
Gonja 3,166 2,729 5,895
sub-total: 49,119 12,707 61,826
percentage: 79% 21% 100%
(b) Southern Togoland:
Buem-Krachi 28,178 18,775 46,953
Kpandu 8,581 17,029 25,610
Ho 7,217 18,981 26,198
sub-total: 43,976 54,785 98,761
percentage: 45% 55% 99%
Grand Total: 93,095 67,492 160,787
Percentage: 58% 42% 100.00%
(Source: J.S. Coleman, "Togoland", pp.72-73).
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2.3. Conclusion:
The phenomenon of the unification movement is considerably more complex 
than it at first appears. To explain it in terms of a deeply felt desire for reunion on 
the part of the Ewe people would be consistent with the public statements of 
figures such as Daniel Chapman and Sylvanus Olympio. But, while previous 
writers have acknowledged the problem, they have generally failed to explain 
why it was that so many Ewes spurned the appeals of the All-Ewe Conference. 
This is the conundrum that this Chapter has attempted to resolve. It has been 
argued that the ambiguities coursing through Togoland politics reflect the 
genuinely contradictory legacies of British administration. On the one hand, 
British Togoland was sucked into the economic orbit of the Gold Coast and swept 
up in the new political currents which animated the colony during the 
Depression years. On the other hand, as Kwaku has previously argued, the 
British were niggardly in their funding of economic development and social 
amenities. Educated Togolanders, and others who travelled west to find work, 
were constantly made aware that they were the poor relations. To add insult to 
injury, it was Gold Coasters (usually Ewes) who seemed to reap most of the 
benefits associated with the expansion of the Togoland cocoa industry. To 
paraphrase Gerald Awuma, the Togolanders were in danger of being supplanted 
in their own homes.
Although the dimensions of the problem were immediately obvious, there was 
more than one possible remedy. While Awuma, Asare and Dumoga were 
prepared to endorse closer integration as a means to level out the inequalities, 
which were after all related to the uncertain future of the Territory, there were 
others who regarded any relationship with the Gold Coast as potentially 
parasitic. On such a view, Togolanders might only experience a genuine 
improvement in living standards if they broke the cord that bound them to the
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Gold Coast while there was still a chance. After 1954, as international support 
began to wane and as new allies appeared inside the Gold Coast, the Togoland 
Congress leadership began to concede the possibility of an ongoing relationship 
as long as it was on federal terms and was not at the expense of Togoland 
reunification. This was a significant concession and one which later made it 
difficult to re-activate secessionism.
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Chapter Three:
"The Bakpele Are Not Ewe": The Invention of Tradition and The Politics of
Unification in Likpe, 1945-1957
Having mapped out the contours of the unification debate on a large canvas, the 
focus now shifts to some of the finer local detail. This Chapter operates on two 
levels. Firstly, the object is to flesh out a number of the arguments that were 
advanced in the previous Chapter. In particular, I aim to show how the realities 
of integration, and British policy more generally, put pressure on the Bakpele to 
define themselves in relation to their Ewe neighbours. An analysis of politics 
within a minority community such as Likpe is a necessary corrective to the 
hitherto exclusive concern with the Ewe. At another level, the Chapter evaluates 
a specific contention advanced by J.S. Coleman with respect to the 1956 
plebiscite, namely that the unification struggle was merely the aggregation of 
localized factional disputes. The implication is that Togolanders had not yet 
developed a consciousness that transcended the local community. In the case of 
Likpe, it will be argued, a broadening of horizons and the deepening of local 
divisions were in fact opposite sides of the same coin - one that was minted in the 
first instance by the Gold Coast administration.
3.1 Factionalism in Likpe
3.1.1. The Issue of Localism
In the numerous studies which have explored community politics in Africa, what 
has often been commented upon is the remarkable capacity of communal 
divisions to reproduce themselves in a slightly mutated form over time. The 
unexpected pace of decolonization typically required politicians to harness large, 
and often isolated rural populations, at a stroke. It is understandable, therefore,
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that the first political parties latched themselves onto existing political 
collectivities, whose principal object was to prosecute rivalries at the local level, 
A bargain was often struck, according to which political leaders could call in 
pre-packaged blocs of voters, while local leaders were promised assistance in the 
pursuit of their objectives. * This model of centre-local politics has acquired wide 
currency and it is not therefore surprising to encounter it in studies of Togoland 
politics. Writing shortly after the 1956 plebiscite, J.S. Coleman expressed his 
doubts as to whether the poll really provided an accurate guide as to the state of 
public opinion. He noted that the plebiscite administrators studiously avoided 
interpreting the options to the voters. This allowed the politicians to concentrate 
upon matters not strictly connected with the plebiscite. When he examined the 
results more closely, Coleman found a distinctive pattern:
"The predominance of local issues i s ... suggested by the rather 
striking pattern of voting revealed by the plebiscite results. In 61 
per cent of the 344 wards, which were the primary electoral units, 
voting tended to be overwhelmingly for or against integration.
There were many instances, for example, where even within one 
Local Council Area, one ward voted overwhelmingly for union... 
and a contiguous ward voted overwhelmingly for separation...
Thus it is possible to question the accuracy of the plebiscite results 
as a reflection of the will of the British Togolanders on the 
fundamental issue of union with the Gold Coast."2
David Brown has so far conducted the only detailed local study. Although he 
emphasizes the fluidity of factional alignments, and is not unmindful of the 
debate over the merits of unification, he nevertheless portrays the chieftaincy 
dispute in Kpandu as the primary filter through which Togoland affairs were 
sifted.^ In a sense, there is nothing surprising in the discovery that local issues 
were salient; nor does that make Togoland unusual. But where civil society is 
well-developed, one would expect national politics to create new foci of political 
allegiance cutting across local divisions. It is important to probe this matter 
further since if Coleman was correct, the case that was made out in the previous 
Chapter may be beside the point.
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The plebiscite results can, in fact, be read in a number of different ways. While 
the pattern identified by Coleman is clear enough, one should also note that there 
was more than a three to one ratio of votes cast in seven of the sixteen Local 
Council Areas: namely, Adaklu, Dutaso, Yingor, Anfoega, Gbi-Hohoe, Nkonya 
and Krachi. These clearly did represent concentrations of support for the 
Togoland Congress (TC) or the Convention People’s Party (CPP), regardless of 
the local divisions that existed within these communities (and these were often 
quite substantial). There is, moreover, a discernible pattern to this distribution. 
Leaving aside Krachi, these were precisely the communities that had most 
resolutely resisted British administrative policy. Likpe was the one 'rebel' 
community that failed to rally decisively to one party or the other. The Bakpele 
villages pulled in opposite directions, yielding a configuration of results identical 
to that identified by Coleman (see Table 3.3 below). Yet, as will become clear, the 
political behaviour of the Bakpele in the period before 1957 owed relatively little 
to 'traditional' sources of cleavage.
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Table 3.1:
Plebiscite Statistics For Southern Togoland By Local Council Area
Area Union Separation
Adaklu 185 1,861
Anyigbe 2,063 1,092
Asogli 1,586 4,049
Dutaso 1,720 6,405
Yingor 1,663 5,574
Ablode 1,287 2,828
Akpini 2,287 4,861
Anfoega 2,459 109
East Dain 2,001 5,560
Gbi-Hohoe 547 3,667
Biakoye 2,210 1,957
Buem 3,127 4,315
Likpe-Lolobi 1,027 2,114
Nkonya 3,511 591
Akan 8,299 6,837
Krachi 10,004 2,861
Total: 43,976 54,785
(Source: United Nations Trusteeship Council, Report of the United 
Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, pp.184-191)
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3.1.2. The Discourse of Politics in Likpe
Like many other Ghanaian communities, Likpe has a tortuous history of factional 
conflict. Typically, divisions have remained dormant for years at a time, only to 
be rekindled by the death of a chief or an event of equal magnitude. In the 
intervening period, the dispute is kept in storage through conflicting 
interpretations of history that circulate within an oral medium as well/being 
preserved in personal archives. British administrators were often baffled by both 
the intensity and longevity of seemingly unimportant disputes, without realizing 
that their predecessors had often helped to sow the seeds of discord. One 
exasperated District Commissioner summed it up when he commented of the 
Bakpele that
"the majority of them are delightful people, but extremely
obstinate."4
This is a sentiment that has been shared by administrators up to the present day.
There are two major categories of cleavage within Likpe. The first revolves 
around competing interpretations of what one might loosely call the 'Likpe 
constitution1. Like other peoples within the Central Togo cluster, the Bakpele 
consist of a group of 'original' inhabitants who amalgamated with later groups of 
settlers. The inhabitants of the modern villages of Todome and Bakwa claim to be 
autocthonous. Their foundation myths recount that they came out of the ground 
near their present location.^ Most of the other villages are inhabited by people 
who claim to have migrated to their present site from Atebubu, in what is now 
the Brong-Ahafo Region. The traditions tell of how the settlers came upon the 
indigenes while searching for land and dependable water supplies. Both sides 
were apparently surprised to discover that they spoke a mutually intelligible 
language. The Bakwa/Todome people, who were vulnerable in spite of their 
mountain hide-out, reputedly welcomed the newcomers and offered them land. 
The two groups then agreed to merge, probably in the belief that there would be 
greater safety in numbers. They were later joined by smaller bands of migrants.
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An agreement is said to have been hatched at the time which was supposed to 
govern the relationship between the different sections of the community. The 
Bakwa/Todome people allegedly agreed that the newcomers should provide a 
chief, and even presented them with a stool, but insisted that they should select a 
man in place of their leader, Clemefi, who was a woman. From that time, the 
head of the village of Mate was simultaneously the Okakple (or headchief) of all 
the Bakpele. The Todome chief, as the 'landowner', became the Mankrado of 
Likpe, with responsibility for the enstoolment of a new Okakple. ^
These traditions are not necessarily accurate in historical detail. What is 
important is that they have provided the central frame of reference for local 
political actors. Two lines of division radiate from the 'Likpe constitution'. Under 
the first, the Bakwa/Todome people have periodically pitted themselves against 
the rest of Likpe. They have guarded their own distinct traditions and even to 
this day speak a slightly different version of the Sekpele language. The Bakwas 
have periodically disputed the right of Mate to monopolize the Paramouncy, 
alleging that the later arrivals were usurpers. Whereas this amounts to a 
repudiation of the ’constitution', successive Todome chiefs have sought to enlarge 
their prerogatives with reference to it. Thus, in the 1930s the Todomehene 
claimed that as Mankrado he was entitled not only to enstool a new Okakple, but 
also to select the candidate/
Secondly, an incumbent Okakple has often diverged from the other chiefs on the 
correct interpretation of the 'constitution'. Whereas the Okakple has in recent 
times sought to assume the mantle of Paramount Chief in the Akan mould, the 
other chiefs have insisted that according to Likpe custom the headchief is merely 
first amongst equals. They have further asserted their right to discipline an 
Okakple who has overstepped the mark. The ultimate sanction of destoolment
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has been deployed against an Okakple on three occasions this century. Traugott 
Soglo was destooled in 1914, following a series of altercations over his drinking 
habits. Interestingly, the final straw came after he insulted the other chiefs for 
having permitted their people to celebrate the expulsion of Germany from the 
territory. He was restored to office in 1919 and then destooled again in 1925. His 
brother suffered the same fate two years later.® Other destoolment actions have 
failed, usually because an incumbent Okakple has managed to tap other lines of 
division.
Each of the original Bakpele villages of Todome, Mate, Avedzeme and Bala, has 
also suffered from fierce clan rivalries, mostly to do with competition for chiefly 
office. Repeatedly, these disputes have resulted in schism and the formation of 
new villages. A precedent was established in the nineteenth century, when the 
Bakwa people broke away from Todome and founded a separate settlement.^ 
German colonial rule unleashed new sources of friction, which led to this pattern 
being repeated. Thus, in Bala the leader of the village drumming group was 
introduced to the German Commissioner, Dr. Griiner, as the chief because the 
inhabitants were afraid to tell him that their stool was unoccupied. Osei duly 
received a helmet and a feather and these symbols of authority passed to his son. 
Some years later, the brother of the previous chief returned from the Gold Coast 
and laid claim to the stool. Captain Lilley adjudicated the dispute and decided in 
favour of the incumbent, since he was in possession of the appropriate symbols 
of office. The aggrieved supporters of the rival candidate seceded and set up a 
rival village at Kukurantumi in 1927.10 The breakup of Avedzeme is a rather 
more complex affair. The Vute clan had already left to form a separate village in 
the 1880s and its chief had received a helmet and feather from the Germans. 
Later, however, the Vutes rejoined Avedzeme in order to alleviate the burden of 
compulsory labour, which the Germans levied equally on all the villages 
regardless of population. The Basio clan, which claims to be a distinct immigrant 
community, was also forced by the Germans to join that village. In 1939,
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following a chieftaincy dispute in Avedzeme, the defeated clan together with the 
Vutes and Basios seceded and founded a new settlement at Agbozome. Shortly 
thereafter, another clan broke off from Avedzeme and established a third village 
at Koforidua.H
Finally, Mate itself has not been immune to such disputes. Oral traditions record 
that the stool was traditionally occupied by a candidate from either of two major 
clans in that town. During the period of German rule, the Kalelenti clan refused 
the stool three times because nobody wished to carry out the onerous duties then 
imposed on the chiefs. In 1932, when the stool became vacant, the Kalelentis 
demanded the right to provide the next Okakple but were opposed by the 
Kalegato clan, which insisted that they had forfeited any claim to the stool. The 
settlement made by District Commissioner Gutch re-affirmed the principle of 
rotation and acknowledged that it was the turn of the Kalelenti clan: Nana Boke 
Akototse HI was duly enstooled the following year.^  As we shall see in Chapter 
Four, this was not the end of the matter. By the 1940s, then, the four original 
settlements had spawned additional villages at Bakwa, Kukurantumi, Agbozome 
and Koforidua. Their formation appears to be unrelated to pressure on land, 
although that was to become one of the distinguishing features of Likpe in the 
second half of the century.
Secession did not signal the end of clan disputes, since the new villages had to 
find their niche in the 'traditional' hierarchy that was institutionalized by the 
British. In each case, the chief of the original village retained seniority, and the 
other chiefs were expected to approach the Okakple through him. The reluctance 
of rebel chiefs to subordinate themselves to their rivals has often strengthened 
the hand of an Okakple in his dealings with the 'wing' chiefs.
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Figure 1:
The Political Structure of Likpe, as of 1945
Headchief: 
Sub-chiefs: 
Village chiefs:
Matehene (Okakple)
Todome Avedzeme Bala
Bakwa Agbozome Koforidua Kukurantumi
3.1.3. The Schisms of the 1940s
At any one time, there has been a potential for conflict and the building of 
alliances along more than one axis. When Likpe entered a period of 
unprecedented political turmoil in the 1940s, however, a different set of 
allegiance was superimposed upon the existing grid. British efforts to rationalize 
their administrative structures provided the spark for the political conflagration 
that ensued. Although there was plenty of combustible material available within 
Likpe, the fuel for the conflict was imported from outside.
3.I.3.I. Boundaries and Identities
When one examines the oral traditions of the Bakpele, what is striking is a 
fundamental lack of consensus about some of the most basic elements of their 
pre-colonial history. This may reflect genuinely different origins and experiences. 
However, what counts as 'tradition' has very often been modified and indeed 
invented in order to service the concerns of the present. A good example of this 
is the divergent accounts of the migration from Atebubu. According to one 
version, the Bakpele reached Notsie in what is now Togo and were involved in 
the flight of the Ewe from that town. According to the alternative version they 
turned westwards before they ever reached it. The Notsie episode is the central 
myth of common origin binding the Ewe people. Debrunner was of the opinion
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that its occurrence in places like Likpe signalled a desire to associate with a 
dominant cultural tradition.^  This is probably correct and yet there are curious 
fragments of evidence that do suggest historical links with the east. Bakpele 
names such as Oloto and Alio suggest a Lagos connection at some tim e.^
Indeed, the stool name of Soglo which is borne by an Okakple of the Kalegato 
clan is quite clearly of Dahomean origin. When some Bakpele traditions claim 
descent from East Africa, an earlier migration from more easterly parts of West 
Africa may be i m p l i e d . B e  that as it may, what is of interest here is the failure 
of any one version of the past to achieve hegemonic status. The historical 
confusion can in turn be traced to influences from the nineteenth century (and 
modified in the twentieth) which have pulled the Bakpele in opposite directions.
In the nineteenth century, the Bakpele undoubtedly had trading links to the 
south, but their more intimate political contacts were with Buem. Like the Buems, 
the Bakpele were probably paying tribute to the Kwahu Dukomans and they 
later joined their neighbours when they rose in revolt. When the Asante invaded 
in 1869, the Bakpele fled to Akposso. After the withdrawal of the Asante forces, 
the Bakpele returned and assisted the Buems in inflicting retribution on the 
Kwahus.l'7 A more powerful Buem state emerged out of the conflict, but the 
precise nature of its relationship with Likpe is unclear. The oral traditions of the 
Akan section of Buem refer to the formation of a confederacy, headed by Nana 
Aburam of Buem-Borada, that embraced the Lefana, Akan, Akpafu, Lolobi, 
Bowiri and Likpe. ^  Although this is not directly confirmed by Likpe traditions, 
the latter do recall instances of close co-operation with Buem. If the Bakpele were 
ever subordinate to Buem, this ceased to pertain under German rule. In 1907, 
when Governor Zech detached five smaller communities from Buem, the Bakpele 
had already ceased to owe any allegiance to the Borada stoo l.^  Links with 
Eweland were never as intimate. Before reaching their final place of settlement, 
the Likpe migrants had clashed with the Gbis over access to water resources in 
the Hohoe area. The Bakpele did join Peki and Kpandu forces on an expedition to
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punish the Taviefes in 1888, but they never accepted the claims to overlordship 
that were made by Peki, or any other Ewe division for that matter.24*
1
German colonial rule wrought a substantial transformation in these 
arrangements. Ewe cultural penetration was spearheaded by the Christian 
I missions. The Basel Mission which was active in the early years withdrew from 
the Buem area rather than give in to official pressure to replace instruction in Twi 
and English with a combination of Ewe and German.2* Both the Bremen Mission 
and the Catholics relied upon Ewe as a medium of instruction and the language 
of the liturgy. Debrunner has contrasted the receptivity of the minority enclaves 
interspersed amongst the Ewe, such as Avatime, with the negative reaction of the 
minorities further north - notably Buem, Bowiri, Akpafu, Santrokofi, Achlo and 
Likpe. The latter had all come to rely upon Twi as a lingua franca.22
Language may have constituted a barrier to conversion in the early days, but the 
Bakpele adapted more readily to the workings of the Churches than did the 
Buems. In 1898, the Okakple Nana Soglo I sent his two sons to be educated at the 
administrative headquarters at Misahohe, from where they were referred to the 
mission station at Amedzofe. Martin Soglo remained there for some time, 
returning to Mate as a teacher in 1905.2^ Two years previously, the first school in 
Likpe had been opened by Peki teachers from the Bremen Mission, They were 
followed shortly thereafter by the Catholics. The competition for converts was 
often intense and continued after the expulsion of the German missionaries and 
the creation of the Ewe Presbyterian Church (E.P.C.) in 1927.
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Significantly, the rival Churches found supporters amongst different factional 
constituencies. Thus, the clans who seceded to form Agbozome were Catholic, 
leaving Avedzeme as a Presbyterian enclave. Similarly, in Mate the Kalelentis 
embraced Catholicism, while the Kalegatos affiliated to the E.P.C.. The founding 
of new schools was always a valuable bargaining counter for the Churches. The 
schools played a most significant role in helping to spread the Ewe language. As 
a result, the Bakpele have acquired a particular facility with Ewe. A recent study 
observed that:
"In the central area, which borders on the Ewe to the south but not 
the north, Ewe is learned mainly in school, except perhaps amongst 
the Likpe, some of whom learn it at home... It is thought to be 
spoken by around 75% among each of the Bowiri, Siwu, Sele and 
Likpe speaking communities, with the Likpe speaking it best."24
By contrast, Twi retains a firm hold amongst the Buem, where it is spoken by the 
Akan section as a first language and by the Lefana as a second language.
The appeal of Ewe also resided in the fact that it was the language of trade. The 
period of German colonial rule brought more sustained economic linkages with 
the Ewe areas to the immediate south and east. The Bakpele laboured on public 
works alongside their Ewe neighbours and were rewarded with an extension of 
the main Palim£-Kpandu road. However, most produce (consisting at first of 
rubber and palm-kemels) was headloaded to Palim£ via Woate, Fodome, Gbledi, 
Kuma-Bala, Kuma-Tokpli and Kusuntu.2^ Palim£ was also the distribution point 
for an expanding range of consumer goods. The economic consequences of the 
partition of Togoland have already been dealt with in the previous Chapter. The 
Bakpele were amongst the beneficiaries of the expansion in cocoa production 
referred to there. Unlike the Buems, they did not alienate their land to Ewe 
migrant farmers, except to a limited extent in the vicinity of Bakwa. There was 
little land to start with, apart from which many Bakpele were impressed, while 
working as farm labourers in the Gold Coast, with the wealth to be derived from
cocoa cultivation.^ The pioneer farmers extended their cocoa holdings on an 
annual basis through to the 1950s, by which time land was starting to become a 
scarce resource. One survey conducted in the Jasikan area in 1959, which 
included neighbouring Lolobi, recorded complaints about a shortage of suitable 
land on which to plant cocoa. In subsequent years, researchers drew attention to 
a mounting food deficit which was related to the land squeeze.^a There are no 
figures for land utilization within Likpe itself. But the figures for cocoa purchases 
in the 1950s, before smuggling became entrenched, suggests that new plantings 
had begun to tail off by the 1950s (See Table 3.3). That would be compatible with 
the oral evidence to the effect that the Bakpele were experiencing difficulties in 
acquiring access to adequate as well as contiguous land on which to plant cocoa.
As in the Gold Coast, cocoa profoundly altered the economic landscape. During 
the 1930s, consumer goods from the expanding town of Hohoe filtered through 
to Likpe via Fodome. The Bakpele desired more direct contact and in 1939 they 
constructed their own road from Mate to Hohoe. Thereafter, the United Africa 
Company, G.B. Ollivant and a number of smaller traders opened branches of 
their stores in Mate itself.^  As already indicated, Palim£ was the principal victim 
of these developments. Brokers ceased purchasing cocoa for Palime-based firms, 
while other Bakpele relied on the Hohoe market for the purchase of their 
w an ts.^  This did not signal the demise of all cross-border exchange. On the 
contrary, trade was opened up between the Bakpele and their Danyi neighbours 
perhaps for the first time. Danyi farmers smuggled their cocoa into Mate and 
crossed back with consumer goods which were unavailable in French Togoland - 
a pattern that was later to be repeated in reverse.
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Table 3.2:
Cocoa Purchases in Hohoe District (including Likpe), 
1947-1957 (tons)
Year Hohoe Total for 
British Togoland
Hohoe as % 
of Total
1947/48 3,264 19,960 16.3%
1948/49 5,195 26,458 19.6%
1949/50 4,336 24,625 17.6%
1950/51 4,392 24,635 17.8%
1951/52 3,722 23,838 15.6%
1952/53 3,892 27,909 13.9%
1953/54 2,812 21,856 12.8%
1954/55 3,260 22,071 14.8%
1955/56 4,065 27,657 14.7%
1956/57 3,983 31,782 12.5%
(Source: Cocoa Marketing Board, Annual Report and 
Accounts, various editions)
The impact of these developments upon the consciousness of the Bakpele was 
contradictory. While Likpe revelled in its newfound prosperity, some people 
resented the economic and cultural ascendancy of the Ewe. These were matched 
by similar expressions of 'nativism' in Buem, which provided much of the early 
support for the Togo Union. The decision of the British authorities to press on 
with its amalgamation policy brought matters to a head.
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3.I.3.2. The Amalgamation Question
The amalgamation policy originated in a desire to cede greater responsibility to 
the chiefs of Togoland, The underlying objective was to create viable Native 
Authorities, which would operate their own courts, raise their own taxes and 
manage their own services. In the straitened conditions of the 1930s, this would 
relieve some of the pressure from an overburdened colonial state. The policy was 
linked to ideas about indirect rule, although the latter was applied only haltingly 
in the Gold Coast. Southern Togoland posed special problems because, outside of 
Buem, there was no tradition of political centralization. An essential starting 
point was, therefore, to merge the 68 autonomous Division into more 
manageable u n its .^  The Divisional chiefs in a given locality were to be 
encouraged to unite under the leadership of one of their number. Then a State 
Council would be established with powers to settle constitutional disputes, to 
make bye-laws and to preside over Treasuries funded by local r a t e s . E a c h  
Divisional chief would sit on the State Council, but would also retain his own 
court. The courts of the sub-Divisional chiefs would, however, be closed.^ 
Although the local administration wanted swift results, the District 
Commissioners were expected to observe a set of additional guidelines. 
Amalgamation was to be voluntary and required the unanimous consent of all 
the sub-chiefs in a community. The States had to be large enough and 
geographically contiguous. Furthermore, amalgamation would only receive 
recognition if 'binding native customs' had been performed. Finally, the heads of 
the new States were to be treated as first amongst equals and would not therefore 
become full Paramount Chiefs. This meant that they would not be able to 
interfere in the internal affairs of the constituent Divisions.^ The administration 
promised that greater efficiency would result from amalgamation and hailed the 
reform as an antidote to the German legacy of political fragmentation.
As early as 1924, the Ho District Commissioner had suggested postponing the 
recognition of new Headchiefs until the number of Divisions could be re d u c e d .  33 
But it was not until 1929 that the policy was pursued in earnest under the 
enthusiastic direction of Captain C.C. Lilley. By 1931, as many as 44 Divisions 
had been amalgamated into four new States. The least artificial of these was 
Buem, the core of which had survived German rule. The others were Awatime, 
consisting of ten Divisions; Akpini, led by the Kpandu chief and comprising 19 
Divisions; and Asogli, which was centred on Ho and embraced 14 D i v i s i o n s ,^
By the time of his retirement in 1938, Lilley was able to report that only 14 
Divisions remained unaffiliated to a S ta te d  Despite his confident 
pronouncements of success, there were already some rumblings of disquiet 
within the administration. It was admitted that the original guidelines had not 
been properly adhered to. Large numbers of people had been brought into States 
against their will, and the Headchiefs had begun to claim powers which they 
were never intended to possess. Shortly after the departure of Lilley, the 
Commissioner of the Eastern Province suggested that the implementation of the 
policy had in fact been m is g u id e d .3 6
The shortcomings of the amalgamated States were not lost on the Divisions 
which had resisted the blandishments of Captain Lilley. In 1944, there were ten of 
these: namely Nkonya, Santrokofi, Anfoega, Tsrukpe, Goviefe, Abutia, Adaklu, 
Gbi, Ve and L ikpe.^ In 1941, seven of them submitted a petition to the Governor, 
in which they pointed out that to join a State meant subordinating themselves to 
an alien Paramount Chief. Instead they wanted to set up a Joint Divisional 
Council in which the Presidency would rotate. There was some sympathy for 
their predicament, but the authorities withheld consent for fear of how the 
already amalgamated Divisions might react. In 1945, a petition along the same 
lines was despatched to Governor Burns, who voiced his concern that the 
mistakes of south-eastern Nigeria (where the warrant chiefs policy had 
culminated in the 1929 Aba riots) were being repeated in Togoland.^ Once again
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the unamalgamated Divisions were simply advised to attach themselves to an 
existing State. Nevertheless, a breach had been made in the administrative wall 
and this grew wider as the decade progressed.
3.I.3.3. The Eruption of the Atando Dispute
The Divisions which opposed amalgamation did so for different reasons. The 
Ewe communities of Gbi, Ve and Anfoega declined to come under the umbrella 
of Kpandu, which each of them regarded as a rival.^  The Nkonya, on the other 
hand, refused to co-operate on the grounds that they were not Ewe but a Guan 
people. In Likpe, there was less resistance to the principle of amalgamation, but 
there was substantial disagreement when it came to choosing a home. Whereas 
one section of the community supported amalgamation with an Ewe State, 
another wished to rekindle old associations with Buem. In the early phases, the 
chiefs of Todome and Bakwa backed a plan to amalgamate under Gbi-Hohoe. 
When this was blocked by the other chiefs, the Todomehene persuaded the 
Okakple to throw in his lot with the Akpini State. This was vigorously opposed 
by the chiefs of Bakwa, Bala and Avedzeme and was ultimately scuppered by 
Lilley, who argued (erroneously) that the Bakpele were a 'Twi-speaking division' 
which belonged with Buem.^O The chiefs of Todome and Bakwa, posing as the 
defenders of Likpe autonomy, successfully resisted any move in that direction. 
The stalemate continued into the 1940s, when the Okakple Boke Akototse III 
revived the idea of some form of association with Gbi. The greater receptivity of 
the authorities provoked vigorous complaints from Nana Agya Mensah II, the 
dynamic young chief of Avedzeme. When the Assistant D.C. held a meeting in 
1947 to discuss the question, it was Agya Mensah who spoke most forcefully 
against union with Gbi:
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"The Sub-Chief was most vehement in his opposition to 
amalgamation with Gbi. He cited the old Likpe legend of atrocity 
committed by the Pekipons (ie. Gbis) on a Likpe woman some 
seventy years ago. It is interesting to record that the recounting of 
this tale drew sympathetic murmurs even from the Head Chief's 
party. He went on to say that the Likpes and Buems were brothers, 
that the Likpe Division should amalgamate with Buem and that the 
Head Chi^| was courting disaster within the Division by his present
The debate between Agya Mensah and Nana Akototse illustrates the very 
different constructions that could be placed on the Bakpele past. Agya Mensah 
invoked a longstanding distrust of Hohoe, which was compounded by jealousy 
at the newfound prosperity of that town. He also reminded the Bakpele of their 
historical associations with Buem. Nana Akototse, on the other hand, argued that 
union with Gbi made more sense because of growing commercial contacts and 
the fact that the Bakpele were proficient in the Ewe language.^ The rest of Likpe 
was forced to decide between these positions, each of which contained an 
element of truth. The D.C. himself believed that the historical evidence favoured 
Agya Mensah:
"The original Likpes came from Atebubu, Gold Coast, crossed to 
Nuatja, and returned to their present area. Association with the 
Buems has been long and intimate. It is clear that the Likpes have 
much greater affinities, racially and linguistically with the Buems 
than the Gbis.™
His superiors, however, concluded that the weight of numbers favoured Nana 
Akototse. While Agya Mensah could only claim the support of Agbozome, the 
chiefs of Mate, Bakwa, Todome, Koforidua and Kukurantumi were all prepared 
to back the O kakple.^ Abandoning their earlier insistence on full amalgamation, 
the authorities agreed to the creation of an Atando Native Authority embracing 
Likpe, Ve and Gbi, in 1949. The presidency of the Atando N. A. was to rotate 
between the three Headchiefs and there was to be no State Council. But the N. A. 
would be expected to raise its own finances through a levy imposed on its 
citizens.
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No sooner had the Atando N.A. been inaugurated than Agya Mensah formed a 
Likpe Grand Council to co-ordinate resistance to the new arrangements. He then 
set about widening his base of support. The imposition of local taxation was an 
obvious issue that lent itself to political mobilization. The leaders of the Grand 
Council claimed that taxation heralded a return to the depredations suffered 
under German rule and that the revenue would benefit Hohoe rather than Likpe. 
The prosperity of Hohoe was attributed to its parasitic relationship with Likpe 
and other cocoa growing communities. Amongst the specific grievances that 
were listed was the failure of the Gbis to contribute anything towards the 
construction of roads leading into that town:
These Gbis opposed very strongly to the opening [sic] of any motor 
roads from Likpe to Hohoe ie, the Likpes were forced to stop with 
the Likpe-Hohoe road via Bakwa at the outskirts of the town of 
Hohoe. Again the Ayoma-Hohoe road via Likpe-Kukurantumi was 
to be constructed by the towns that lie on the road without any 
assistance from the Gbis. The people of Likpe solely had to be 
responsible for the Hohoe-Likpe road via Likpe until as recently as 
1949 when the Government took it up."45
It is significant that Agya Mensah also began to phrase his objections in the
language of ethnicity. Borrowing a leaf from Captain Lilley's book, he asserted
that the Bakpele were essentially an Akan people. The Bakpele had to resist the
temptation to assimilate with the numerically and economically dominant Ewe,
with whom they had little in common. His attack is worth quoting at length, if
only for its hyperbole:
"The people of Likpe are from time immemorial traditionally and 
historically an Akan tribe which was once part and parcel or the 
Ashanti kingdom and still retains intact customs, tradition, 
chieftaincy, constitutional practices, language etc., of the Akans of 
the Ashanti to this day ana which are immically and diametrically 
opposed to those of the Ewes... Among the people of Likpe [and] 
the Ewes the only Uniformity that exists is the accident of colour.
The dissimilarity is as great as that which exists between a Greek 
and a Swede or a Bulgarian to a Dutchman or an Ashanti to a 
Hawsa [sic] or a Fanti to Ewe man."46
Agya Mensah and the Okakple fought their battle on several levels. On the 
symbolic plane, they adopted different chieftaincy titles. While the Okakple was 
content to refer to himself as Togbe in the Ewe manner, the Avedzeme chief
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insisted on the Akan variant of Nana. The Okakple knew that the authorities 
would have to back him and adopted an intransigent stance in the belief that rest 
of Likpe would fall into line. Agya Mensah, on the other hand, exploited the 
idiom of legitimate resistance, accusing Akototse of behaving in a manner that 
was autocratic and alien to Bakpele tradition. Evidence of their efforts to mine the 
rich seam of factionalism can also be found in the alliances that were forged.
Since the Bala chief supported Akototse, it was easier for Agya Mensah to prise 
Kukurantumi away from loyalty to the Okakple. The Agbozome chief rallied to 
Akototse, but there were clan divisions within the village which Agya Mensah 
could exploit to his own advantage.
The authorities did throw their weight behind Nana Akototse, albeit 
reluctantly,^ Nevertheless, the Grand Council succeeded in disrupting the 
workings of the Atando N. A. through a campaign of non-payment of taxes and 
more direct assaults on the loyalist chiefs. By early 1950, Nana Sekyere I of 
Agbozome and Nana E.Y. Amoah IV of Bakwa had been forced to flee their 
villages, and Nana Komla Dihie of Todome was precariously balanced.^® All 
three lost face for having endorsed the Atando scheme. In April, Grand Council 
supporters marched on Mate with the intention of destooling Nana Akototse 
himself, but were turned back by a detachment of Police.^ Nana Agya Mensah 
demonstrated his cunning by seeking to enstool someone from Bakwa as the new 
Okakple, thus exploiting an old source of grievance. At the time, Mate people 
were subjected to physical assault and a blockade was imposed on the northern 
approaches to the town.^0
The authorities, acknowledging the trouble that Agya Mensah could foment, 
decided to make an example of him. He was arrested and prosecuted on charges 
of undermining the lawful standing of the Native Authority. To their 
embarrassment, the case reached the West African Court of Appeal, where it was
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dismissed. Agya Mensah emerged from jail with the status of a hero and more 
pugnacious than ever. The Grand Council similarly played on the treatment that 
was meted out to Nana Agyeman I of Kukurantumi. He had been assaulted by 
the Native Authority Police in February 1951, while resisting arrest on charges 
akin to those of Agya M ensah.^ Gradually, the authorities came to the 
conclusion that initial doubts about the wisdom of including Likpe in Atando 
had been well-founded. They therefore looked to the Coussey proposals as an 
excuse to abort the experiment. When Agya Mensah petitioned the Trusteeship 
Council, he was informed that Likpe would almost certainly be united with 
Buem, Krachi, Nkonya and Santrokofi in a new District Council. The Likpe 
Grand Council had, it seemed, triumphed over both Nana Akototse and the 
British.
For a time, it appeared that the union of Likpe, Gbi and Ve might survive in the 
form of a Local Council attached to a Northern District Council. However, a 
proposal along these lines from the Atando N.A. provoked strong opposition 
from the minority communities north of Hohoe. Their case echoed that of the 
Grand Council:
"We have no grudge whatsoever against the Ewes as a race. We, 
however, feel correctly that our identity as an ethnic group should 
ever be preserved and not confused. We deplore that paragraph in 
the Joint Anglo-French Memorandum... which described us as 'a 
few lesser peoples (the Buems, Likpes, Santrokofis, Akpafus,
Bowiris and Nkonyas of British Togoland and Akpossos of French 
Togoland) who are not Ewes but whose interests are so confused 
with those of the latter that they cannot be excluded from 
consideration from the Ewe problem.1 This statement clearly denies 
our identity as a race and this loss of identity has cost us dearly in 
matters of educational Scholarship, where because we are regarded 
as Ewes, whatever Scholarship is granted to Ewes is assumed to 
benefit us equally."^2
While the Togoland Congress was moderating its hostile stance towards the Gold
Coast Ewe, the minority communities were becoming more conscious of their
relative deprivation vis-a-vis the Ewe as a whole. The local government reforms
that followed the Coussey Report enshrined ethnic criteria in the new
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administrative structures. The Atando N.A. was dissolved. While Gbi received its 
own Local Council under the Kpandu District Council, Likpe and Lolobi were 
fused to create a new Local Council attached to the Buem-Krachi District.
The only major issue which remained to be resolved was the fate of the chiefs of 
Bakwa, Todome and Agbozome, Although the Grand Council dropped its 
charges against Nana Akototse, it insisted that the destoolment proceedings 
against the other chiefs be recognized. In 1955 the authorities agreed to establish 
a Commission of Enquiry. During the proceedings, Nana Amoah IV of Bakwa 
announced that he was no longer contesting his destoolment, but the Todome 
and Agbozome chiefs were finally cleared of the charges levelled against them.^^ 
Here ended the Atando affair. In seeking to interpret its significance, one is 
bound to ask whether it was simply a manifestation of deeper factional currents 
in Likpe. Certainly Agya Mensah played the factional card when it suited him, 
but he met with only partial success. Most of the chiefs remained loyal to the 
Okakple, which is why three of them had to be removed. Agya Mensah had to 
steer his way around clan rivalries in Bakwa, Todome and especially Agbozome 
if his coup was to have any chance of success. Similarly, all the clans in Mate 
were solidly behind Nana Akototse. But most importantly, Agya Mensah never 
lost sight of what the dispute was really about: that is, equipping the Bakpele 
with an identity that was meaningful in the changed circumstances of the 1940s. 
The growth of new patterns of ethnic alignment in the colonial period is well 
attested to in research covering diverse parts of he continent.^ Although British 
Togoland was not a colony, many of the same influences can be identified: 
especially commerce and the Churches which privileged one language, Ewe, at 
the expense of the rest; and new boundaries within which communities 
competed for attention. Although Agya Mensah invoked an Akan heritage that 
was deeply rooted in history, this was little more than an audacious fabrication, 
that only had an appeal against the backdrop of integration with the Gold Coast.
90
3.2. Likpe and The Politics of Togoland Unification
3.2.1. Atando and The Surfacing of Party Divisions
There was some chronological overlap between the Atando affair and the first 
stirrings of party politics in Likpe. By 1949, Nana Akototse was already active in 
the Togoland unification movement, while interviews would suggest that the 
CPP first surfaced in 1950.^ In time, the Atando Native Authority came to be 
regarded by the British administration as a key unification stronghold. In 1951, 
the credentials of S.G. Antor were dismissed in the following terms:
"Mr. Antor represents nothing but a handful of political
adventurers in the town of Borada and the Atando Native
Authority area."56
Within Likpe, it was Mate and Bala which provided the most consistent support 
for the TC after 1951. On the other side, the Grand Council citadels of Avedzeme, 
Kukurantumi, Bakwa and Agbozome gave their enthusiastic backing to the CPP. 
The leading party stalwart in Likpe was none other than Nana Agya Mensah 
who, like Nkrumah, had emerged from prison triumphant over the British. In 
January 1954, Agya Mensah led a delegation to F.Y. Asare, then Ministerial 
Secretary for Local Government and Housing and Member of Parliament for 
Buem. The object was to persuade Asare to support the enstoolment of the Grand 
Council nominees in Agbozome and Bakwa, and to secure recognition of one 
Nicholas Soglo as Mate chief.5^ The fact that Agya Mensah and the others were 
campaigning for the re-election of Asare facilitated such an approach, although 
Asare himself had not the weight to pull off such a result. Later, when the 1956 
plebiscite took place, Likpe divided down the middle, as demonstrated in Table
3.3. The pattern of results is broadly consistent with the divisions created by the 
Atando affair and raises the question of whether there was a transfer of loyalties 
from one theatre of competition to the other.
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Table 3.3:
Voting in the Likpe-Lolobi Council Area in  the 
1956 Plebiscite
Ward Union Separation
Lolobi Kumasi 83 599
Lolobi Ashiambi 34 309
Likpe Mate 49 532
Likpe Bala 37 280
Likpe Kukurantumi 354 14
Likpe Todome }
Likpe Bakwa } 304 188
Likpe Avedzeme}
Likpe Agbozome } 166 192
Likpe Koforidua}
Total: 1,027 2,114
(Source: United Nations Trusteeship Council. Report of the United 
Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, p.189)
This question demands two answers. The first is that while there was indeed a 
spillover from one arena to the other, this was initially because the Atando and 
unification issues raised the same bone of contention, namely the relationship 
between the Bakpele and their Ewe neighbours. The major protagonists were 
already involved in territorial politics before the Atando dispute reached a
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crescendo. Agya Mensah recalls that he took an early interest in Gold Coast 
politics. He was first of all a member of the United Gold Coast Convention in 
Accra and then joined the CPP when it broke away in 1949.^9 Equally, Nana 
Akototse had been involved in the Togoland unification movement from the 
early stages. In 1950, he was a signatory to the Natural Rulers resolutions which 
signalled the birth of the TC as a political party.60 it is striking that neither Nana 
Agya Mensah nor Nana Akototse appear to have invoked party support during 
the time that the Atando contest was at its most intense. It was only after the 
Native Authority had been dissolved that Agya Mensah made his approach to 
F.Y, Asare,
As has already been seen, Agya Mensah objected to the Atando N. A. because he 
claimed that it placed the Bakpele in a compromising position with respect to 
Hohoe. Equally he felt that a united Togoland would merely entrench Ewe 
hegemony, whereas the latter would constitute just a minority within a greater 
Gold Coast. Conversely, Nana Akototse approached Atando and the unification 
questions from the same basic assumption that the relationship between the 
Bakpele and the Ewe was symbiotic. His involvement within the Native 
Authority, of which he was twice the President, reinforced this perception. In 
Hohoe he came into contact with leading unificationists, such as S.G. Antor and 
A.K. Senoo who especially valued his support at a time when many of the chiefs 
were still wavering. It was Nana Sekyere who helped to make the alliance a 
lasting one. His membership of the Southern Togoland Council since 1949 is 
proof that he too exhibited an early interest in the politics of the Trust Territory. 
Forced to flee from Agbozome as a consequence of the Atando affair, he settled 
in Hohoe and married the daughter of Togbe Gabusu, the Gbi Headchief. The 
latter was greatly influenced by Senoo and Antor, who hailed from Hohoe and 
Logba respectively. Nana Sekyere came to occupy a prominent position in the TC 
front line, serving as both the Vice-Chairman and Vice-President of the party.1^  
Whereas other minority communities defected to the CPP in the 1950s, the 
Atando connection cemented a loyal band of unificationists within Likpe.
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Secondly, while ethnicity was an important catalyst, it was rapidly transcended 
by other considerations as the debate over the future of Togoland opened up. The 
CPP captured the imagination of the younger and more educated sections of the 
community who saw their own class aspirations mirrored within the party. A 
surprising number of Bakpele were either ex-servicemen or had lived and ‘"" // / 
worked in the Gold Coast, which meant that they tended to keenio abreast of 
current events. The populist image of the CPP was deeply seductive, but support 
for integration was also based on a shrewd appreciation of where the best 
interests of the territory lay. The Gold Coast was more richly endowed than 
Togoland, while French Togoland appeared foreign and somewhat provincial. 
Although Agya Mensah was a chief, the breadth of his horizons was typical of 
his generation. At least one District Commissioner was impressed by the figure 
he cut:
"This individual is an educated young man and frequent visitor to
Accra, who quoted at length from the Coussey Report and
Abraham Lincoln."62
The most influential element within the TC was the collection of so-called 
'German scholars', who were an identifiable element in most communities in 
Togoland. These were older men who nurtured some memories of German rule 
and had often supported the Togo Bund in the 1930s. Some of the TC activists 
had even been interned for their pro-German sympathies during the Second 
World War. Their assessment of British rule was generally unflattering, although 
they rated the French even lower down the evolutionary scale of rulers - an 
interesting inversion of colonially inspired racism. Their goal was to reconstruct 
the golden age of a united Togoland as it had existed in German times.
The balance of influence between the youngmen and the scholars varied from 
one village to another, tilting the political scale in one direction or the other. In
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the words of Nana Soglo Alio III:
"The old German educated people were Ablode [supporters of 
unification]. Mate had many of these people and so was strongly 
Ablode unlike Kukurantumi, Bakwa and Avedzeme."63
Frank Tsaku, the most committed CPP supporter in Hohoe, made a similar
observation about that town.6^ Where the youngmen were preponderant, the
CPP performed most successfully. Not surprisingly, these tended to be the same
villages where the chiefs had been weakened by destoolment actions. Yet there
was inevitably some reshuffling of political alliances following the Atando saga.
Some older men, who had endorsed the Grand Council campaign could not
bring themselves to rally behind the CPP ^ Conversely, there were youngmen in
•■r
Mate and Bala who subscribed to the goal of integration with the Gold Coast. On 
the whole, realignment in the mid-1950s tendecl'favour of the TC. Whereas Nana 
Akototse was in a minority over Atando, the TC won the uppeijhand in Likpe as 
a whole. Todome, which had previously expelled its chief, was one village where 
the TC was able to reverse the flow. The party fought to ward off the opposite 
scenario in Mate. There Nicholas and Victor Soglo (later Nana Soglo Alio II and 
III respectively) clashed with their father and other senior members of their clan, 
who were committed unificationists.6^ Mensah Lemboe of the rival Kalelenti 
clan, who was destined to become one of the greatest foes of Nana Soglo Alio III, 
was drawn into the ranks of the CPP alongside the brothers and became one of 
the most articulate advocates of the CPP cause.
3.2.2. The Levels of Political Debate
It remains to comment upon the mechanisms through which, and also the 
enthusiasm with which, ordinary Bakpele were drawn into the political fray. The 
tempo of Togoland politics was sustained at a consistently high level as a 
consequence of successive elections (in 1954 and in 1956) and the periodic tours 
of the United Nations Visiting Missions. These ensured that territorial politics 
never went off the boil and regularly infiltrated the local arena. The political rally
was the most effective medium of political communication: it provided good 
entertainment and an adept speaker could use the opportunity to draw subtle 
links between the concerns of the community and the ’unification versus 
integration' issue. Those whose sympathies lay with the TC were fortunate in that 
Hohoe, an ideal location for public meetings, was within comparatively easy 
travelling distance. The CPP was unable to hold its rallies in Hohoe without 
incurring the wrath of the chief and elders and even running the risk of physical 
injury The party faithful therefore needed to travel further afield, to Jasikan or 
Kpandu, in order to satisfy their diet of politics. On the other hand, the CPP was 
better funded and generally better organized. Consequently, it could lay on 
vehicles and travelling speakers, who brought the CPP message direct to the 
villages. On one occasion in the early 1950s, Kwame Nkrumah spoke at a rally in 
Bakwa, a performance which President Hilla Limann was to repeat three decades 
la ter.
It would have been surprising if the Bakpele had completely compartmentalized 
local issues from Togoland affairs. But what is noteworthy is the extent to which 
the messages disseminated by the party machines were received, reproduced 
and embellished by activists at the village level. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 give the 
reasons why respondents said they supported either unification or integration. 
Ethnic considerations were accorded a distinctly limited significance. This is 
partly because ethnicity ceased to provide a useful guide to political action. 
Whereas Nana Agya Mensah was suspicious of things Ewe, by the mid-1950s, he 
belonged to a party which had a significant Ewe following and which was 
engaged in a bitter struggle with Ashanti sub-nationalism. If Nana Agya Mensah 
and others were disorientated, they did not let it show. Instead, they restored the 
ethnic card to the pack and concentrated on the benefits that they believed would 
flow from full political integration. This illustrates the rapidity with which the 
political arena was expanding at this time.
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Most of those who backed the reunification option referred to the historical fact 
that the Togolands had previously comprised a single territorial unit. There was 
a curious non sequitur in this line of reasoning, but it was one that was shared by 
the party leadership which never explained why it was so important to 
reconstruct a territory which Europeans had invented which had only existed for 
a period of some thirty years. A number of respondents also recalled the 
apprehension that if British Togoland had been integrated with the Gold Coast, 
the French would have had an excuse to absorb their section of Togoland into 
the E m p i r e . ^  This echoed warnings issued by Antor and the leadership of the 
party. The TC apparently had less success with the argument that, since 
Togoland had hitherto suffered from its relationship with the colony, there 
would be advantages to a looser relationship in future. The CPP activists in Likpe 
merely replied that since French Togoland was an impoverished territory, the 
wealthier British section would end up subsidizing its development. On the other 
hand, if they opted for integration, Togolanders could legitimately claim a share 
of the substantial resources at the disposal of the CPP administration in Accra. 
The Bakpele could also have their cake and eat it, since the French Togolanders 
might be persuaded to join the fold at a later date.
The CPP made important political capital out of its professed commitment to 
economic development and social welfare. The Bakpele were especially 
susceptible because, like many of the minorities^they had been doubly 
disadvantaged: first by being part of Togoland and then by their reluctance to 
accept the terms of amalgamation. On the first score, it was the Bakpele rather 
than the authorities who had constructed the road between west Likpe and 
Hohoe. In the mid-1940s, Nana Akototse had tried to build another road across 
the mountain to Danyi, but had to abandon the scheme because the 
administration would not help with the rock-blasting that was required. On the 
second score, the authorities had decided on a punitive approach. The
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unamalgamated Divisions had been denied the right to establish their own
Treasuries or to raise local taxes, imposing narrow limits on their capacity for
s e l f - h e l p .^  This briefly changed when Likpe joined Atando, but the Grand
Council campaign against taxation hardened the attitude of the authorities once
more. At the end of 1949 when a teacher petitioned the District Commissioner
about the state of the roads in the area, he received the following terse reply:
"The first question which arises is what are the Likpe people 
prepared to do to help themselves? Do they pay their taxes to their 
Native Authority? If so, have they approached their Native 
Authority for assistance? If the Native Authority can give them a 
grant will they turn out and give a hand to make the money go 
further? Government cannot do everything. It has this year taken 
over the Likpe-Mate road. How can Government control the 
weather?"6^
Nana Agya Mensah may also have been correct to argue that the principal 
beneficiary of the Atando setup was not Likpe but Hohoe. By 1951, Hohoe could 
boast a water supply, a new hospital and St. Francis Teachers Training College.^ 
Likpe had little to show for its involvement, apart from a Government agreement 
to maintain the Hohoe road.
Those communities which had held out longest against the amalgamation policy 
were conscious that they had been excluded from many of the fruits of post-war 
development. The CPP exploited this grievance both by playing the minorities off 
against the Ewe majority (where appropriate) and by promising a substantial 
injection of funds into those communities that rallied to the party flag. This 
explains why most of the 'rebel' communities delivered their votes to Nkrumah 
en masse. This aspect of the political equation has hitherto received little 
attention.
The contrasting experiences of Anfoega and Hohoe illustrated the lasting 
significance of the choices that were made. Like Nkonya, Anfoega converted to 
the CPP at an early date and was handsomely rew arded.^ Hohoe remained 
loyal to Antor and suffered the consequences. It never became the Regional
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capital, although it was the logical choice for commercial and geographical
reasons. In the words of Kwaku:
"By 1960, Anfoega had a Teacher Training College, a government 
supported Church hospital, a secondary school, local council 
offices, a tarred main street, post office and a police station... The 
roads leading into Hohoe were among the worst in the Region. The 
stretch from Golokwati to Hohoe was so gutted and dusty that the 
dust was popularly referred to as 'Antor atama’ (Antor's snuff)."'^
Naturally, the CPP urged the Bakpele to follow the precedent of Anfoega and
Nkonya rather than Hohoe,
Within Likpe itself amenities were channelled almost exclusively towards CPP 
villages. When Nkrumah visited Likpe, he promised Bakwa the money for a 
health centre, which would have been more conveniently sited in Mate. The most 
bizarre use of patronage was the tarring of the road that from one end of 
Kukurantumi to the other. As Table 3,5 would suggest, most people who 
supported the CPP did so because they believed that benefits would flow from 
closer association with the Gold Coast. This was not merely a question of access 
to amenities. Many of the younger Bakpele aspired to some type of paid 
employment, which they were unlikely to gain under conditions of reunification, 
since they did not speak French. A buoyant Gold Coast, on the other hand, held 
out interesting prospects. Yet the Bakpele were not entirely mercenary in their 
approach to politics. Many felt a genuine attachment towards the Gold Coast 
which was every bit as real as the Togoland nationalism of the 'German scholars'. 
It is significant that so many respondents mentioned the achievement of 
independence as the factor that led them into the integrationist camp.
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Table 3.4;
Responses to the Question: "If You Supported 
Unification, Why Did You Do So?"
Reasons Number Percentage
1, British and French Togoland 
to be one 34
used
85.0
2. Similarity between the Bakpele and the Ewe 0 0.0
3. Difficulties created by the 
frontier 3 7.5
4. Lack of development/exploitation 
Togoland 2
of
5.0
5, Other 1 2.5
Total: 40 100.0%
(Survey of Likpe, 1986)
Table 3.5:
Responses to the Question: "If You Supported Integration With 
the Gold Coast, Why Did You Do So?"
Reasons Number Percentage
1. The Bakpele are not Ewe 1 1,0
2. French Togoland was a poor territory 4 3.9
3. Integration with Gold Coast 
woulcTenhance development
52 50.5
4. Would achieve independence 
more quickly
45 43.7
5. Other 1 1.0
Total: 103 100.1
(Survey of Likpe, 1986)^
Although the CPP appeared to build on a firmer base, the TC held a slight edge 
in the electoral contests that took place in Likpe before 1957. A CPP Member of 
Parliament was elected for the Buem constituency in 1954 and again in 1956 (see
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Tables 3.6 and 3.7), but the TC had the upperhand in Likpe itself. This was
largely because it commanded greater influence in the more populous towns of
Mate and Bala. The TC might have extended its base of support were it not for /
y
the robust tactics employed by the CPP^In Bakwa, TC sympathisers were fined by 
the chief and elders, while in Kukurantumi they were driven out of the village.
Despite the safeguard of a secret ballot, Ablode supporters in Bakwa claimed was 
the juju was used to drive them out of the Congress.^ The atmosphere was more 
relaxed in villages where the TC was preponderant. A policy of neutrality was 
pursued by the Todome chief, and even Nana Akototse avoided forcing his 
opinions upon Mate. It is possible that he was too ill to do so: in 1955, before the 
plebiscite was held, Nana Akototse finally died.
Table 3.6:
The 1954 Election Result By Local Council Area in the Buem 
_____________________Constituency____________________
Area Votes Cast F.Y. Asare (CPP) A.K. Odame (TC)
Buem 3,598 2,116 1,482
Biakoye 2,411 1,435 976
Likpe-Lolobi 2,276 966 1,310
Nkonya 2,764 2,585 179
Total: 11,049 7,102 3,947
(Source: GNA (Ho) DA/D117 "Togoland Plebiscite: Villages and' 
Wards")
Table 3.7:
The 1956 Election Result, Buem Constituency
Votes F.Y. Asare (CPP) A.K. Odame (TC) W.W. Antwi
16,017 9,449 6,273 295
(Source: Gold Coast Gazette. 28 July 1956)
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3.3. Conclusion:
The Special Report on the Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem, which
followed a United Nations Mission in 1952, commented on the state of political
awareness as follows:
"The Mission saw keen political battles being fought by the various 
political parties using modern campaign techniques.,. One feature 
of the work of the present Mission was the large number of 
communications received on the unification question. The total was 
2,899... In one center theMission received witnin a few minutes 325 
such communications,"75
This impression of political vitality is confirmed by the record from Likpe.
In the 1930s, there was already a vocal minority within the community which 
harked back to the German era and was punished by the administration for its 
temerity. After the War, however, political awareness was more evenly spread. In 
the first instance, sectionalism was an important spur to political action. While 
northern Ewe teachers were spearheading opposition to Anlo penetration, the 
Bakpele engaged in a struggle to define the terms of their own identity. Nana 
Agya Mensah was a fervent critic of Ewe cultural and economic imperialism, of 
which Hohoe was the most immediate symbol, and looked instead towards the 
Akan heartland. Togbe Akototse, on the other hand, viewed the Ewe influence as 
essentially benign and perceived closer links with Hohoe as being in the best 
interests of the community. In all of this, it is difficult to identify the replay of 
established factional cleavages outlined by Coleman. What was enacted was not 
the same old scenes with slightly different props: British administrative policy 
had entirely rewritten the script.
Over time, ethnicity was subsumed by weightier questions about the fate of 
Togoland once the Gold Coast received its independence. The attitudes of the 
Bakpele seem to reflect the calculations of pork-barrel politics (or 'belly politics') 
that is familiar from studies of rural Africa. This might be taken as evidence for a
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highly localized field of political vision, but even on this apparently secure 
ground one has to exercise caution. If the Bakpele and others took an avid 
interest in roads, schools and hospitals (as opposed to ideological debate, which 
usually comes back to those issues anyway), that was because they had seen 
precious little of these facilities since the assumption of British rule. The 
minorities had fared worse than most, precisely because they had refused to 
co-operate with the amalgamation policy on the grounds of being distinct from 
the Ewe. There is therefore a strong thread of continuity from the local political 
struggles of the 1930-40s (to which even Buem was not immune) through to the 
1950s.
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Chapter Four:
,rThe Parties Have Fought And Settled It":
The Triumph of the Integrationists in Likpe, 1956-1969
In the two years preceding the 1956 plebiscite, British Togoland was finely poised 
between the advocates of unification and of integration. The rout of the Togoland 
Congress (TC) that followed could not easily have been predicted, but was 
comprehensively achieved by the end of the decade. The Convention People's 
Party (CPP) established a monopoly of power at every level of government, from 
the Local Councils through the Regional administration to the central 
government. The unification movement never recovered from the blow, although 
traces of its support base remained at the time of the inauguration of the Second 
Republic. This Chapter seeks to account for this turn of events using a 
combination of evidence drawn from the Regional and local levels. The 
chronological span is extensive and somewhat unconventional. It is customary to 
approach Ghanaian politics using the chronological markers provided by the 
First Republic (1957-66),! the military inter-regnum (1966-1969) and the Second 
Republic (1969-1972). However, it is more convenient for the purposes of the 
argument to commence with the aftermath of the 1956 plebiscite and to conclude 
on the elections of 1969.
4.1, A Post-Mortem of the Unification Movement
In the wake of the 1956 plebiscite and the election of that year, the Togoland 
Congress was left in a greatly weakened position. The leadership had constantly 
assured the party faithful that victory was within their grasp. The majority vote 
in favour of integration and the refusal of the United Nations to consider the 
Southern figures separately brought the first rude shock. When the CPP won a 
decisive victory over the combined opposition parties in the subsequent election, 
and even increased its share of the poll in Southern Togoland, the full 
implications became obvious for the first time: the Trust Territory was to be
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absorbed within the Gold Coast and on the terms of the CPP. The Congress was 
left with the choice of raising the stakes or trying to salvage as much as possible 
from the wreckage.
In the first instance, the party inclined towards compromise. As has been noted, 
the leadership had already reconciled itself to the principle of a continuing 
association with the Gold Coast. As early as 1954, unificationists had offered 
federalism as an acceptable basis on which to ground such an association:
"There is a middle way. A middle way which will be acceptable to 
the Ewes as well as the non-Ewes; the inhabitants of the British half 
and those of the French half of Togoland. And what dictation 
cannot achieve, compromise will. That way is federation."2
During the plebiscite campaign, the leadership sought to win over wavering
voters with an assurance that links with the Gold Coast would not be severed if
the 'No' option triumphed:
"In casting your vote, therefore, vote solidly for separation from the 
Gold Coast pending Unification of the two Togolands. Unified 
Togoland shall seek a relation with self-governing Gold Coast after 
Unification and Independence. The statement that Togo shall at all 
cost go under French rule, is hundred per cent untrue."^
Once the results were known, unificationists again exhibited their flexibility. In 
February 1957 a number of prominent chiefs from Akpini, Asogli, Gbi and Likpe 
sent petitions to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. They repeated their 
misgivings about the way the vote was counted, but signalled their willingness to 
abide by the result on condition that they were granted a separate Regional 
Assembly.^ In another petition, several Buem chiefs concurred with this demand, 
but revived the idea of excluding the Gold Coast Ewes (and possibly those of 
Togoland) from any such Region.^ The TC leaders were said to be working on 
their own proposal for Regional autonomy as late as two days after 
independence.^
With the benefit of hindsight, one might argue that Antor and his colleagues 
gravely miscalculated in linking arms with the other opposition parties and
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associating with their Proposals For A Federal Constitution-  ^The TC might have 
made a case for special treatment on grounds of the unique status of the British 
Togoland and the need to lure French Togoland into a political union. By making 
common cause with the National Liberation Movement (NLM), the party placed 
its feet firmly in the enemy camp from the stand-point of the CPP. The latter 
spurned the federal option, arguing that it would prove both costly and 
divisive.** The political deadlock, manifested in the opposition boycott of the 
Bourne Commission and the Achimota Conference, was what persuaded the 
British Government of the need to organize a fresh round of national elections in 
1956.9 victorious at the polls, the CPP was hardly likely to concede to the 
opposition what it had withheld until then. Nevertheless, there were sufficient 
signs of flexibility early in 1957 for the path of compromise to seem a viable one. 
The CPP conceded the formation of Regional assemblies and interim bodies were 
established pending the report of the Regional Constitutional Commission. For 
their part, the opposition parties agreed to co-operate in hastening the final 
stages to independence.
But there was also an section within the unification movement which favoured 
more resolute opposition to what was interpreted as the unwarranted annexation 
of Togoland. As Independence Day approached, plans were set in motion to 
foment a crisis that would compel the United Nations to reconsider its earlier 
ruling on integration. By February 1957, armed gangs were reportedly gathering 
in the bush in different parts of the Region. Towards the end of that month and in 
early March, the Police discovered secret military camps and caches of explosives 
in the vicinity of Alavanyo (bordering Nkonya, where a Forest Reserve had been 
created in 1931) and Hodzo (north-east of Ho). In the days leading up to and 
including Independence Day, there were violent clashes between militant Ablode 
supporters and the Police in the towns of Jasikan, Kpandu and Hohoe. ^  The role 
the Congress leadership in these proceedings is unclear. In Parliament, Antor 
denied the existence of a plot and rather than defend the use of force, he focussed 
on alleged Government mishandling of the affair. ^  Antor and Kodzo Ayeke
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were brought to trial and sentenced to six year terms of imprisonment, but were 
later acquitted on a p p e a l . ^  Regardless of who was responsible, the consensus is 
that the militants were poorly organized and clearly no match for a Government 
which could call on the Police and the Armed F o r c e s . ^  The United Nations was 
not tempted to intervene and the incidents only presented Nkrumah with the 
ideal opportunity to deal with the unificationist menace as he saw fit.
The abundant literature dealing with the First Republic is virtually unanimous 
about the creeping authoritarianism of the Nkrumah regime. There is, however, 
some disagreement as to whether the source of intolerance lay in the character of 
the CPP as a party and the personal defects of Nkrumah, or in an over-reaction to 
security threats that were genuine enough.^ In Trans-Volta Togoland, the 
behaviour of the CPP was arguably a symptom of insecurity. Although the 
Alavanyo incident was resolved with comparatively easily, the Government 
remained extremely sensitive to the threat of secession. Not all harassment was 
initiated from above. Thus, it was the chiefs who levied fines upon TC members 
in the Buem towns of Borada, Jasikan and Ahamansu after independence. ^  
Nevertheless, the riots did help to set in motion a cycle of official repression 
which was repeated periodically until the fall of Nkrumah in February 1966. In 
the immediate aftermath of the riots, the authorities swooped down upon 
unificationists in towns and villages throughout the Region. By early April, 355 
people had been arrested and many of these were put on trial. The Peace 
Preservation Order remained in place in some areas until 1959. With the passage 
of the Preventive Detention Act in 1958, it became that much easier to deal with 
'subversives’ - a category which grew ever wider.
The clamp-down on the opposition parties, which regrouped as the United Party 
(UP) in November 1957, was assisted by a tighter administrative grip imposed on 
the Regions. After the Regional Constitutional Commission reported in 1958, the 
Government diluted the powers of the proposed Regional assemblies, effectively 
reducing them to an advisory ro le .^  The UP boycotted the elections, which
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enabled the CPP to capture the assemblies and then to wind them up the 
following year. To add insult to injury, the Government obliterated the most 
visible legacy of the Trusteeship period when it abruptly changed the name of 
Trans-Volta Togoland to the Volta Region in 1 9 5 9 . The mechanisms through 
which the CPP established its grip over the Volta Region were much the same as 
in other parts of the country. The Regional Commissioner, who together with the 
District Commissioners became the principal locus of power, was a political 
appointee whose loyalties lay to central government in Accra.-*® He was selected 
on the basis of his ability to detect and to snuff out political dissent before it 
reached dangerous levels. The rules of the game were set in 1958 when Krobo 
Edusei, who had already demonstrated his talent for a rough-house mode of 
politics, was appointed Acting Regional Commissioner. He made no secret of his 
willingness to use force in dealing with the unification movement. Thus he
informed a gathering of civil servants that:
"... for sometime the government has
reaching Accra that there are in this region - particularly in the Ho,
s been concerned with reports 
j  
Kpandu and Buem-Krachi districts - elements engaged'in
lawlessness and acts of subversion aimed against the state of Ghana 
and her citizens... and the government has determined on swift and 
effective action to [deal with] lawlessness and intimidation. That is 
why I have come here with the instructions from the Cabinet to take
confidence in TVT.
Before long, opposition Members of Parliament were complaining about the 
indiscriminate arrest of supporters and the destoolment of chiefs who were 
sympathetic to the unification cause. There were two noteworthy casualties in 
1958. The Gbi Chief, Togbe Gabusu IV, was forced into exile and was 
subsequently proclaimed destooled.21 The Government also took advantage of a 
long-standing chieftaincy dispute in Ho to depose the pro-unification Dome chief 
and transfer the stool to the rival Bankoe clan .^  There are striking parallels with 
the way in which the Nkrumah regime manipulated traditional politics in 
Ashanti and in the N orth ,^  Ironically, the success with which the regime stifled 
dissent in the Volta Region merely contributed to its sense of insecurity in the 
longer term. Under the threat of detention, many unificationists moved beyond
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the boundaries of the state to Togo, where they remained a potential threat for as 
long as the government there was prepared to back subversion.
A year after Ghanaian independence, there was little cause for immediate 
concern. It appeared as if Nkrumah might even resolve the reunification issue 
through a process of negotiation. In 1958, the Comity de l'Unit(§ Togolais (CUT) 
under the leadership of Sylvanus Olympio abandoned its boycott of the electoral 
process and won a sweeping and unexpected victory at the p o l is h  Olympio had 
always stood out as the most articulate spokesman for the Ewe and Togoland 
unification causes, while exhibiting a distinct lack of enthusiasm for membership 
of the French community. The CPP embraced members who had once worked 
alongside Olympio and who remained favourably disposed towards him. Partly 
for this reason, the Nkrumah regime contributed material assistance to the CUT 
campaign effort in 1958.^
As has often been noted, Olympio and Nkrumah entertained very different 
political expectations.^ Whereas Nkrumah was hoping for full political union, 
Olympio was unwilling to submerge the sovereignty of Togo in a new state 
where Ghanaians would be numerically preponderant. Nkrumah did not 
improve his chances of success when he publicly speculated that Togo might 
become the seventh Region of Ghana. Olympio, who was unwilling to look 
beyond the formation of a customs union, opted for complete independence from 
France in 1960. Nkrumah then unwisely attempted to coerce him into 
reconsidering his position. He sealed the border at the end of that year, 
explaining that this course of action was necessary in order to bring home to 
Olympio the folly of perpetuating such an artificial boundary .^
By this time, the delineation of the frontier had become a bone of contention in 
itself. After 1957, communities the length of the border solicited the aid of their 
respective governments in a bid to displace stranger farmers from what they 
claimed were their lands. The truth was that many communities, including
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Likpe, had land on the wrong side of the frontier which they had been allowed to 
farm as a result of an Anglo-French accord. In the Krachi district, Adele farmers 
from French Togoland who had farmed for decades in the vicinity of Dadiase, 
Breniase and Shiare were harassed by the resident population. The Akposso 
similarly tried to expel Buem farmers living on the Togolese side of the b o r d e r  
These cases illustrate the naivety of portraying border peoples as the innocent 
victims of state rivalries: the reality is that these communities have as often 
manipulated uncertain national frontiers to their own advantage. Nkrumah 
preferred to settle these border disputes within the framework of a political 
union rather than negotiate on the demarcation of the frontier. Once Olympio 
opted for independence, the possibility of an amicable settlement evaporated and 
the frontier was established as an additional irritant in relations between Lome 
and Accra.
In 1960, the Nkrumah regime began to suspect the Togolese of plotting the 
secession of the former Trust Territory. In January informers infiltrated a meeting 
held at the Togolese border town of Yikpa, a few miles to the south of Likpe, 
which confirmed these suspicions. The Government planned to arrest the 
Ghanaian participants once they crossed the border, but was thwarted when the 
Togolese provided political asylum. Amongst those who accepted the offer was 
Reverend Ametowobla, the Member of Parliament for Ho West. A renewed bout 
of detentions ensued, which led to another flood of refugees over the frontier. By 
June the refugee population numbered 800 in Palim6 a l o n e .  ^ 9
The following year, events took a further twist when a power struggle within the 
CPP led to the defection of Komla Gbedemah from the ruling party. Gbedemah 
had not only been instrumental in building the CPP into an effective national 
machine, but had also made it a credible force within Eweland. Although the 
split is generally regarded as ideological, it also marked the intensification of 
ethnic rivalries within the regime. Gbedemah was accused of corruption along 
with a number of party stalwarts and was stripped of his Finance Portfolio, He
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responded with an attack in Parliament on the creeping authoritarianism of the 
regime and then retreated into e x i l e . I n  subsequent years, the authorities 
alleged that he was plotting the overthrow of the Government with the backing 
of Kofi Busia and the Togolese government.^
In January 1963, Sylvanus Olympio was assassinated in a military coup in which 
many African leaders and external observers detected the hand of Nkrumah. The 
incoming Grunitzky regime was even less likely than the CUT to endorse 
political union, but there were early signs that it might be willing to expel the 
dissidents on its soil.^2 More cordial relations between the two regimes were 
symbolized in the reopening of the frontier. But, although the exchanges never 
became quite as acrimonious, the honeymoon soon ended in recriminations over 
the frontier, Togolese import duties and the methods used by the Nkrumah 
regime to stamp out the rising tide of smuggling 33 Thus, the CPP regime 
remained vulnerable on its eastern flank until the end.
To the authorities, the proliferation of subversive material inside the Volta 
Region suggested a co-ordinated campaign to provoke internal disorder. The 
leaflets that circulated contained two potentially explosive appeals. Firstly, they 
combined the traditions of the unification movement with the personal authority 
of Komla Gbedemah - a blend that would have seemed incongruous before 1960. 
Secondly, they appealed to the chiefs as the bearers of popular legitimacy. 
Although most of the chiefs protested their loyalty to the CPP, there was some 
evidence of restiveness by 1964 when even the President of the House of Chiefs 
complained about neglect of the Region.3^ These two elements were fused in a 
letter (attributed to an 'Ewe-Togo Democratic Union') urging the chiefs to take a 
stand against Nkrumah:
"Togbiwo and Nananom. Rather tell him in no equivocal terms to
release all Ewe and Togolese detainees forthwith, restore Komla
Agbeli Gbedemah to his right position of the right-hand of 
remove the Ghana-Togo frontier at once, and ensure full Ec 
and Freedom to Ewes and Togolanders^Without these, bac 
overthrow him and his godless gang."35
sower, 
uality 
< us to
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In this case, the Regional administration swiftly instructed the chiefs to surrender 
all copies of the letter for destruction.
Growing suspicion of Ewe loyalties (usually taken to include the minorities) 
underlay patterns of recruitment into the highest offices of Government and 
state. Following the disgrace of Gbedemah, F.K.D. Goka from Tongu was 
ushered in to serve as Minister of Finance, a post which he lost in 1965. F.Y. Asare 
(the Member of Parliament for Buem) was stripped of his portfolio and charged 
with corruption in 1964,®® Joseph Kodzo was elevated to the Cabinet, but he 
represented the Akan-Krachi constituency in the north of the Region. After 1965, 
no Ewes were included in the Cabinet.®'7 Following a series of bomb blasts, 
assassination bids and rumours of coups, Nkrumah also embarked upon a 
systematic purge of the security services. This began with the Police in 1962 and 
culminated in the dismissal three years later of Major-Generals Otu and Ankrah, 
the Chief of Defence Staff and his Deputy respectively.®® The purges were not 
always damaging to Ewe officers. For example, J.W.K. Harlley became Chief 
Commissioner of Police following the dismissal and detention of E.R.T. 
Madjitey,®^ Nevertheless, the growing tendency for Nkrumah to rely upon 
Northerners and people from his Nzima homeland only heightened Ewe 
concerns at a time when the sympathies of the Volta Region were under close 
scrutiny. /
regime /
The basic insecurity of the Nkrumay, which induced it to lash out at real and /
imaginary opponents, does not imply that the unification movement had
recaptured the political initiative. On the contrary, its political infrastructure
collapsed under the full weight of Government pressure. After 1961, the
leadership was either in exile (like Reverend Ametowobla) or in detention (like
Antor). The political vacuum at the local level was filled by the ruling party even
in areas that had been most stubbornly Ablode. The most striking reversal took
place in Kpandu North, the constituency that had been the virtual fiefdom of S.G.
Antor. After his detention in the wake of the 1961 railway strike, the seat was
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declared vacant and one of the small core of CPP activists in Hohoe, Frank Tsaku, 
was elected unopposed to fill it.^O This seizure of the Congress headquarters 
invited comparison with Wenchi where the seat of Kofi Busia similarly fell to the 
ruling party. The ecstatic CPP branch assured F.Y. Asare in triumphalist tones 
that Hohoe would undergo a conversion every bit as profound:
"...Hohoe shall be what Wenchi now is in the Brong-Ahafo Region - 
an impregnable stronghold where all knees shall bow [sic] in 
support of the Government, and within their bounds, opposition 
shall be lost in 'oblivion". *
The CPP entrenched itself at every tier of government, choking off opposition 
access to resources and rewarding individual and community loyalties through 
the dispensation of patronage - although this tended to shrink over time. United 
Party supporters were left without protection or the means with which to fight 
back. Throughout the Region, therefore, they broke ranks and defected to the 
enemy. The breakup of TC networks was assisted by the enforced exile of key 
activists at the town and village level. The Ablode forces were scattered not just 
because Togoland unification appeared too distant a goal to strive for, but 
ultimately because the fundamental objectives were somewhat hazy. The contrast 
here with some of the more successful African separatist movements is 
instructive: whereas the Eritreans harboured a historic sense of grievance 
towards Amharic Ethiopia and were prepared to take up arms to restore their 
independence, Togoland unificationists lacked an evocative image of the past (at 
least, for those below the age of sixty) or a compelling vision of the future. In that 
sense, 'greater Togoland' ceased to define a realistic imagined community.
Having made these general observations, it may be helpful to elaborate with 
reference to Likpe.
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4.2. The Ascendancy of the Convention People's Party in 
Likpe
4.2.1. Coercion From Above, Desertion From Below
Political developments inside the Volta Region were played out in microcosm 
within Likpe. Following the plebiscite and election of 1956, pro-Ablode chiefs and 
elders such as Nana Komla Dihie of Todome were associated with the 
olive-branch petitions to the Secretary of State. At the same time, local activists 
were involved in more militant tactics. The Parliamentary statement by Ako 
Adjei to the effect that it was people from outlying villages who had attempted to 
disrupt the independence preparations at Jasikan, is confirmed by sources in 
L ik p e  42 They tell of an appeal (the origin of which is unclear) for ex-servicemen 
to convene at Ja s ik a n .4 3  in the riot that ensued on 4  March, at least one man from 
Mate was seriously injured. This was followed by a Police raid on Likpe to round 
up the culprits and destroy bush encampments like the one discovered at 
A la v a n y o .4 4  in consequence, a number of leading TC members were arrested. 
G.K. Kumesi, the Mate party Chairman received a prison sentence of 18 months, 
while Henry Kwashigah (the Secretary) received 6 m o n th s .45 Further arrests 
followed in 1959 and the next year still more rounded up after the infiltration of 
the meeting at Y ik p a  .46 The success with which the authorities uprooted the 
Congress in Likpe owed much to the willingness of CPP loyalists to expose 
individuals who remained intransigent. By 1959, the CPP in Likpe was able to 
boast that 'Cipipification' was almost complete:
"With reference to records of Branches in this Likpe Division we can 
assure and we hope the government will highly appreciate the 
rapid and healthy growth of C.P.P. on this healthy soil of Likpe 
Division. The only grit in the oil as far as the whole Division is 
concerned is at Likpe Koforidua but we can guarantee that it is no 
hard nut to crack. We are operating hard to convert that town with 
its chief into C.P.P. members."47
The prison sentences imposed upon elderly men such as Kumesi and Kwashigah 
(former members of the Togo Bund) broke their political will. They ceased to
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wield much political influence thereafter. Their colleagues who fled to Togo 
mostly lapsed into political inactivity. In the words of one Mate man who spent 
his exile quietly farming in the vicinity of Akposso Badou and later Palime:
"Everybody was on his own. We only greeted each other. We had
no meetings on Ghanaian affairs."48
These were often years of personal loneliness for the Bakpele who were forced to 
remain in exile. When they returned after the 1966 coup, it was often with the 
firm intention of avoiding political entanglements. Those who chose to remain in 
Likpe had little option but to recant and to enrol in the ruling party. Although 
pioneer CPP members raised their eyebrows at the influx of former 
unificationists into their ranks, this was regarded further up the party hierarchy 
as a measure of achievement.
The prevailing climate of fear was, therefore, a crucial factor behind the collapse 
of opposition within Likpe. Yet it is equally important to appreciate that the CPP 
did win the argument over the national question. The victory of the CPP merely 
hastened the displacement of a generation that had been born around the turn of 
the century by a younger group of political actors, mostly born after 1920. In fact, 
the real significance of the incarceration of Kumesi and Kwashigah was that it 
closed off a competing source of political ideas and reserved centre-stage for the 
new men.
Even if the regime had not resorted to compulsion, the tide was steadily turning. 
The single most important reason was a shift in the political economy of the 
sub-region. For most of the century, an ability to expand cocoa cultivation on 
family lands had conferred on the Bakpele a measure of economic independence. 
But, having settled alongside the Togo mountain range for reasons of security, 
they suffered from a potential shortage of farming land. By the early 1960s, it 
became increasingly difficult for local farmers to acquire sufficient land on which 
to plant new cocoa and coffee. Even in Buem, the legendary abundance of forest 
land was becoming a thing of the p a s t T o  compound matters, both 
Kukurantumi and Bakwa lost cocoa land in the early 1960s as a result of litigation
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with their n e ig h b o u r s .^  The foreclosure of cocoa farming left paid employment 
as the most attractive alternative for talented young men from the community. 
Many Bakpele trained as teachers and sold their skills in other parts of the Region 
or further afield.
It is at this time that Likpe produced its first cohort of University graduates, a 
number of whom penetrated the ranks of the Ghanaian intellectual elite. Ray 
Kakrabah-Quarshie from Agbozome progressed from the Likpe-Mate Roman 
Catholic Junior/Senior School to the O'Reilly Educational Institute in Accra.
From there he gained entry to the prestigious Adisadel College in Cape Coast. In 
about 1958 he entered the University of Ghana, where he became General 
Secretary of the National Union of Ghanaian Students in 1961. In later years, he 
made a reputation for himself as a writer and founder member of the Progress 
P a r t y J . K .  Kafe, who originated from the same village, attended St. Augustine's 
College in Cape Coast until 1956 and then entered the University of Ghana. He 
later studied at London University and in due course became Librarian at the 
University of G h a n a .52 The career of Dr. Obed Asamoah, who embarked on a 
career as a lawyer, is outlined in greater detail below. These individuals served as 
role-models for others who were to follow in their footsteps. In the early 1960s, 
they were fairly inconsequential within community politics, but their insertion 
into the Ghanaian intellectual milieu represented a further significant step in the 
political integration of Likpe.
The triumph of integrationist ideology needs, however, to be distinguished from 
the ascendancy of the CPP as a party. There were undoubtedly a good many 
Bakpele who were members of the CPP because they identified with what it 
stood for. These individuals had usually enlisted in the CPP in the early 1950s. 
But the party did gain genuine converts at a later stage. What seems to have 
impressed people most about the CPP was its commitment to a rapid 
transformation of the socio-economic environment - often involving the very 
'gigantomania' which has evoked such critical comment from economists.53
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Although the functions of the state expanded under dyarchy, some of most 
important initiatives came to fruition after independence. Of some significance 
was the Adomi bridge over the Volta, which was completed in early 1957. It 
provided a direct road link between the Volta Region and Accra for the first 
tim e .^  It is well-known that the Volta Lake caused considerable dislocation and 
yet it made a deep impression on the Bakpele who had to endure none of the 
in c o n v e n ie n c e .^  in the educational field, the First Republic witnessed a 
significant expansion of secondary schools and Training Colleges.^ Although 
none was physically located in Likpe, it was at last possible to acquire a decent 
education without leaving the Region. The perception that rapid improvements 
were possible, which contrasted so obviously with the incremental model of 
progress embodied in colonial ideology, helps to explain some startling changes 
of political position. The son of G.K. Kumesi, who might have been expected to 
harbour a special grudge against the ruling party, articulated a common 
response:
"Even though Nkrumah defeated our party, the way he started our 
development projects, we saw he was going to do something good 
for us. 7
Nevertheless, a large section of the community embraced the CPP for more 
mercenary reasons. A recurring theme during interviews was the contrast 
between political alignments before and after independence. In the early days, it 
was noted, people joined parties out of political conviction, whereas personal 
expedience took precedence after 1957. The instrumentality of rural politics is a 
theme that is familiar from the research of Maxwell O w usu .^  Although he 
interprets it as the persistence of an Akan political culture forged within 
pre-colonial Akan polities, this is less applicable to Likpe where traditional 
authorities never commanded access to economic resources such as land. The 
most obvious reasons are more compelling.
On the one hand, the departing colonial power never established an effective 
local government machinery, which might have enabled rural communities to
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sustain their own development objectives autonomously of the state. The Local 
and District Councils which were established after 1951 arose from the wreckage 
of the Native Authorities. The councils of Trans-Volta Togoland were shackled 
by many of the problems that are familiar from other parts of the country: 
including shortages of finance and fierce local rivalries which were often a 
hangover from the amalgamation period. Although the Likpe-Lolobi Council 
was more solvent than most others in the R e g i o n ,^  its overall impact was 
limited. More effort was expended on the choice of a Council headquarters than 
on development priorities. The adjustment of local government boundaries after 
independence merely created further confusion.60 In 1959, the Likpe-Lolobi area 
was subsumed within a Buem Local Council and then, following the 1961 Local 
Government Act, a Buem-Krachi District Council was formed. The new set-up 
was unpopular, not least because of the distance between Likpe and the District 
headquarters. Although the Councils were brought under close CPP control, the 
basic lack of finance (exacerbated by the reduction of block grants) virtually 
paralysed their operations. The Town Development Committees enjoyed more 
popular support, which is one reason why they too were brought under party 
control, but their strength lay in mobilizing labour rather than money. The 
Committees could assume responsibility for some operations, but in the final 
analysis state support was required in order to build better roads, construct 
bridges, and service village health centres. Thus, it was only natural that the 
Bakpele should solicit assistance from the centre - approaching it through the 
party hierarchy or, as often, short-circuiting it altogether.
The rules of the political game were unambiguous. If the Bakpele resisted the 
CPP, they would be cut off from state resources; if they embraced the ruling 
party, they could expect sympathetic consideration. In a characteristically blunt 
speech in 1959, the District Commissioner was explicit:
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"Whether you are C.P.P. or U.P. or whatnot, our aim is one i.e. to 
develop Ghana. Here I wish to tell you to always vote for the right 
person and since this is the C.P.P. Government you will be doing 
yourselves a not inconsiderable harm if you vote for a U.P. man as 
his voice could never be heard anywhere... and here I wish to stress 
most emphatically the two important steps to be adopted and these 
are (a) persuasion and (b) force"61
The point was driven home by the differential treatment extended to villages in
Likpe. Those with a good party record were rewarded for their fidelity: Bakwa
finally received the health centre that Nkrumah had promised; Kukurantumi
became the headquarters of a new cocoa district; and Avedzeme was the
recipient of a water supply (which later broke down). The peoples of Mate,
Todome, Bala and Koforidua knew that they had been slighted and understood
what was required to remove the stain on their record.
On the other hand, internal constraints on the local economy heightened the 
attractions of employment by the state. Even the United Ghana Farmers 
Co-operative Council (UGFCC), whose parasitism has been fully demonstrated 
by Beckman, was a mixed blessing in the sense that it provided some local 
employment.62 As always, party connections were the key to rewards. The 
Secretary of the Mate branch, a school teacher with solid CPP credentials, 
recalled the cynicism of the period:
"The attraction of the CPP was that Nkrumah recruited lots of 
people into the C.M.B., where they were given cars and so on.
Many were also able to join the Police... Many teachers left the 
classroom to become spraying superintendents of the C.M.B. and 
were each given a car. 6,3
It is certainly remarkable how many former Ablode activists changed their
political spots. For example, in September 1964 when the Likpe CPP met to
discuss Bakpele nominations for the newly created Biakoye Parliamentary seat, it
did so under the chairmanship of Nana Komla Dihie of Todome and in the
presence of Nana Sekyere of Agbozome.64 Both had played an active r61e in the
TC less than a decade before. Predictably, in the light of its previous orientation,
the most striking conversions took place in Mate. The dynamics of this town are
considered in more detail in the next section.
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Of course, the expansion of the state realm came at some cost to the cocoa
farmers, given that the fiscal base of the Ghanaian state depended so heavily on
hidden taxes siphoned off by the Cocoa Marketing B o a r d . Yet it was
comparatively easy for farmers along the eastern frontier to take advantage of
higher Togolese prices. In 1962, a CPP Branch Secretary from New Ayoma drew
attention to co-ordinated coffee smuggling at Kute:
"If you go to Kute-Buemyou will see young girls and boys from 
Akposso in Republic of Togo carrying loads of coffee to the 
Republic of Togoland [sic] in day time from 10am-2pm every day 
ana lorries too loading them from towns in Eastern Buem to 
Kute-Buem"66
From Likpe, cocoa and coffee was headloaded over the mountain to the Danyi 
villages. In an effort to impose tighter controls, the regime created a presumption 
of smuggling where it could be shown that a suspect was moving his/her crop in 
an easterly direction. Moreover, the border was formally sealed for much of the 
period after 1960. But these measures were only as effective as the Border Guards 
(who fell under the Police until 1964) who enforced them.6^ Most smugglers 
were masters of the local terrain, unlike the Guardsmen. Moreover the latter had 
their own stake in the burgeoning underground economy. One report in January 
1964 observed that the closure of the frontier was consistently violated by 
officials
"It is believed that the police are not at all eager to have the border 
opened, owing to the loss of revenue they would suffer. For a 
'consideration it is quite possibly to get one's car across the frontier 
either way - during dark hours."68
The same principle operated along the maze of bush paths connecting villages on
either side of the frontier. Potentially, therefore, farm owners could enjoy the best
of both worlds: namely access to some of the benefits of state expenditure
together with the rewards of their labour and that of their workers.
4.2.2. The Politics of the Likpe Stool Dispute
In 1955, Nana Boke Akototse III eventually died. Over the next two years, the 
selection of a successor was buried beneath the struggle over the future of British 
Togoland. Once the Nkrumah regime had eliminated the UP challenge, and the
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unification movement began to unravel, chieftaincy politics returned to the local 
agenda with a vengeance. This has to be emphasized because it amounts to a 
reversal of the order of significance conventionally attributed to national and 
local issues within the rural arena.
In theory, there should have been little scope for controversy. The Gutch Enquiry 
of 1932 had established the principle that the Paramouncy rotated between the 
Kalegato and the Kalelenti clans in Mate. Since Nana Akototse was of the 
Kalelenti clan, the next Okakple should of rights have emanated from Kalegato.
In practice, not everybody was disposed to accept the Gutch interpretation, 
which provided the occasion for a prolonged constitutional crisis.
A Regent by the name of Daniel Setu was appointed from the Kalelentis who 
sought to enstool a candidate from the same clan, arguing that the selection of a 
new Okakple was the prerogative of the Mate clan heads alone. The chiefs of the 
other villages were unlikely to endorse such an interpretation of the 'Likpe 
constitution' and on 7 December 1957 they convened a meeting at Todome. This 
reaffirmed the rotatory principle and called on the Kalegato clan to nominate a 
new chief.1^  The favoured candidate was Nicholas Soglo, a contractor who had 
been living outside the area for some time, and who was mentioned in the 
previous Chapter in the context of a deputation to F.Y. Asare. Both sides then 
proceeded to lobby central government for recognition.
In 1958, the Nkrumah regime was intervening openly in chieftaincy affairs. 
Nicholas Soglo had impeccable CPP credentials and so was enstooled in January 
1959 with the title of Nana Soglo Alio II. At this point, the Mate branch of the 
CPP, which had hitherto embraced the youngmen of different clans, split down 
the middle. The CPP branch executive, which was dominated by members from 
the lower end of the town, initiated a campaign to undermine the authority of the 
new Okakple. In May 1959, the first substantial CPP rally in Mate was marred 
when the executive tried to bar Nana Soglo from the proceedings.^ From the
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early months of I960, members of the Kalelenti dan and their sympathisers 
withheld all recognition from the chief. Amongst other things, the communal 
labour organized by the Town Development Committee was disrupted because 
the Kalalentis refused to obey the 'gong-gong' of the Okakple. The rebels 
calculated that a collapse of communal labour would rebound on the Okakple at 
a time when the District Commissioner was insisting on the importance of 
community self-help. Nana Soglo counter-attacked by encouraging the 
youngmen from the upper half of the town to form a rival CPP branch.7-^ A war 
of words ensued between rival branches seeking to discredit each other in the 
eyes of higher authorities. Nana Soglo held a slight edge in that a number of his 
fiercest opponents were tainted with Ablode connections. In a letter to his 
opponents, which was intended for the eyes of the administration, he observed 
that:
"... the said Chairman and his Executive has all along been 
fallaciously trying to label all Loyal Party members m ward C.l. as 
being members or the erstwhile Ablode . An act which we abhor in 
very strong terms; in that Likpe Mate which frankly speaking was 
once a n ' Ablode's' stronghold [of] which Clemence Sraku was the 
Secretary, but being a blood relative to the local Chairman William 
Agbodo has been made Secretary for Mate branch C.P.P.... the said 
Chairman and his Executive are erroneously trying to paint this 
picture as a means to satisfy their selfish end, namely to seejif that 
would help them to win a reud on a Chieftaincy [matter]..."72
Nana Soglo Alio n  retained the confidence of Government, but in December 1960 
he died in mysterious circumstances. It was alleged that his wife, a member of 
the Kalelenti clan, had poisoned him. The succession dispute now entered a new 
and even more bitter phase. The Kalelentis argued that according to the rotatory 
system, it was their turn to propose a candidate for the vacant stool. But when 
Nana Komla Dihie convened another meeting of the Likpe Traditional Authority, 
the chiefs took a dissenting view. They ruled that since the Kalelentis had 
repeatedly refused to acknowledge Nana Soglo as Okakple, they could not now 
invoke the Gutch formula.7^
Surprisingly, this decision was upheld by Jospeh Lemboe, the elderly Kalelenti 
clan-head who wished to avoid another damaging schism. His sense of fair play
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was not, however, shared by other senior figures in the clan and he was stripped 
of his clan title. In the confusion that ensued, rival candidates were enstooled.
The Kalelentis, who were still in possession of the stool, held a ceremony 
investing S.Q. Mantey, a school teacher, with the title of Nana Akototse IV. The 
Kalegatos enstooled Victor Soglo, the brother of the deceased chief. Once again, 
the authorities were forced to make a ruling and they came down on the side of 
Soglo, who was gazetted as Nana Soglo Alio III in August 1961. This decision 
was justified on the grounds that only two of the Likpe chiefs, namely those of 
Koforidua and Agbozome, had backed the Mantey c la im . ^  But it is likely that 
other considerations intruded as well. Nana Soglo believes that it was his long­
standing attachment to the CPP, at a time when Mate was under the thrall of the 
TC, which was decisive.^ He belonged to that generation of Bakpele whose 
horizons extended further than the boundaries of the Region. He had risen to the 
rank of Inspector in the Gold Coast Police and had spent most of the intervening 
years in distant locations like Tamale. The CPP was therefore his natural home. 
Nana Soglo also felt that his selection owed something to Government fatigue 
with Bakpele politics. As a Policeman with a tough reputation, he was seen as the 
candidate most likely to succeed in restoring order. ^  Although the regime had 
formerly exploited divisions, the stress was now on communal harmony.
The campaign of the Kalelenti clan leaders did not peter out after the installation 
of Nana Soglo. Instead they conspired to undermine his standing in the eyes of 
the Bakpele and the Government. In 1962, they preferred destoolment charges 
against Nana Soglo, claiming that he had defiled the stool and had then refused 
to carry out the appropriate purification ceremonies.^ This followed an incident 
in which he had been detained by the Togolese authorities on suspicion of 
spying, and had been forced to carry night-soil during the period of his 
incarceration. Reference to this episode was an attempt to outrage the 
sensibilities of the Bakpele and to portray the Okakple as someone who held 
tradition in contempt. The real motive was obvious to all and the campaign failed 
to win the backing of the rest of Likpe.
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The Kalelentis held one remaining trick up their sleeve, which was to outbid the 
Soglo faction in expressions of fealty to Osagyefo. In 1960, the District 
Commissioner made a significant concession to the factional strife in Mate when 
he recognized the existence of separate party branches for East and West Mate. 
The following year, there was a concerted drive in both sides of the town to 
register new party members. Although the exercise lost some momentum in 
subsequent years, by 1964 Mate could claim the second largest party membership 
in Buem District (See Table 4.1).
In the process, the older CPP strongholds like Bakwa were left behind. 
Furthermore, in a cunning effort to swim with the latest ideological currents, S.Q. 
Mantey gave up his teaching post at the Catholic Mission in Dzelukope and 
enrolled at the Ideological Institute at Winneba/® From there, he kept up a 
steady stream of correspondence in which he professed his unswerving loyalty to 
the CPP and disputed the credentials of Nana Soglo. Not to be outmanoeuvred, 
the Kalegato faction dispatched the Secretary of the East Mate branch to the 
Ideological Institute as a counter-weight. Nana Soglo himself appointed a Regent 
and took up employment as a security officer on the Mines, obtained it would 
seem on the strength of his party connections.^
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Table 4.1:
Ranking of the CPP Party Branches in Buem District 
By Size, as of 31 October 1964
Ranking Town Number of Cards
1 Jasikan 912
2 Likpe-Mate (total) 721
3 Nkonya-Wurupong 410
4 Okadjakrom 325
5 Borada 295
6 New Ayoma 289
7 Akaa 271
8 Likpe-Kukurantumi 230
9 Santrokofi-Bume 221
10 Kwamikrom 216
16 Bakwa 185
42 Likpe-Koforidua 61
43 Likpe-Bala 61
44 Likpe-Todome 44
45 Likpe-Agbozome 35
53 Likpe-Avedzeme 16
(Source: "The Convention People's Party (Buem District Branch): 
Annual Delegates Conference, Okadjakrom, Programme, 1964)°u
Over time, it became apparent that the Government was unlikely to abandon 
Nana Soglo. Indeed the Mantey faction was making powerful enemies in the 
Regional administration as a result of its efforts to play one set of officials off 
against the other. In 1962 District Commissioner J.R. Dabo wished to pursue an 
action for libel following an accusation that he had a personal interest in 
protecting the Okakple. Evidence that the patience of the authorities had 
finally snapped came in 1963 when the Cabinet, acting on the advice of the
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Regional Commissioner, issued an order prohibiting Thaddeus Agbowoada (the 
new clan head) from entering within a 30 mile radius of Likpe.8^
Early in 1964, the frustrated Kalelenti clan leaders resolved to follow precedent
by seceding from Mate altogether. The District Commissioner intervened to
prevent the removal of building materials from the town, while the employers of
Mantey (who was then at the Catholic Mission) were asked to exert pressure on
him to abandon the plan.85 Mantey denied that the intention to build a new town
was in any way related to the stool dispute. Instead, he claimed, it was simply a
question of farmers wanting to move closer to their land.8^ The Regional
Commissioner, who had no difficulty seeing through this line of defence,
commented that:
"If Mantey is honest with himself, he will admit that it is only his 
aggrieved clan, that is in the stool dispute that now cunnmgly 
group and style themselves into Likpe Abrani farmers."85
Nevertheless, the Mantey faction did have one factor working in its favour. The 
site for the proposed town was located further away from the frontier than Mate, 
which reduced the ease of smuggling. Members of the clan, calling themselves 
the "Mansaketu Farmers", pointed out that since their lands were located to the 
west, they were breaking the law every time they brought their cocoa eastwards 
to Mate for sale. Since it was as well to hang for a sheep as for a lamb, there was 
an incentive to smuggle rather than sell cocoa in Mate. In a petition requesting a 
separate UGFCC buying centre, a thinly veiled threat to do so was dangled in 
front of the administration:
"Instead of the 54/- cocoa price per load at Mansaketu therefore, the 
Mansaketu farmer loses 10/- for the farm labourer, 2 /-  for 
conveyance to Mate and so reducing the actual price per load of 
cocoa, 54/- to 42/- as far as the Mansaketu farmers are concerned... 
we are on our own and on behalf of the entire farmers on the lands 
mentioned above petitioning the Council once again this year, that 
a sealing station and therefore a society of the United Ghana 
Farmers' Council be opened for us... as we have unanimously 
decided on the date of this petition to risk the conveyance of cocoa 
towards the east Ghana-Togoland border, an act which is really 
illegal, suspicious and telling on us as patriotic farmers of 
Ghana."86
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The "Mansaketu Farmers" appreciated that if they received the buying centre, 
they would have succeeded in eliciting de facto recognition for a separate village. 
The Mantey faction won this particular argument. Despite the misgivings of the 
Regional administration, the Kalelentis
and allied clans demolished their homes in Mate in 1965 and founded Abrani 
close to Kukurantumi on the Hohoe-Kute road. As their chief, they selected S.Q. 
Mantey who was henceforth known by his stool title of Nana Akototse IV. 
Amongst those who chose to remain in Mate was the family of Joseph Lemboe, 
which was rewarded with the creation of a separate Mate stool.®^ The act of 
secession turned out to be a grave miscalculation in the longer term. Although 
Mantey continued to play the CPP card in the hope that the Government would 
reverse its decision, it was questionable whether somebody who did not live in 
Mate could ever become Okakple. Nana Soglo insisted that the Kalelentis had 
forfeited their claim to the Paramouncy once and for all, a view which was 
widely shared in the community. The Kalelentis were not to know that the tenure 
of the Nkrumah regime was itself about to be rudely terminated. A couple of 
months after the foundation of Abrani, the Armed Forces and Police seized 
power and dismantled the structures of one-party rule.
4.3. The Rebuff of the Unificationists
4.3.1. The Aftermath of the Coup
When the Nkrumah regime was toppled with such comparative ease, the Bakpele 
were as surprised as anybody else. Most personal and community objectives had 
been premised on the continuation of the CPP in office. The media, in its 
reportage of successive assassination attempts, had succeeded in creating an 
image of Nkrumah as a leader who was indestructible. The elaborate mythology 
was swept away in a matter of hours. In the midst of the uncertainty that 
replaced it, most Bakpele applied the lesson they had learned after independence:
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namely, the importance of climbing aboard the latest bandwagon without delay. 
Much as former unificationists had sidled into the CPP, party members now 
pretended they had never identified with the fallen regime. In March 1966 local 
figures who had appeared on CPP platforms, and who had traded in the verbal 
currency of socialism and Nkrumahism, organized a public meeting in support 
of the coup. Party cards and records were publicly burned (probably for reasons 
of self-preservation) and an effigy of Nkrumah was buried in the Mate 
cem etary.^ Similarly, the chiefs of Likpe and Lolobi, who had been conspicuous 
in CPP activities, greeted the coup effusively:
"They [the CPP Government] seemed to believe that they werea 
special breed divinely ordained to remain in office for ever and ever 
and so lording it over us by preaching virtues and practising vices.
But by the Grace of God, the Army and the Police's timely action 
has liberated us to breath the Air of Freedom once more. We 
appreciate and fully support for the 'Coup de Grace’ befitting that 
Satanic Regime of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana for ever."8y
Sensing an opportune moment, they went on to request assistance in the
fulfilment of eight development projects, some of which had previously been
turned down by the Nkrumah Government.
The most blatant opportunism was exhibited by the chief and elders of Abrani. 
They were aware that the National Liberation Council (NLC) was examining 
chieftaincy affairs very closely with a view to reversing the anomalies introduced 
by the Nkrumah regime. In April 1966, Agbowoada petitioned the NLC, claiming 
that Nana Akototse had been deprived of the Paramouncy which was rightly his, 
only because Nana Soglo was a CPP apparatchik.^ This was followed by a 
petition requesting a Commission of Enquiry, in which it was claimed inter alia 
that Nana Soglo had been a Government spy and that Nkrumah had rewarded 
him, on his release from Togo, with a job at the State Mining Corporation.^ 
These appeals understandably fell on receptive ears. In July, the Regional 
Administrative Officer agreed that there were grounds to appoint such a body, 
since the Gutch formula had apparently been violated.^ In May 1967, 
Agbowoada was permitted to return to Likpe, and in July a Chieftaincy
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Committee was appointed to look into the related questions of who was entitled 
to occupy the Likpe stool and whose prerogative it was to approve a candidate.^
Nevertheless, it is worth recording that there were some long-standing party 
members who declined to renounce their affiliations in spite of the prevailing 
atmosphere. In many cases, they had been dismayed at the decision to by-pass 
the CPP branches and to appoint someone from Anlo to fill the Biakoye seat. Yet 
they had invested too much in the CPP to abandon it that easily. When it came to 
the destruction of party documents, the Chairman and Secretary of the Mate 
branch ran a personal risk by concealing the membership book and their party 
cards. Equally, Nana Soglo made no attempt to conceal his own political record 
and this proved to be his salvation. When the Siriboe Chieftaincy Committee 
convened, it rapidly transpired that Nana Akototse IV had attended the 
Ideological Institute and had repeatedly paraded his party loyalty. The Chairman 
was outraged at this'blatant attempt to mislead the NLC and before he could 
decide in favout/Nana Soglo, Nana Akototse withdrew from the hearings. He 
continued, however, to dispute the legitimacy of Nana Soglo and it was not until 
1970 that an abortive effort at reconciliation was made.
Many others who disowned the CPP did so out of fear. The pendulum had 
swung back and most Bakpele felt they had no option but to follow its trajectory. 
On the other hand, those individuals who had taken refuge in Togo or who had 
stopped short of joining the CPP were presented with an opportunity to level 
some old scores. Once the dust had settled, however, what was open to question 
was their capacity to rebuild a derelict Ablode structure.
4.3.2. Interpreting the 1969 Elections
The observation that is most commonly made about the period spanning the 1966 
coup and the return to civilian rule in 1969 is that the process of transition 
brought latent ethnic tensions closer to the sur f ace . Thi s  was partly inherent in
the nature of the coup, since the inner circle of conspirators was overwhelmingly 
Ewe whereas the latter represented but a minority within the Army and P o liced  
When the NLC was constituted, three of its seven members were Ewes: namely 
Lt.-Colonel Kotoka, J.W.K. Harlley and A.K. Deku. Within the first year, rumours 
began to circulate to the effect that the Ewe and Ga members were manipulating 
the environment to the advantage of their ethnic constituencies. Conversely, the 
unsuccessful coup that killed Kotoka appeared to contain elements of an Akan 
b a c k la s h  96 Once the transition to civilian rule began in earnest, a fresh spate of 
rumours began to circulate. While Akwasi Afrifa, who replaced Ankrah as 
Chairman of the NLC, was suspected of favouring Kofi Busia, Harlley and Deku 
appeared to back the political ambitions of Komla Gbedemah. The divisions, 
which threatened to tear the NLC apart, hastened the process of military 
withdrawal.
The pattern of voting in the 1969 election is also interpreted in ethnic te rm s , 97 
While the Progress Party under Busia swept Akan constituencies across the 
country, it won only two seats in the Volta Region, both of which were located in 
the north. On the other hand, the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) won almost 
half of its seats within the Volta Region, but failed to capture a single 
constituency in the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo or Central Regions.9®
The ethnic interpretation is valid as far as the election as a whole is concerned. A 
series of local electoral studies has confirmed that the NAL was indeed damaged 
by its close association with the E w e s .9 9  But what is usually overlooked is that 
within the Volta Region the PP could lay as valid a claim to the Ewe mantle as 
NAL itself. Prominent Ablode politicians returned to the political fray and while 
they avoided advocating secession, they did reopen the debate about the terms 
on which Togoland had been incorporated. In the Constituent Assembly, S.G. 
Antor and A.K. Odame proposed a motion to restore at least the name of 
Trans-Volta Togoland, and there were hints that this was merely the tip of the 
proverbial i c e b e r g . W h e n  new parties began to coalesce, Antor, Odame and
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Kofi Dumoga aligned themselves with the Progress Party. M.K. Apaloo, who had 
previously represented the Federated Youth Organization in Anlo and had made 
common cause with the TC, preferred to join the United Nationalist Party under 
the leadership of Joe Appiah. These figures (with the exception of Dumoga who 
did not stand) were hopeful of reactivating support bases in their former 
constituencies. After all, they could claim to have made personal sacrifices in 
standing up to Nkrumah. In their eyes, Gbedemah was politically vulnerable 
because he had been instrumental in building the CPP. In a free electoral contest, 
there was every reason to expect the PP to at least share the honours in the Volta 
Region.
On polling day, NAL swept the board in those constituencies which were not 
Akan-speaking. Antor stood in East Dayi, which was substantially the same 
constituency as he had won by a margin of more than 6,000 votes in 1956. On this 
occasion, he received less than 20% of the poll, which was all the more 
humiliating because the victor was a virtual n o v i c e . I n  Buem, which had been 
shorn of Biakoye, A.K. Odame hoped to reverse his earlier defeat at the hands of 
F.Y. Asare, but cornered only 36% of the vote (see Table 4.2). In Anlo 
constituency, the PP candidate attracted a derisory vote while M.K. Apaloo was 
convincingly beaten into second place. Even the two northern seats of Krachi and 
Nkwanta were won by the PP on the narrowest of margins. In sum, some of 
the foremost Ewe (and minority) politicians were delivered a stinging rebuff by 
the electorate of the Volta Region.
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Table 4.2:
The 1969 Election Result in Four Constituencies
Candidate Party Votes Winner
1. Biakoye:
S.K. Aboagye PP 1,900
Obed Asamoah NAL 8,834 NAL
T.C.Y. Adibo UNP 103
C.K. Amoah PAP 663
R.Y. Empreh Independent 929
2. East D ay i:
D.K. Avoke NAL 11,775 NAL
A. Bwatsy-Alog UNP 122
S.G. Antor PP 2,941
3. Buem:
Alex K, Odame PP 3,590
C.K. Nayo NAL 5,778 NAL
A.K. Ekpe UNP 94
A.S.K. Donkor PAP 621
4. A nlo :
K. Ahiabor PP 156
R. Seglah NAL 5,062 NAL
M.K. Apaloo UNP 1,707
(Source: Legon Observer, 5 September 1969)
There were two basic reasons for this outcome, each of which bears on the 
underlying theme of national integration. On the one hand, Antor and his 
associates were blamed for having marginalized the Region in national politics. 
When they raised the Togoland question, they were accused of disinterring 
something that had been laid to rest to the satisfaction of almost everybody. 
Although former TC activists tried very hard to breathe life back into their party
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networks, the most influential members had either died or were by now too old 
to engage in politics. Within the Volta Region, at least, the PP rekindled 
memories of a past that people preferred to put behind them. On the other hand, 
NAL seemed to promise a fresh start. The party is sometimes portrayed as a 
slightly mutated version of the defunct CPP Yet it is significant that some of the 
CPP stalwarts held aloof from NAL. Frank Tsaku, the former Member of 
Parliament for Kpandu North, declined to join the party because he regarded 
Gbedemah as a t r a i t o r .  103 Similarly, Nana Agya Mensah kept his distance on the 
grounds that he knew the limitations of the NAL leadership. 104: In fact, much of 
the success of NAL can be attributed to the selection of candidates who had no 
political record and were therefore without blemishes. These were younger men, 
who were characterised by higher levels of educational attainment than their 
opponents (see Table 4.3). Dr. Obed Asamoah, who stood successfully for the 
Biakoye constituency, was a case in point. He had been born at Likpe-Bala in 
1936 and was one of the Bakpele who travelled outside the Trust Territory for his 
education. He attended Achimota school and then proceeded overseas for his 
University education, returning to Ghana with a Doctoral degree. Like the other 
NAL candidates, he was not weighed down by a political record. Between 1960 
and 1962 he had worked as a lawyer and had then lived overseas for the 
remainder of the Nkrumah period. It was only after the 1966 coup that he 
returned to take up employment in the Law Faculty at the University of 
G h a n a . A s a m o a h  first entered the limelight following his election to the 
Constituent Assembly, where he played an active part in p ro c e e d in g s .!  06 He 
initially gravitated towards the so-called Third Force, but later opted for NAL 
and was selected as the candidate for the Biakoye constituency.
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Table 4.3:
The Background of NAL Candidates Elected W ithin 
the Area of Former British Togoland in 1969
Name Age Seat Education Profession
V.K.D. Akude n.a. Ho-East n.a. n.a.
F.K. Adinyira 46 Ho-West Achimota College 
Paris University, 
Wisconsin University 
(M.A.)
lecturer
C.K. Nayo 42 Buem London University teacher
S.K. Osei-Nyame 32 Akan Achimota College 
University of Ghana
lawyer
T.K. Agadzi n.a. West-Dayi n.a. n.a.
Dr. O. Asamoah 33 Biakoye Achimota 
London University 
Columbia University 
(Ph.D.)
lawyer/
academic
D.K. Avoke 36 East-Dayi University of Ghana lecturer
(Source: Moses Danquah, The Birth of the Second Republic, pp. 197- 
110)
The NAL candidates belonged to the first wave of Togolanders that fitted 
comfortably into the higher echelons of the Ghanaian elite. The southern Ewe 
had long being producing businessmen and professionals whose own class 
interests lay in the preservation of Ghanaian territorial integrity (detailed 
research into the making of an Anlo bourgeoisie is long overdue). They were now 
joined by the latest intake from the interior. Indeed the Ghanaian elite as a whole 
shared a common outlook on most essentials, as Dr. Asamoah himself noted in 
the context of the elections:
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"With the exception of the insignificant parties theoretically 
committed to a policy of socialism, the manifestoes issued by the 
parties that contested the elections are quite similar. This is not an 
accident nor is it unique with Ghana. It is because for a number of 
reasons there is a large measure of agreement about the ends of 
contemporary Ghanaian society and the means by which they can 
be achieved... The P.P. and the main opposition parties which 
contested the election were movements built around leaders whose 
ideas were hardly dissimilar."107
While Asamoah displayed a keen interest in Pan-African causes, he never
exhibited much sympathy for the unification movement.10^
A vote for NAL therefore amounted to a collective effort to harvest the fruits of 
political integration. The paradox is that the Volta Region suffered greater 
marginalization because of a failure by NAL to attract comparable support in 
other parts of the country. Yet it has to be said that this was not for want of 
trying. The party fielded candidates in 139 out of a possible 140 
constituencies,1 but suffered from a widespread perception of ethnic 
exclusiveness. In the process, both the northern Ewe and the minorities were 
tarred with a negative stereotype that derived from the high profile of the 
southern Ewe in commerce, the professions and in state institutions.
The broad trends outlined above do not tell quite the whole story. The success of
Dr. Asamoah in the Biakoye constituency also owed a lot to a meticulous
campaign on his part. Since his return to Ghana, he had worked hard at building
his local contacts. In the words of Yaw Twumasi:
"O.Y. Asamoah... built a personal political machine, in a 
constituency where the electorate is of four different ethnic stocks, 
through his services as a lawyer and frequent week-end visits while 
lecturing at Legon: it is arguable that he too could have won for any 
one of the contending parties."110
In fact, the Biakoye constituency was even more heterogeneous than Twumasi
suggests, since it encompassed Bowiri, Nkonya, Akpafu, Santrokofi, Lolobi and
Likpe.111 The Bakpele overwhelmingly backed Asamoah as the 'local boy1,
although a minority of unificationists transferred their allegiance to the PP. But
since Likpe provided too narrow a base, Asamoah had also to establish his
credentials in neighbouring communities. He was aided by the fact that the
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larger Nkonya vote was split between two local candidates. Moreover, Nkonya 
had always prided itself on its CPP traditions, which placed a barrier in the path 
of S.K. Abogaye, the PP candidate. In the event, Dr. Asamoah won the seat with 
more than 70% of the votes cast and so became the first person from Likpe to 
enter Parliament.
4.4. Conclusion:
The poll that opened the way to the Second Republic put the seal on a process of 
integration that had begun in the 1920s, in that it finally closed the door on the 
separatist option. Initially, the administrative union of British Togoland and the 
Gold Coast facilitated economic exchange and social mobility between the two 
territories. Over time, this contributed to a sense of traversing a common path, a 
metaphor that is borrowed from Benedict Anderson. Yet in the post-war period 
more than one 'imagined community' competed for hegemonic status. The vision 
of a united Eweland foundered early on as a result of the clash of material 
interests between the Gold Coast Ewe and the farmers, traders and teachers of 
Togoland. Far more seductive was the vision of a reunified Togoland. This had a 
resonance amongst an older generation who bore German names, could speak 
the language and who (surprisingly enough) looked back on the German colonial 
period as a golden age. It also appealed to Togolanders whose life experiences 
constantly reminded them that the Trust Territory was disadvantaged by 
comparison with the colony. To return to the travelling metaphor, the unification 
movement gathered support by warning Togolanders that they were in danger of 
being forced to carry the luggage of the entire party. The third vision was that of 
a united Ghana that would finally erase the ambiguous status of British 
Togoland. The CPP promised to reapportion the load that had been unfairly 
distributed by the British and gave an assurance that the fruits of independence 
would be reached much more quickly if Togolanders would only link arms with 
their Gold Coast and follow the alternative route.
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It was shown in Chapter Three how the Bakpele became deeply implicated on 
either side of the unification debate. Although local concerns were never entirely 
supplanted, the political struggle never amounted simply to a modified version 
of old factional disputes. This Chapter, the last in the section, has further argued 
that, while the coercive tactics of the Nkrumah regime destroyed Ablode 
networks, the movement was already on the retreat. The 'German scholars' 
literally died out, while many Bakpele aspired to employment opportunities that 
were presented by the Ghanaian state. Furthermore, the middle belt of the Volta 
Region had begun to produce its own intellectual and (to a lesser extent) business 
elite which could compete for power and influence on the national stage.
Yet the Nkrumah years also witnessed a growing cynicism about the pursuit of 
politics. It was in this context that local factionalism took the form of fierce 
competition for the ears of the regime. In other words, the loss of a meaningful 
political agenda fomented the outpourings of factional conflict that had been 
muted in the 1950s. Finally, although the 1969 elections have generally been 
examined in the light of heightened ethnic awareness, a quite different 
construction is possible The pattern of results represented a crushing defeat for 
the former unificationists as well as a desire to return to the mainstream of 
national politics. These are conclusions which cut against the grain of much of 
the extant research.
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Fart Two: Economic Crisis and the Spectre of National Disintegration,
1969-1981
During the 1970s, many of the factors that had assisted long-term integration 
ceased to be operative or at least declined in significance. The physical 
infrastructure of the country deteriorated noticeably, the state ceased to act as a 
provider of services or as an attractive source of employment, while the living 
standards of the majority of Ghanaians declined markedly. The second part of 
this thesis assesses the impact of these developments upon national integration, 
using Likpe once more as a case-study. Chapter Five examines renewed 
challenges to the territorial integrity of the Ghanaian state posed by smuggling 
and secessionist activity. Chapter Six then considers whether there is any 
evidence for a conscious withdrawal from the state nexus.
Chapter Five
Smugglers and Secessionists: The Political Economy of the 
Frontier 1969-1981
During the 1970s, Governments repeatedly warned of threats to national 
sovereignty posed by secessionists, allegedly sponsored by the Eyadema regime 
in Togo, and smugglers operating along the length of the frontier. Although 
neither element was entirely new, they did resurface at a time when the 
Ghanaian state was finding it increasingly difficult to monitor the activities of its 
citizens. It is comparatively easy to examine the impact of secessionism, which is 
attempted in the second section of the Chapter. Smuggling poses greater 
methodological problems, not only because it is notoriously difficult to quantify, 
but also because its political meaning tends to be oblique. Whereas the aims of a 
secessionist are self-evident, it is less easy to penetrate the mind of a smuggler. At 
one level, smuggling can be viewed simply as a form of criminal activity. Yet the 
definition of crime is inherently ideological. Moreover, if law is the point of 
contact between state and society, persistent criminality may be construed as a
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challenge to officially sanctioned norms of behaviour. Before probing these 
matters more deeply, it is necessary to establish the context within which the 
debates about smuggling and secessionism were conducted. This context is also 
relevant to the issues dealt with in the Chapter that follows.
5.1. Establishing the Context
5.1.1. Ethnicity and the Politics of Exclusion
Following the inauguration of the Second Republic in 1969, the Volta Region 
found itself pushed towards the margins of power. In the two Cabinets formed 
by Kofi Busia, the Region was not represented, although it is fair to note that 
there were only two Progress Party (PP) Members of Parliament from which to 
choose. It was more particularly the actions of the regime which raised suspicion 
that the Region was being punished for its support of NAL. The PP made much 
play of its rural development programme and yet expenditure in the Volta 
Region actually declined. The length of new roads constructed in the Region fell
I
from 72 miles between 1967 an! 1969, to 30 miles in 1969/70 and one-and-a-halft
miles in 1970/71. Again, whereas Government-financed community water 
projects virtually doubled in the Busia years, the rate of construction in the Volta 
Region fell by 30%.* Ethnic partiality also intruded into the apportionment of 
civil service and military positions. Although Nkrumah had become increasingly 
wary of the Ewe in the 1960s, many people from the Region did benefit from the 
expansion of state employment during his term of office. Others received 
appointments or promotions under the NLC. The export of skilled manpower 
was a hallmark of the southern sector of the Region, where inadequate land 
resources were compounded by the adverse effects of the Volta Lake.^ In 
February 1970, the Busia regime embarked on a purge of the civil service and the 
Police, ostensibly to reverse previous acts of nepotism. It transpired that a 
disproportionate number of the 568 people to be dismissed were Ewes.^ Belief in 
the existence of a vendetta was reinforced when leading Ewe officers, notably
Brigadier Amenu, Lt.-Colonel Kattah and Brigadier Ashley-Lassen, were 
removed from positions of military command to which their seniority entitled 
th em /
When the military struck for a second time in January 1972, Colonel 
Acheampong recited a long list of Government misdemeanours which justified 
the co u p / This included recklessly stirring up ethnic animosities. Acheampong 
referred to the lessons of Nigeria, which had only recently emerged from a 
bruising civil war, and pledged the National Redemption Council (NRC) to the 
eradication of tribalism at all levels of society.** It is noteworthy that the coup was 
planned and executed by a small coterie of mostly Ewe officers/ When the 
membership of the NRC was finally stabilized, three of its nine members were 
Ewes from the Volta Region - namely Majors Selormey, Agbo and Brigadier 
Ashley-Lassen, who was also appointed Chief of Defence S taff/
The junta governed in a more or less collective fashion until 1974, when signs of 
internal dissension began to surface. The forced retirement of Alphonse Kattah, 
who Acheampong perceived as a security threat, was resented by other Ewe 
officers/ Then in December 1974, Ashley-Lassen was retired and replaced as 
Chief of Defence Staff by Colonel Okai, whose relations with his Ewe colleagues 
and superiors had always been fraught/^ Finally, in October 1975, Acheampong 
announced the formation of a Supreme Military Council (SMC), consisting of 
himself, the Chief of Defence Staff, the four Service Commanders and the 
Inspector-General of Police.-^ Of these, only the head of the Border Guards, 
Brigadier Utuka, originated from the Volta Region and he was an unknown 
quantity. Rather than accept a position on a downgraded NRC, Selormey and 
Agbo resigned and were summarily retired from the Armed Forces. The 
following month, the regime claimed to have uncovered an Ewe plot, involving 
Kattah and Captain Kojo Tsikata, in which all the members of the SMC with the 
exception of Utuka were to have been executed/^ Those who failed to escape to
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Togo were arrested and became the subject of a show trial that dominated the 
state media over most of 1976.^
Kofi Awoonor, who was amongst those found guilty of complicity, claims that 
the Acheampong regime was gripped by an 'Ewe psychosis' at this time. ^  This 
may exaggerate the strength of the reaction, but it is clear that Acheampong 
distrusted his Ewe counterparts enough to exclude them from the inner sanctum 
of what was by then a full-blown military regime. The implications of these 
developments will be amplified in the Chapter that follows.
5.1.2. A Decade of Decay
The second backdrop was provided by the escalating economic crisis of the 
1970s. The deeper structural causes thereof, if indeed they were structural,-^ lie 
beyond the scope of the thesis; yet its manifestations are highly germane to what 
follows. It is legitimate to speak of a crisis in at least three senses. Firstly, and 
most transparently, the productive sectors of the economy wilted under 
prolonged exposure to misconceived economic policies. For the greater part of 
the colonial period, cocoa had served as the principal engine of economic growth. 
This was because the farmers had assiduously reinvested their profits in 
transport, commerce and more cocoa. The vitality of rural capitalism owed 
relatively little to the agency of the state, given that colonial officials were 
worried about the adverse social consequences.^ Post-war development strategy 
was premised upon a more active role for the state, which could only be funded 
out of higher taxes on cocoa. As has already been noted, this precipitated an 
awakening of Asante sub-nationalism and, in a more ambiguous manner, 
heightened the alienation of the Togoland farmers. The collapse of world cocoa 
prices in the early 1960s, brought home to the Nkrumah regime the inherent 
instability of an economy which was dependent on the vicissitudes of the 
external market. Ghanaian socialism amounted in effect to an ambitious attempt 
to break out of this dependency, by constructing an industrial base under the
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direct control of the s ta te d  Thus, the position of the state within the Ghanaian 
political pantheon had risen from watchdog to the fons et origo of national 
development.
Paradoxically, this required even heavier taxes upon cocoa, which in the long-run 
helped to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs. The farmers either diverted 
their energies from cocoa or took advantage of the opportunities for 
smuggling.!** Both The National Liberation Council and the Busia regime 
adopted hesitant steps to recast the relationship between the state and the cocoa 
economy. Some enterprises were sold off, but for the most part the statist 
structures of the First Republic were perpetuated. The retreat of the farmers from 
official marketing channels in fact increased at the turn of the decade and added 
momentum to the onset of economic decline. In the 1970s, Ghana suffered from 
acute shortages of foreign exchange that starved state industries of vital spare 
parts and raw materials. Consequently, the production of most consumer goods 
collapsed, thereby removing one of the remaining incentives to cash crop 
producers.
At this juncture, the crisis of production became intertwined with the second 
dimension of the crisis, namely the shrinking . fiscal base of the state. Falling 
cocoa production (at times mitigated and at other times compounded by the level 
of world prices) eroded state revenues, while subventions to loss-making 
industries consumed much of the revenue that r e m a in e d .-^  (See the Appendix to 
this Chapter) As a result, the state ceased to perform the minimal preconditions 
for economic growth - those which even the minimalist state of the colonial era 
had fulfilled. The road and rail network were not adequately maintained, thus 
choking the commercial arteries linking town and countryside. Rural producers, 
who should in theory have benefited from rising urban food prices, in practice 
found it difficult to market their crops. Conversely, they had to fall back upon 
local substitutes for many of the consumer goods that ceased to be available on 
the open market.20
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Governments aimed to compensate for the failure of state intervention at the 
level of production, by tightening controls over the sphere of distribution as well 
- what one might call the 'Tar Baby effect'. The history of price control is one of 
increasingly draconian measures designed to frustrate the logic of a market that 
was constricted by endemic sh o r t a ge . Th e  unforeseen hitch was that - and this 
is the third manifestation of the crisis - the coercive apparatus of the state was 
itself becoming less dependable as an instrument of social control. One 
consequence of the revenue squeeze was that the wages and salaries of state 
employees fell conspicuously behind the cost of living. To make ends meet (and 
where possible to enrich themselves) state functionaries at all levels engaged in 
graft. This inflicted damage upon bureaucratic norms and values, a point to 
which I shall return in the context of border controls.
Yet, the cycle of decay did not end there, since corruption also became 
entrenched at the very core of the Government apparatus. Whereas the NRC was 
initially credited with a sense of purpose, the deterioration that set in after 1974 
was accompanied by declining standards of probity at the centre. Acheampong 
and other members of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) were able to amass 
personal fortunes and to reward their favourites by controlling limited access to 
import licences and essential commodities.22 The Rawlings putsch of 4 June 1979 
was followed by harsh reprisals against corrupt officials, but the environment 
which bred this mode of behaviour was never seriously addressed. The 
'housecleaning' exercise was designed to reimpose moral standards almost out of 
context, whereas kalabule had a clear rationality which was understood by 
everyone concerned.2^ Consequently, many of the public statements and deeds 
of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council teetered on the margin between 
naivety and disingenuity. The attempt to further tighten state controls in the 
midst of scarcity made it almost inevitable that kalabule would breed anew during 
the Third Republic 24 One of the essential points to grasp about the 1970s is that
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those who were closest to the locus of power typically had most to gain from the 
perpetuation of the crisis.
All parts of Ghana were affected, but the lessons of independence were drawn 
especially starkly in the Volta Region. As noted in Chapter Two, one of most 
powerful arguments against reunification with French Togoland in the 1950s had 
been the comparative poverty of that territory. In the 1970s, Togo underwent an 
economic boom, fuelled by rising production and better phosphate prices.^  This 
made it feasible for the Togolese authorities to increase development spending 
and since the base of the Eyadema regime lay outside of Lom6, much of it was 
channelled into the rural areas - even if the north was the principal beneficiary.
At a time of infrastructural decay in the Volta Region, the Togolese were building 
roads that linked the key administrative and commercial centres to the outlying 
areas. Across the border from Likpe, the Danyi villages were acquiring the 
outward symbols of development, such as tarred roads, schools and welfare 
centres, alongside less tangible manifestations of improvement such as falling 
mortality ratesS^ The proximity of these communities, undergoing opposite 
experiences, raises question about the impact upon political consciousness in the 
Volta Region.
5.2. TOLIMO and the Secessionist Chestnut
Curiously, the unification question remained in abeyance during the tenure of 
the Busia regime, although the Aliens Compliance Order and tighter Ghanaian 
frontier controls continued to disfigure relations with the Togolese 
Governm ent.^ In 1972, the incoming Acheampong administration restored links 
with the Eyadema regime. Both sides hailed rapprochement as the comradeship 
that was natural between military men. The fruits of co-operation were to be freer 
movement of goods and people. In March 1973, the leaders signed a one-year 
agreement establishing a Permanent Joint Commission, which was mandated to 
harmonize policies with respect to "political, scientific, legal, social and cultural
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affairs".^® Then in April a ceremony was held to mark the reopening of the 
frontier post at Aflao, which Eyadema welcomed (somewhat optimistically) as 
the first step towards the effective removal of an artificial colonial b o u n d a r y .  ^ 9 In 
many ways, the statements of intent echoed the ameliorative measures explored 
by the Anglo-French Joint Working Party in the late 1940s. Both sides had 
something to gain from closer co-operation on boundary issues. The Togolese, 
who maintained an open-door trade policy, stood to profit from the re-export of 
imported commodities. The Ghanaians, on the other hand, expected the Togolese 
to help stamp out the rampant smuggling which characterised the Busia years.
As an early signal of good faith, the Togolese authorities swooped down upon 
currency traders operating out of Lome.^0
Even as rapprochement was taking place, the unification movement was stirring 
back to life after more than a decade of hibernation.*^ In November 1972, the 
National Liberation of Western Togoland (TOLIMO) came to sudden prominence 
with a petition to the Organization of African Unity. It accused successive 
Ghanaian regimes of having acted in bad faith towards former British Togoland 
and asserted the right to reunite with the Togolese Republic.^ The Ghanaians 
were further embarrassed in February 1974 when TOLIMO members greeted 
Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations Secretary-General, with placards and a 
petition as he passed through Togo, TOLIMO argued that the United Nations 
had a moral duty to organize a fresh test of the popular will in the Volta Region, 
on the grounds that there had been irregularities in the conduct of the 1956 
plebiscite, and that the expressed wishes of the Ewe had been ignored .^  They 
were gambling on the likelihood that, having reflected on the post-colonial 
experience, the majority would welcome a second chance to sever the link with 
Ghana.
The Acheampong regime might have preferred to ignore TOLIMO were it not for 
two additional items of information that it managed to glean. The first was that 
TOLIMO was seeking the backing of Ewe chiefs on both sides of the frontier,
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who had been meeting on a regular basis since 1969.^ Like Nkrumah, the NRC 
was conscious of the political influence that was exercised by the traditional 
authorities in spite of their formal loss of power. Secondly, Ghanaian intelligence 
revealed that the Togolese authorities had a hand in financing the activities of 
TOLIMO. In subsequent years, the Togolese were unabashed in making 
irredentist claims upon Ghanaian territory. In January 1976, for example, The 
Times carried a Togolese advertisement which urged Acheampong "to show his 
statesmanship and restore Togo as she was before 
the Europeans got to work."^5
The Togolese were incapable of seizing Ghanaian territory by force of arms, but 
Acheampong was alert to the trouble that might be aroused amongst a 
disaffected populace. The NRC reacted with a familiar combination of carrots 
and sticks. In March 1973, in an echo of the Yikpa episode more than two decades 
earlier, the authorities infiltrated a secret meeting held in Palim£ and arrested a 
number of chiefs as they were returning to the R e g io n .* ^  They were treated 
leniently because the NRC wished to avoid creating martyrs if possible. In 
August 1975, the Government suspected that many of the TOLIMO activists were 
losing their stomach for political exile and granted them an amnesty, which was 
later extended into January of the following year. Finally in March 1976, the NRC 
introduced a new Decree which outlawed TOLIMO and prescribed a fine not 
exceeding £5,000, imprisonment not exceeding five years or both, for attending a 
TOLIMO meeting or shouting its slogans,^ Thereafter, TOLIMO activists were 
left in little doubt about the treatment they would receive if they fell into the 
hands of the authorities. As had been the case in the late 1950s, many found it 
preferable to take up exile in Togo rather than court political risks at home.
At the same time, the Government sought to drive a wedge between TOLIMO 
and its potential constituency. To this end, Operation Counterpoint, an elaborate 
propaganda exercise carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Information, was launched in 1976. A high-level team toured all parts of the
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Region in an effort to discredit TOLIMO and to let it be known that the SMC had 
no intention of reopening the unification question. A crucial supporting role was 
performed by senior chiefs in the Region, who were assiduously cultivated by 
Acheampong. His two most influential allies were the President of the Volta 
Region House of Chiefs, Togbe Adja Tekpor VI of Avatime, and the Paramount 
Chief of Anlo, Togbe Adeladza II. They were probably the instigators of a 
resolution passed at an emergency meeting of the House of Chiefs in March 1976, 
which distanced the House from the actions of some chiefs and endorsed 
Government measures to handle the secessionist threat.^® The alliance with Adja 
Tekpor was later renewed when he was recruited to serve on the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Union Government. As the pressure mounted, it ceased to be 
possible for chiefs to maintain their silence. Throughout the Region, therefore, 
they competed in exhibitions of loyalty, both to protect themselves from 
destoolment and where possible to win favours from the centre.
In the final analysis, secessionism failed to gain momentum for reasons that had 
less to do with Government repression than with inherent weaknesses in 
TOLIMO as a political organization. First of all, it was damaged by its 
associations with the unification movement. Most of its leaders had been active at 
some point in the Togoland Union or the Togoland Congress: the list of names 
includes S.G. Antor, A.K. Odame, Kofi Dumoga, G.O. Awuma and Albert 
S i m p  s o n .  ^  ^  The first two had recently been rebuffed by the voters, as we have 
seen, and their credibility was now at an even lower ebb. During the Second 
Republic, Antor and Dumoga had accepted the posts of Ambassador to Togo and 
Dahomey respectively and therefore incurred much of the blame for the 
discriminatory policies of the Busia administration. The Acheampong regime 
was quick to exploit these facts. For example, Utuka delivered a speech in 
October 1977 which played on the hypocrisy of the leadership:
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"The leaders of this Movement are few, and are only seeking their 
own selfish interest Some of these leaders like C.K. Dumoga and 
I.B. Bawa to mention only a few, have been involved in government 
of this country at one time or other... It is rather interesting to note 
that these leaders did not raise a finger about the status of the part 
of the Volta Region which they now seek to secede, during their 
political days... Now that these people are no longer in government, 
they have suddenly realized that the results of the 1956 plebiscite 
should be called into question. Their treachery, arrogance and lust 
for power and  to cause confusion in Ghana are now clearly
manifested."^
There was an obvious truth here which was not lost upon people within the 
Region, Acheampong took the matter a step further, alleging that TOLIMO was 
an instrument in a PP plot to foment civil disorder and thereby to topple the 
NRC.
TOLIMO also fell victim to the structural flaws which had first split the 
unification movement. Initially, it treated the reunification of the Ewe people as 
the major p r i o r i t y B u t  this had little resonance amongst the minority 
communities north of Hohoe who were asserting their ethnic distinctiveness. In 
1975, the Togolese Government intervened to install a set of more malleable 
leaders who had not been involved in the old unification movement. They were 
younger and drawn to a much greater extent from the minorities such as 
Buem.42 When the ousted leadership declined to abide by the change, a schism 
erupted within TOLIMO which was never fully repaired. In the south of the 
Region, where integrationist ideas had always held precedence, neither set of 
claimants enjoyed much confidence. The Anlos and their neighbours furnished 
such a prominent sub-section of the Ghanaian professional, intellectual and 
military elite that they could only lose from union with a Francophone country - 
especially one which was dominated by Northerners. It is not surprising, then, 
that Selormey, Agbo and Ashley-Lassen were as hostile to secessionism as was 
Acheampong himself. Robert Kotei once made an unsubstantiated and ultimately 
implausible claim that Komla Gbedemah was in league with the Chief of Staff of 
the Togolese Armed Forces to reunify the Togo and the Volta Region under his 
Presidency.^ Otherwise, what is noteworthy is the conspicuous absence of 
southerners from the ranks of the secessionist movement.
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Finally, TOLIMO was heavily dependent upon financial and moral support
provided by the Togolese authorities. As evidence of their complicity mounted,
the Acheampong regime adopted a more bellicose posture towards Togo. In the
speech already referred to, Utuka issued a thinly veiled threat against the
Eyadema regime:
"We shall cut ruthlessly through and devastate any country which 
makes a false move with military precision, and cause total havoc 
in less than a few hours, we have the capacity to strike hard."44
The proximity of Lom£ to the border made such a threat plausible enough and,
following an attempted coup that same month (which was apparently staged
from Ghanaian soil), Eyadema began to waver. According to Brown, he halted
TOLIMO plans to launch guerrilla incursions (which Utuka had registered
knowledge of) and even went as far as to prevent that organization from holding
rallies in Palim£ Without Togolese backing, and without sustained contact
with potential supporters inside the Volta Region, TOLIMO withered on the vine.
In retrospect, the attention that was centred on TOLIMO appears 
disproportionate to the threat it posed. TOLIMO failed to revitalize the networks 
of the unification movement of which it was but a pale reflection. In Likpe, at 
least, the secessionist scare seems to have been treated with an air of detachment. 
It is not merely that TOLIMO failed to get its message across, but also that it 
misread the mood in the Region. As great as the privations undoubtedly were, 
decades of integration had forged ideologies, material interests and mere habits 
of mind which imparted some consistency to the structures of the nation. 
Whatever its shortcomings, the educational system still served as an important 
medium for disseminating images of what it was to be Ghanaian. Equally, the 
structures of the Evangelical Presbyterian and Catholic Churches functioned as 
bonding agents when other institutional links were slackening. And finally, 
while the daily newspapers became increasingly difficult to acquire in remoter 
areas, radio remained an important channel of communication between centre 
and periphery. Through radio, it was possible to keep abreast of current affairs,
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which assumed the character of high theatre as the decade drew to a c lo se d  The 
radio also enabled ordinary people to participate in a series of national rituals 
that confirmed their membership of something much larger. These included the 
simple pleasures of listening to sport and the weekly lotto results.4^ Most of the 
radios that were available in the 1970s could only pick up signals from the Ghana 
Broadcasting Corporation, and although batteries became scarce towards the end 
of the decade, they were freely available in Togo.4** In short, the Bakpele and 
others continued to participate in an imagined national community.
5.3. The Political Economy of Contraband
In his Preface to the 1972 edition of Bandits. Eric Hobsbawm posited Ghanaian 
cocoa smuggling as an African variant upon the phenomenon of social 
b a n d i t r y  49 By the latter he meant forms of criminality that are condoned 
amongst communities whose way of life is threatened by the encroachment of 
capitalism and its accomplice, the modem state. As a rear-guard action of the 
peasantry, it belongs with other more overt forms of social p r o t e s t . ^  This lead 
has never been followed for a number of sound reasons. Chief amongst these is 
the historical evidence that production for the market was not imposed upon, but 
adopted enthusiastically by the Ghanaian peasantry. Also by the time of the First 
World War, most of the country was locked into a reasonably effective system of 
administration that extinguished the conditions under which widespread 
banditry might thrive. There are nevertheless certain aspects of the model which 
it would be useful to explore here. Firstly, it is worth considering whether 
smuggling was perceived as a legitimate act of defiance within a border 
environment. Secondly, it is worth considering whether an increase in smuggling 
presaged the breakdown of existing patterns of economic integration, the 
restoration of moral economies spanning the frontier, and re-incorporation into 
Togolese commercial circuits. It is helpful to begin with a closer examination of 
official perspectives.
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5.3.1. The View From the Centre
It is most unusual for Governments to admit that smuggling constitutes anything 
other than a criminal act, since to do otherwise invites questions about state 
legitimacy. At the same time, Governments are often defensive about the levels 
of crime since these can expose how patchy their control really is. It is 
particularly true of African Governments that they typically claim to possess 
more effective control than they in fact command. In the case of Ghana, the 
widening gap between rhetoric and reality, together with the periodic efforts to 
realign the two, provide a valuable insight into the interactions between the state 
and its citizens.
Interestingly, the Acheampong regime began by accentuating the dimensions of
smuggling. This was partly because there was a great deal of it during the early
1970s, which was not easily concealed. According to one estimate, about 93,000
tonnes of cocoa, or more than a fifth of the crop, was illegally marketed outside
Ghana in 1970/71. The figure for the Volta Region is 14,000 tonnes or more than
50% of the crop.51 These figures are no doubt inflated, but even if we adopt the
lower estimate of 31,000 tonnes for Ghana as a whole, the volume is still
considerable. There was also a leakage of consumer goods in the early 1970s,
which one report itemised as follows:
"Although there are many articles involved in smuggling, the main 
ones include cocoa, matchets, wigs, soap, sugar, refrigerators, 
television sets, radiogrammes, vehicle spare parts, textiles, prints, 
suiting materials, footware, cosmetics, gold and diamonds. Others 
are sardines, corned beef, drinkables, perfumes, and cigarettes.
Mos^gf such articles are produced in Ghana, while others are
More importantly, the Acheampong regime required a justification for holding 
on to power. From the start, the NRC staked its claim to legitimacy on the 
urgency of economic reconstruction. The Operation Feed Yourself Programme 
was wheeled out as the heavy artillery in the 'economic war' that was declared.^ 
The anti-smuggling campaign was slightly less strategic, but it enabled the NRC 
to project an image of itself as both dynamic and patriotic. Acheampong made
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repeated references to the damage inflicted by smuggling, such as the inability of 
the state to finance adequate social services and physical infrastructure. 
Smuggling later served as a convenient excuse for shortages and the failings of 
Government policy more generally.
During the first four years of NRC rule, smugglers featured regularly in the press
and in official speeches as profiteers who were prepared to sacrifice the welfare
of the nation on the altar of their own self-interest. On this view, their acts were
profoundly anti-social. An editorial from the The Daily Graphic in 1974 captures
the tone of moral outrage which permeated official discourse at this time:
"Nothing can justify smuggling: the impulse is generated by a 
perverted state of mind which sees money as an end in itself, just as 
it is with all dirty business deals. Smugglers are criminals pure and 
simple, and in view of the special situation of our country, their 
activities are wholly treasonable... Short of the capital punishment, 
it seems the next best thing is to send all smugglers summarily into 
detention - lock them up and throw the keys away."54
A genuine search for root causes was comparatively rare. Although the level of
cocoa prices was sometimes mentioned as a disincentive to farmers, it was
nevertheless assumed that Government alone was qualified to judge matters of
equity - and it had delivered its verdict.
If smuggling was anti-social, it followed that the authorities were justified in 
adopting tough measures to deal with it. It is worth underlining the note of 
confidence which accompanied the rhetorical assertions of state power. The tone 
was set in February 1972 when the NRC proclaimed that:
"The National Redemption Council is dismayed by the high 
incidence of smuggling now prevalent in the country. It is indeed a 
pity that in the present state of our economy certain ungrateful 
members of our society still indulge in this act of economic 
sabotage. The National Redemption Council has therefore 
instituted immediate action to arrest the situation. All members of 
the public are being informed that the routes for smuggled goods 
both in and out of Ghana are now under strict surveillance. Anyone 
caught smuggling will be severely dealt with."55
In July of that year, the NRC passed a Subversion Decree which prescribed the
death sentence for trafficking in timber, gold and diamonds, and a prison
sentence of not less than 15 and not more than 30 years for the smuggling of
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cocoa.^6 Cases that arose under the Decree were to be tried by special Military 
Tribunals set up in each Region, the judgements of which were not subject to 
appeal. In the border Regions, the Commissioners threatened even harsher 
penalties. Thus the Brong-Ahafo Regional Commissioner threatened to evict the 
residents of 13 border villages, while Major Habadah in the Volta Region 
(apparently in ignorance of the wording of the Decree) declared that the 
Government was willing to enforce the death penalty against anybody who was 
caught smuggling cocoa.’-*'7
A hard line would scarcely have been credible if the NRC had not
simultaneously taken action to improve border surveillance. The Border Guards,
who had recently absorbed employees from the former Field Agricultural
Survey, suffered from a poor public image and a lack of morale. They received
much of the blame for the rampant smuggling of the Busia period, because of
inefficiency but also on account of alleged corruption. The NRC judged that the
crux of the problem was the lack of a professional ethos within the unit.
Consequently, it was transferred from Police control to the Armed Forces, where
it was accorded an equivalent status to the Army, Navy and Air Force. The
Border Guards were later broken up into three battalions, located at Ho,
Dormaa-Ahenkro and Bolgatanga, alongside three independent operational
companies,^® The first Commander of the Border Guards was Colonel John
Kabore, who was succeeded by Brigadier F.W.K. Akuffo and by Brigadier E.K.
Utuka. The Guardsmen henceforth received the same pay, conditions of service
and facilities as personnel in the other services. They were also subject to
equivalent standards of training and discipline, which were to be inculcated at a
new training school at Kpetoe in the Volta Region. These reforms were
accompanied by a clear message that abuses within the unit would no longer be
tolerated. In 1972, the Guardsmen were warned that:
"All smuggled goods impounded will be traced to their source and 
the routes mapped out. When this has been done, all law 
enforcement agencies on these routes whose duty is to check the 
smuggling will also be severely and summarily dealt with. Action 
against the personnel of such law enforcement agencies will include 
instant dismissal."5^
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Nor was this an entirely idle threat. Between January and August 1975, Utuka 
dismissed a total of 68 Guardsmen and they were joined by 30 others at Aflao in 
October 1976.60
Nevertheless, it became increasingly obvious as the decade progressed that
Government rhetoric was seriously at odds with reality. Far from diminishing,
smuggling activity was booming. In the case of cocoa, there was a rise both in
absolute terms and as a proportion of the total crop (See Table 5.1). There was
also a significant leakage of minerals. Thus Togo exported CFA 114.9 million
worth of diamonds in 1977 in spite of the fact that she had no mines of her
own.^l These facts were bound to cause some embarrassment to a regime which
had placed so much emphasis upon a 'no-nonsense' approach. This in part
explains the link that began to be drawn in 1976 between smuggling and
secessionism. The SMC claimed that smuggling in the Volta Region was
politically motivated. In 1977, Utuka openly accused the Togolese authorities of
conspiring to weaken Ghana economically:
"... smuggling activities along the borders of Ghana, and into and 
from Ghana is [sic] centrally organized, planned, co-ordinated, 
directed and financed by the Togo Government against Ghana. This 
is a fact. It is sad andLunfortunate that some Ghanaians are being 
used as front men."62
In the Operation Counterpoint campaign of 1976, the issues of smuggling and
secession were explicitly coupled. At the launch of the campaign at Ho in June,
the audience sat under large banners which read: "Operation Counterpoint:
Anti-Secession, Anti-Smuggling, Anti-Hoarding, Anti-Profiteering".6^
The linkage was not without its problems however, since rampant smuggling 
could be interpreted as widespread support for secession, which was precisely 
what the regime was eager to deny. The SMC squared the circle by claiming that 
secessionists from outside were taking advantage of the basic ignorance of border 
peoples. The task of the authorities was therefore to 'educate' the latter about the 
consequences of their actions. The secessionist thesis could not, of course, 
account for the more substantial traffic in cocoa over the Ivorian frontier or for
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smuggling into Upper Volta, Utuka, however, insisted in 1977 that most 
contraband escaped through the eastern froiitier, and especially through A flao.^ 
Given the proximity of that town to Accra, this was not a preposterous statement.
Table 5.1:
Estimated Losses of Cocoa Through Smuggling ('000 tonnes)
Year Production To
Ivory Coast
To
Togo
Total As % of 
Production
1970/71 413 18 16 34 8.2
1971/72 454 21 18 39 8.6
1972/73 407 14 7 21 5.2
1973/74 340 9 5 14 4.1
1974/75 376 16 5 21 5.6
1975/76 396 21 8 29 7.3
1976/77 320 21 5 26 8.1
1977/78 271 38 8 46 17.0
1978/79 265 29 5 34 12.8
1979/80 281 32 8 40 14.2
1980/81 254 31 8 39 15.4
(Source: E, May, Exchange Controls and Parallel Market Economies 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 69 and 79; D. Bovet and L. Unnevehr, 
Agricultural Pricing in Togo, pp.25,58).
Significantly, the fierce opposition that the Acheampong and Akuffo regimes 
encountered owed a lot to their perceived collusion in the second economy. The 
AFRC later charged that they had been responsible for the proliferation of 
economic crimes in the wider society. The 'housecleaning' of the first Rawlings 
administration was in essence an attempt to enforce laws which often already 
existed on the statute book, but which had been flouted by previous 
administrations. Once again, little attention was paid to whether they were 
equitable or even enforceable. The AFRC revived the stereotype of the smuggler 
as either a social parasite who should be shown no mercy, or as an ignorant
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villager who could only be properly educated through the judicious use of force. 
Those unfortunate individuals who were apprehended received severe, and 
frequently summary, punishment. Yet the AFRC returned power to the 
politicians without proving what a concerted exercise of state power could 
achieve on a more permanent basis.
Smuggling and a host of other economic crimes returned to the public agenda
during the Third Republic. In Parliament, MPs made two significant admissions
which departed from orthodoxy. The first was that the state was effectively
powerless to manipulate conditions in the border areas, not least because its own
officials were unreliable. The MP for Buem, Monica Atenka, observed that the
Border Guards were often dependent upon the goodwill of the communities they
were supposed to police:
"My observations are that there have not been proper 
accommodation arrangements for the Border Guards in some areas.
They are left to stay with the rural folks, some of whom are 
themselves smugglers. I wonder how a Border Guard can arrest 
and efficiently prosecute his landlord or any member of his 
landlord's extended f a m i l y ." ^
It was noted that the longer the Guardsmen remained in one community, the
greater their opportunity to insert themselves into smuggling r in g s .^  The
alternative was to rotate the Guards more rapidly, but this risked forfeiting
access to local intelligence. The authorities generally preferred to post the Border
Guards to a locality for an extended period of time, with the attendant
consequences.
The second admission was that an ethos of smuggling was deeply rooted within 
rural communities. Border peoples were now portrayed as cunning manipulators 
of their environment. A sense of revelation is evident in a speech by the M.P. for 
Dormaa in 1980:
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"Now we get a situation in which the farmers and the Border 
Guards have combined to cheat the nation. For, without the 
assistance of the Border Guards... the farmers alone could not 
smuggle any significant quantity of cocoa out of the country. Both 
the smugglers and the guards have found smuggling a very 
lucrative enterprise. It is alleged that for every bag or cocoa which 
the guards get across the border, they collect something like <i200 
from the owner of the cocoa, that is the farmer, while the farmer 
earns not less than <cl,000 which, of course, is far more than the <fi240 
which he gets in Ghana, and which is not paid promptly by the 
Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board.
It was acknowledged, therefore, that there was more to smuggling than mere 
ignorance and that the advantage lay with the border communities rather than 
the state. Since they could not be brought to heel, the politicians considered 
means of coaxing them into compliance with the law. In a debate on cocoa 
producer prices in November 1980, nine out of the ten MPs who spoke, stressed 
the importance of an immediate increase and a number did so on the grounds 
that smuggling could be checked in no other way.**® After a prolonged delay, the 
Limann administration responded a year later by tripling producer prices.
5.3.2. The View From the Frontier
5.3.2.I. Smuggling as a form of social protest
It is more difficult to expose community attitudes towards smuggling since, as 
Kotey observed in the case of Buem, this is an inherently sensitive line of 
enquiry.*^ When community leaders spoke publicly on the issue it was 
invariably to condemn smuggling outright. It was always understood that while 
the authorities were often unable to monitor frontier traffic, they were still 
capable of punishing acts or merely threats of defiance. The fear of retribution 
means that the views expressed during interviews have also to be treated with 
caution. The argument that follows is based partly upon evidence derived from 
formal interviews, and partly upon less structured discussions and participant 
observation in Likpe.
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In 1972, a reporter from The Daily Graphic investigated perceptions of
smuggling in the Volta Region, in the wake of a tour by Lt.-Colonel Takyi, the
Deputy Executive Chairman of the CMB. He observed that while the chiefs and
people generally concurred on the negative consequences of smuggling, they
were also overtly critical of the behaviour of state agencies:
"At Hohoe, Kadjebi, Ahamansu, Nkonya, Likpe-Kukurantumi and 
its surrounding towns and villages, the farmers state that they are 
less to blame for the smuggling. They stressed that the Border 
Guards should be held responsible for their indulgences. The 
wicked act of some Secretary Receivers who never pay the farmers 
promptly but rather divert the money to some other uses was also 
cited as a cause of smuggling. Very often the question asked by the 
man in the street is: 'What are the Border Guards doing?"'70
During 1985/86, the same points were repeated by the Bakpele, looking back
over the previous decade. It was recalled that the Border Guards used to
encourage villagers to smuggle, and would then shift the burden of guilt onto the
community. Another common complaint was that outsiders used Likpe as a
transit point, thereby helping to earn it a bad reputation. Significantly, these were
both defensive postures which conceded the point that smuggling was
undesirable. However, it would be inadvisable to leave the matter there since less
submissive attitudes were also encountered. For example, Nana Agya Mensah of
Likpe-Avedzeme challenged the terms of the debate in characteristically
forthright manner:
"I would say the name [of smuggling] is wrongly applied. You 
blackmail a man to charge him. Farmers aren't given their due 
price. Last year the price was 16% of the world price [sic]. When I 
produce anything, I have the right to send it to any market. But you 
force me to send it over there [to Togo]. This is legalized robbery of 
the farmers. You give me a name to blackmail me because you don't 
give me my rights."71
This was an atypical response, but one has to admit the possibility that it
represented the tip of the iceberg.
By probing attitudes towards smuggling more deeply, it is possible to expose a 
vein of political criticism, which is otherwise mostly concealed. In a survey 
conducted throughout Likpe in 1986, respondents were asked to express an 
opinion on the major factors that contributed to the smuggling of cocoa, the 
leading item of illicit commerce.77 The results, which are summarised in Table
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5.2, are of particular interest because they are at variance with the official 
interpretations and at least one other survey 7^ Whereas the latter have tended to 
stress the lure of black market profits, the Bakpele interpretation laid the 
emphasis upon push factors.
The disparity between cocoa prices was not inconsequential, and indeed prices 
were a source of considerable grievance in Likpe. Between 1970/71 and 1981/82 
real producer prices fell by about 40%, as a consequence both of high taxes and 
the overvaluation of the currency (see Table 5.3). The Acheampong regime had 
reversed the devaluation measures of the Busia regime and then proceeded to 
print money when faced with budgetary constraints. Yet it insisted on 
maintaining a favourable rate of exchange against the dollar. While the SMC 
denied that Ghanaian farmers were disadvantaged by comparison with their 
Togolese or Ivorian counterparts, official calculations were invariably based on 
official rates of exchange that bore little relationship to effective rates (see Table 
5.4). Whereas cocoa farmers in the interior had to choose between accepting the 
official price or deserting cocoa for alternative crops, those who lived along the 
border could always seek better prices in neighbouring countries (see Table 5.5),
Table 5.2:
Responses to Question: "What Has Been the Main Reason For 
Cocoa Smuggling In Recent Years?_______________________
Reason Number Percentage of Total
(1) Higher Togolese 
prices at black market rates
52 18.4%
(2) People have farms on both 
sides of border
6 2.1%
(3) The lack of goods 122 43.2%
(4) Shortcomings of 
buying system
55 19.5%
(5) Other: 10 3.5%
(6) Don't know 38 13.4%
Total 281 100.1%
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Table 5.3:
Trends in Cocoa Producer Prices, 1970/71-1980/81
Year Nominal Producer 
Price (c per tonne)
Rural Consumer Price Real Price 
Index (1970=100) Index
1970/71 293 100.00 100.0
1971/72 293 108.94 91.8
1972/73 366 118.97 105.0
1973/74 436 139.60 106.6
1974/75 560 164.29 116.3
1975/76 597 209.20 97,4
1976/77 747 330.77 77.1
1977/78 1,333 720.48 63.1
1978/79 2,667 1,258.68 72.3
1979/80 4,000 2,004.38 68.1
1980/81 4,000 3,229.19 42,3
1981/82 12,000 6,761.70 60.6
(Source: World Bank. Ghana: Agricultural Sector Review, January 
1985, p.63)
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Table 5.4:
Trends in Black Market Exchange Rates, 1972-1981
Year
(1)
Official/Effective 
Rate (Cedis per $)
(2)
Black Market Rate
(3)
(2) divided 
by(l)
1972 *1.28 *1.68 1,3
1973 *1.15 *1.50 1.3
1974 *1.15 *1.73 1.5
1975 *1.15 *1.98 1.7
1976 *1.15 *2.88 2.5
1977 *1.15 *9.12 7.9
1978 *2.75 *8.95 3.3
1979 *2.75 *15.61 5.7
1980 *2.75 *16.70 6.1
1981 *2.75 *26.26 9.6
(Source: Pick's Currency Yearbook, various editions; Ernesto May, 
Exchange Controls and Parallel Market Economies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, p. 127)
176
Table 5.5:
The Rewards of Cocoa Smuggling Into Togo
Year
Ghana Price 
(<i/tonne)
Togo Price 
(CF A/tonne)
Black Market Togo 
Price (tf/tonne)
1970 293.80 88,000 523.12
1971 300.47 93,000 538.81
1972 360.92 93,000 588.03
1973 385.04 93,000 564.19
1974 484.47 95,000 675.92
1975 577.90 115,000 783.56
1976 679.15 120,000 1,055.54
1977 976.78 130,000 2,795.70
1978 1,601.40 150,000 4,632.04
1979 3,308,10 200,000 8,347.46
1980 3,936.30 220,000 17,232.23
1981 5,333.50 220,000 14,914.72
(Source: Ernesto May, Exchange Controls and Parallel Market 
Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 129)
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In the case of the Volta Region, however, the smuggling of cocoa has to be 
viewed in the context of a mounting crisis of reproduction. Production 
underwent a dramatic decline in the 1970s due to disease and the age of the trees. 
Apart from the familiar threat of capsids and (to a lesser extent) swollen shoot, 
black pod exacted a heavy toll on the crop. Whereas one expert felt able to 
proclaim in 1968 that fungal diseases were a minor h a z a r d , within a couple of 
years an agricultural officer was reporting a serious outbreak in the 
Dodo-Amanfrom District:
"I have to report that I visited a lot of the farms reported to have 
been attacked by black pod at Bethel, Zida village at Dodo Salem, 
Pusuopu and other villages and discovered to my horror that the 
disease had indeed caused an immense havoc which was bound to 
affect the crop and reduce considerably the output this current 
season. In most of the farms not a single healthy pod can be seen on 
the cocoa trees and the attack has spread on to the small immatured 
pods and cherrelles to a degree that npt even^a load of cocoa, as I 
noticed it, can be obtained from each farm."75
In the course of the decade, the disease spread southwards and was endemic in
the Likpe-Kukurantumi cocoa district by 1980. Furthermore, the stock of trees in
the Volta Region was generally older than in other parts of Ghana, as can be
guaged from Table 5.6. Whereas over 5% of farms in the 1970s were below eight
years old in the Ashanti and Eastern Regions (where cocoa was first adopted),
the comparable figure for the Volta Region was under 2%. The majority of farms
were clustered at the other end of the scale. Although no specific figures for
Likpe exist, the earlier adoption of cocoa there would suggest a less favourable
age profile than in the more northerly sectors of the Region.
Table 5.6:
Results of National Cocoa Survey, 1970-79: Age Distribution of 
Cocoa Farms (in percentages)______________________________
0-7 8-15 16-30 over 30
Region years years years years Total
Volta 1.8 4.7 66.4 27.0 99.9%
National 9.1 17.7 57.5 15.7 100.0%
(Source: Cocoa Board Headquarters, Accra)
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Black pod and ageing trees combined to produce falling yields and by extension, 
a steep decline in cocoa incomes. This process might have been offset by new 
plantings, but the decisive fact about much of the Region, especially Likpe, was a 
shortage of forest land.7** Furthermore, as the pioneer farmers passed away, the 
existing income from cocoa was spread more thinly throughout the community. 
Under the Bakpele system of patrilineal inheritance, all the children are eligible to 
receive a share of the estate. In the case of cocoa, the farms may be physically 
divided, although they are commonly placed under the control of an eldest son 
who manages them on behalf of other members of the family.77 In either event, 
the cocoa income was dispersed more widely than before. With few other sources 
of income, the low producer prices offered by the CMB imposed an intolerable 
burden upon families. This explains why smuggling is popularly associated in /' 
Likpe not so much with accumulation as with hardship.
Table 5.7:
Cocoa Purchases and Smuggling Between the Volta Region and 
______________Togo 1969/70 to 1981/82 (tonnes)______________
Year
Regional
Purcnases
Togo
Purchases
Estimated 
Togo Production
Estimate of 
Smuggling
1969/70 20,540 23,188 10,000 13,188
1970/71 15,104 27,878 10,000 17,878
1971/72 10,107 29,361 9,358 20,000
1972/73 21,839 18,604 9,700 8,904
1973/74 14,261 16,000 9,161 6,839
1974/75 13,754 14,000 9,000 5,000
1975/76 13,257 18,000 9,000 9,000
1976/77 9,223 14,000 9,000 5,000
1977/78 7,369 17,000 9,000 8,000
1978/79 5,980 13,000 8,000 5,000
1979/80 4,776 16,000 8,000 8,000
1980/81 1,496 16,000 8,000 8,000
1981/82 1,683 11,000 8,000 3,000
(Source: D. Bovet and L. Unnevehr,.Agricultural Pricing in Togo. 
p.25,58; Cocoa Board, Accra; GilLand Duffus. Cocoa Statistics. 
April 1981 and November 1989)75
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Table 5.8:
Cocoa Purchases in Likpe-Kukurantumi District, 
1977/78-1984/85 (tonnes)
Societies 1977/8 1978/9 1979/80 1980/1 1981/2
(a) Likpe:
Kukurantumi 179 113 69 12 16
Abrani 91 76 40 8 16
Nkwanta 90 44 55 12 7
Bakwa 39 18 30 8 4
Bala 67 25 24 8 5
Mate 72 32 34 10 6
Koforidua 130 41 39 5 17
Agbozome 175 58 57 4 17
(b) Lolobi:
Kumasi 355 143 198 13 25
Ashiambi 161 61 119 4 9
Hunyeasem 118 42 58 4 9
(c) Akpafu:
Sokpo 76 48 48 6 8
Adorkor 213 115 92 3 18
(d) Buem:
Old Baika 294 222 225 12 26
New Baika 115 79 75 5 9
Total: 2,175 1,117 1,163 112 192
(Source: Cocoa Board, Regional headquarters, Hohoe)
Given that the sums of money involved were frequently minuscule by 1980, it 
was often the other failings of the state which were decisive. After the 1966 coup, 
cocoa purchasing had been contracted out to licensed buying agents of the CMB, 
but there was a return to unitary purchasing in the 1977/78 season to remedy
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alleged inefficiencies.7^ However, the Produce Buying Division was dogged by 
many of the same shortcomings as its predecessor, the UGFCC. The Secretary 
Receivers were accused of manipulating the scales and of embezzling funds, 
which resulted in the farmers being issued with chits. Long delays typically 
ensued before the farmers received payment. During interviews, many older 
farmers contrasted state purchasing unfavourably with the activities of the old 
buying firms, in spite of memories of the 1930s holdups. One farmer from 
Agbozome explained the difference as follows:
"I was an agent for the UAC and GBO at Kute. I hate the chit and 
cheque system because the small-scale cocoa farmer has to travel 
for a few cedis whilst in the colonial days you were paid on the spot 
cash and could buy your needs even there from their own stores.
Or during the off-season, you could credit the goods or ask for a 
cash advancement so that the cocoa farmer was at no time in need.
Where are those facilities today when the Secretary Receivers have 
either tightened or loosened the weighing scales to cheat the poor 
cocoa farmer of a few kilograms for their personal benefit?"80
In more prosperous cocoa-growing Regions, a sudden influx of cocoa beans
could leave a buying centre short of money. This ought not to have been a
problem in the Volta Region and yet non-payment was a common enough
experience. Furthermore, in parts of Buem the derelict state of the roads and
bridges often meant that the buying centres were virtually inaccessible.
As is clear from the last quotation, the old buying firms had previously doubled 
up as wholesalers and retailers of essential commodities. The spread of cocoa 
cultivation was historically associated with new patterns of consumption: 
manufactured soap, sugar, roofing sheets and cloth all entered the domestic 
sphere as necessary goods which were readily obtainable at the village level. In 
the 1970s, there was a severe contraction in the supply of consumer goods, which 
resulted from the collapse of local industries and the shortage of foreign 
exchange. The state-owned Ghana National Trading Corporation (GNTC), 
virtually ceased operations in Likpe. The GNTC and the expatriate firms (which 
continued with a greater or lesser degree of state participation) retained stores in 
Hohoe, but their shelves were regularly empty. The few goods in circulation 
passed through the hands of a fortunate minority with the right connections. By
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contrast, the markets on the Togolese side of the border were always 
well-stocked. Since the cedi was not convertible at official rates, the Bakpele who 
visited the Danyi markets needed to cross the border with goods that would earn 
the requisite CFA francs. Cocoa was always certain of finding a buyer, but coffee, 
plantain and palm-nuts served the same purpose. The result was a reversal of the 
patterns of trade that had been current until the 1950s, when the villagers of 
Danyi used to headload their wares into Likpe on market days.
According to a popular Bakpele interpretation, then, it was the bad faith and 
incompetence of the authorities rather than the greed of border peoples that was 
ultimately responsible for smuggling. This was the very point that Nana Agya 
Mensah made more explicitly. Nevertheless, local attitudes were tinged with a 
degree of ambivalence. The Bakpele had never relished the prospect of throwing 
off the yoke of state power. Rather, the periodic requests for a Police station 
suggests that the state was regarded as the repository of certain valuable 
functions.®! The real complaint of Nana Agya Mensah was that the state had 
ceased to perform its side of the bargain, while insisting that the farmers keep to 
theirs. As a staunch CPP loyalist, he believed that the rot had begun with the 
overthrow of Nkrumah and that the solution lay in a return to the path pioneered 
by the CPP .®2 Needless to say, his vision was decidedly statist in orientation. 
Others were more inclined to blame Nkrumah, but they too hoped for the 
restoration of a symbiotic relationship with the centre. Smuggling did not 
therefore denote a rupture and indeed it may have contributed to the political 
quiescence of the Volta Region, That is, it helped to alleviate hardship through 
non-political means and limited the potential appeal of secession.
Moreover, while smuggling was widely accepted as legitimate response under 
very difficult circumstances, it was not condoned by all sections of the 
community. A number of interviewees deprecated smuggling as socially 
irresponsible and ventured the opinion that it might have been tackled more 
effectively if only the authorities had sought the co-operation of the chiefs.®®
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Assuming that this was an honest expression of opinion, it illustrates once again 
the remarkable level of civic consciousness exhibited by the older generation. 
However, it is also indicative of the tensions that began to emerge in the wake of 
the crisis of reproduction.
In Likpe, as in most parts of the Region, smuggling took the form of small 
quantities of goods headloaded across bush tracks rather than truckloads of 
contraband driven through border posts. It was standard practice for ordinary 
farmers to carry their crops to market in Danyi as the need arose. Nevertheless, 
the decline in cocoa output reinforced the importance of bulking operations. A 
number of traders specialized in the buying of small quantities of cocoa and 
coffee and then hired the services of carriers. Those who were most intimately 
involved in the smuggling complex were strangers and the landless youth of 
both sexes. Larger towns such as Hohoe had small communities of strangers, 
often Nigerians, who oiled the wheels of the black m arket.^  In farming areas,
X *
there were concentrations of Togolese nationals. Some some had bought land or
/
had taken long-term possession of pledged farms. Successive governments 
blamed pledging for smuggling, on the grounds that Togolese farmers were less 
likely to sell to the CMB. Thus, in 1973 Colonel Nyante, then the Regional 
Commissioner, recommended that the CMB should provide the money with 
which Ghanaian farmers could reclaim their lands.^  In the context of a land 
squeeze, the indigenes themselves stood to gain from anti-smuggling measures 
that would have the effect of displacing these strangers. It is not necessary to 
elaborate on this aspect here, since little land had in fact been alienated in Likpe.
There was nevertheless a stranger population in Likpe, mostly Kabres from 
northern Togo, who performed the bulk of the work on the cocoa farms. In her 
1956 survey of the Jasikan area, McGlade discovered that the kotokunu labour 
contract was almost universal. The labourers were paid a fixed price per load, 
which typically amounted to less than the one-third share characteristic of the 
abusa system.®^ Her assessment was that this was a historical relic that survived
in the Volta Region chiefly because of its proximity to an abundant supply of 
cheap Togolese labour.®^ In 1969 the Aliens Compliance Order provoked a mass 
exodus of foreign nationals from the Region, yet the kotokunu system remained in 
place. A relative shortage of labour did produce more favourable terms in Likpe, 
since the labourers could threaten to seek new employers. Whereas a kotokunu 
labourer in the mid-1950s was paid about 13% of the producer price, thirty years 
later the going rate was 20%.®® Moreover, the farmers needed to offer additional 
inducements such as trees which could be felled to tap palm-wine on a 
share-crop basis. Still, the labourers were not sheltered from the effects of the 
downward trend in production and prices. Their response was to minimize their 
labour inputs, which may explain why the farmers started to complain about the 
laziness of their work-force at this time. Whereas labourers had previously 
weeded twice a year, by the turn of the decade they were reluctant to do so 
without additional rewards. The poorer standards of farm maintenance may 
have been partially responsible for the spread of black pod disease.®^ In 1982/83 
the Chief Farmers of Likpe and Lolobi began to meet in order to fix a standard 
payment for a minimum performance of tasks.90
The labourers were concerned not only about the level of their cash income, but 
also about the form in which it was delivered. Since most visited their home 
areas at least once a year, they needed a regular supply of CFA francs, which 
would not be forthcoming if the farmer sold to the CMB and sometimes even if 
he did not. Many labourers therefore under-declared the harvest and then 
proceeded to market the difference secretly. Illicit buyers (often strangers) visited 
the farms and bought cocoa at a price which lay somewhere between the black 
market and CMB. prices. At a time when many cocoa farms were under joint 
family ownership, effective supervision was difficult to maintain. Several 
Bakpele farmers reported having to dismiss their workers for theft. ^  This would 
appear to have been part of a wider pattern. Thus, in 1972 a chief in the Jasikan 
district told of how a Togolese national living in the Dodo-Amanfrom area 
bought stolen cocoa beans, dried them and then recruited Kotokili youths to
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carry them to Togo.^2 There are also hints of that similar practices occurred 
elsewhere in Ghana. During a Parliamentary debate on smuggling in 
Brong-Ahafo in 1980, for example, one M.P. attributed the bulk of smuggling in 
his constituency to the activities of Zabarimas and other foreign nationals.93 
Once it is understood that the farm-owners were often as not the victims of 
smuggling, their ambivalence towards its existence is easier to comprehend.
The chiefs and members of the older generation also became concerned about the 
effects of smuggling on social cohesion. Most younger farmers did not have land 
upon which to plant new cocoa and there were limits to the ability to earn an 
income from food crops. Some villages had low-lying lands which were suitable 
for rice cultivation and these now began to be farmed more intensively, 
especially by the women. People from Mate, for example, rented land as far away 
as Bakwa. Nevertheless, Likpe was running a food deficit by the late 1970s, at 
which time Anyomi observed:
"The Likpes, who depended on cash crops such as cocoa and coffee, 
have little farming land now and thus cultivation of food crops has 
reduced considerably. Likpes, who were formerly supplying Hohoe 
markets with rice, yams, plantains and cocoyams are now buyers of 
these iteiris from the people of Danyi in Togo and from Hohoe 
markets.
Whereas urban employment had lured talented young Bakpele away from the 
community in the 1960s, high inflation and low wages had closed off that exit. 
Many young men left for Nigeria, where they were able to make a living out of 
the opportunities created by the oil boom. Those who remained either turned to 
non-agricultural work such as blacksmithing and tailoring, or to petty 
smuggling. The local establishment looked upon the latter with some misgivings, 
since it seemed to loosen the bonds of family control. Young men were reluctant 
to go to farm when they could make more money from contraband. The majority 
simply hired out their carrying services, but some acquired the means to finance 
their own operations. This often involved the purchase of cocoa beans stolen 
from other members of the community. Another source of concern was that the
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earnings tended to be spent on 'wee* and alcohol, in the absence of other forms of 
e n te r t a in m e n t95  jf there was a sub-culture associated with smuggling, as posited 
by Rathbone via H o b s b a w m ,9 6  it was specific to the younger men and women. 
Members of the older generation, who were often pillars of the Catholic or 
Presbyterian Churches, complained instead of the indolence of youth. In 1986 one 
old man, who prided himself on having planted his own cocoa as early as 1914, 
attributed the decline of yam production not to land shortage but to 
work-shyness on the part of the young men:
"The youngsters have refused to do any yam farming out of 
laziness. And if we the old ones make yam farms, the young ones 
will steal."97
At one level, this was a merely familiar symptom of the generation gap, but it 
was also grounded in the reality that young men who derived their incomes from 
smuggling acquired a greater measure of independence. It is the perception of 
moral decay that accounts for puzzling statements to the effect that chiefs should 
have been asked to play a more active role in the campaign against smuggling.
Finally, the evidence from Likpe does not suggest the emergence of a new moral 
economy spanning the frontier. Although the Bakpele did frequent the Danyi 
markets more regularly than before, what is more striking is the extent to which 
the community turned in upon itself. Togolese goods were notoriously expensive 
and there were limits to the supply of commodities which could be exchanged. 
Consequently, there was a revival of local crafts which had all but died out 
before the crisis struck, Bakpele women were able to supply a cheaper substitute 
for manufactured soap using cocoa waste and palm oil.98 Similarly, the art of 
blacksmithing, which had hitherto seemed doomed for extinction, staged a 
sudden recovery. Blacksmiths produced their own hoes and acquired a steady 
trade in the repair of cutlasses which local farmers could not afford to replace. 
There was also more work for local tailors. The considerable level of local 
self-sufficiency ensured that the Palim£ nexus did not recover its former 
importance. Nor did the new pattern of trading relations seem to foster more 
intimate social contacts across the frontier. Although more Bakpele may have
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married from Danyi and further afield than ever before, this was far from normal 
practice. If anything, the Bakpele assessment of their Togolese neighbours 
became less favourable. A common complaint was that people who carried goods 
to market were often asked to return at a later date to receive payment. When the 
Bakpele smuggler returned, the Togolese buyer would feign ignorance of the 
transaction or threaten to inform the Togolese border guards, which might result 
in a sound beating. As indicated before, it is important to recognize that border 
communities often deploy the coercive power of the state at the expense of each 
other.
5.4. Conclusion:
During the 1970s, scenarios which did not appear overly optimistic at the time of 
independence began to look strangely misconceived. The comparative dynamism 
of the economy and the efficacy of the bureaucracy, each of which had attracted 
favourable comment, turned out to be ephemeral in the longer term. Although 
the greater prosperity of the Gold Coast had strengthened the hand of 
integrationists at an earlier phase, a reversal of fortunes did not reshape political 
loyalties to any meaningful extent. For a brief moment, the appearance of 
TOLIMO seemed to portend the reopening of the unification question. Yet what 
is most noteworthy about TOLIMO is its complete failure to capture the 
imagination of people in the Volta Region. It will not be necessary to raise the 
Togoland question again.
The growth of smuggling presents greater problems of interpretation. It 
demonstrated two things: the willingness of border peoples to violate the law 
and the inability of the state to do anything very much about it. But smuggling 
was always double-edged. It exacerbated the fiscal crisis of the state and the 
foreign exchange squeeze, but it also functioned as a safety-valve. Smuggling 
eased the shortage of essential goods, permitted some farmers to maintain their 
incomes and provided a source of earnings for the unemployed youth.
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Smuggling might conceivably be interpreted as an expression of social banditry 
were it not for the ambivalence displayed towards it by many of the farmers, 
who were on the receiving end of theft. The attitudes displayed by the Bakpele 
may not be aberrant, since another study carried out at Dormaa in 1976 found, to 
the surprise of the student concerned, broad support for the anti-smuggling 
campaigns of that t im e .99 As for the youth, smuggling was in some sense an 
alternative to the modes of political expression that were familiar to their parents. 
Thus, successive generational layers in Likpe exhibited significantly different 
responses to the public realm.
Statistical Appendix to Chapter Five:
Table 5,9:
Ghana's External Trade Position, 1972-1981 (tf million)
Year Imports Exports Balance of Trade
1972 393.3 564.4 +171.1
1973 525.9 730.4 +204.5
1974 943.7 840.9 -102.8
1975 909.3 928.3 +19
1976 991.7 960.9 -30.8
1977 1,193.3 1,166.1 -27.2
1978 1,681.8 1,580.6 -101.2
1979 2,344.2 2,736.9 +392.7
1980 3,103.6 3,157.8 +54.2
1981 3,041.0 2,924.0 -117.0
(Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, 
September 1984, pp.54-56)
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Table 5.10:
Production of Major Commodities, 1972-1981
Year Cocoa
('000 tonnes)
Cereal
Crops
(kg.)
Starchy
Staples
(kg)
Gold
(kg.) Diamonds 
('000 carats)
1972 407.0 723.5 6,133.3 22,522.0 2,658.8
1973 340.0 764.1 6,866.7 22,688.2 2,306.8
1974 376.0 863.1 7,979.7 19,097.5 2,571.7
1975 396.0 671.5 5,452.3 16,295.1 2,336.2
1976 320.0 689.4 4,442.5 16,494.2 2,282.9
1977 271.0 639.0 3,995.0 14,957.2 1,946.8
1978 265.0 540.0 4,105.0 12,504.7 1,422.8
1979 281.0 780.0 3,927.0 11,093.8 1,225.6
1980 254.0 674.0 4,349.0 10,981.0 1,149.2
1981 220.0 725.0 4,114.0 10,595.3 836.2
(Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, 
September 1984, pp.5-7; World Bank, Ghana: Agricultural Sector 
Review, January 1985, p.63)
Table 5.11:
Revenue and Expenditure, 1971/72-1981/82 U million)
Year Revenue Expenditure 
Recurrent Development Total
Balance
1971/2 435.4 430.7 103.8 534.5 -99.1
1972/3 391.7 449.1 96.0 545.1 -153.4
1973/4 583.6 569.2 169.3 738.5 -154.9
1974/5 804.8 875.4 286.1 1,161.5 -356.7
1975/6 814,8 997.4 441.2 1,438,6 -623.8
1976/7 1,074.6 1,308.0 637.2 1,945.2 -870.6
1977/8 1,539.1 2,322.2 695.4 3,017.6 -1,478.5
1978/9 2,187.8 3,334.5 759.8 4,094.3 -1,906.5
1979/80 3,026,1 4,076.8 594.7 4,671.5 -1,645.4
1980/1 3,279.1 6,329.3 1,390.0 7,719.3 -4,440.2
1981/2 4,545.0 7,917.0 927.0 8,844.0 -4,229.0
(Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, 
September 1984, p.34)
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Chapter Six:
Limits of the Exit Option: Bakpele Reactions to A 
Beleaguered State
Having disposed of the issues relating to territorial sovereignty, it remains to 
consider some of the other ways in which the relations between community and 
state were coloured by the crisis. Naomi Chazan has offered an interpretation 
that is helpful in anchoring the discussion that follows. * She describes a 
dialectical process in which the deflation of state power is counterbalanced by the 
revival of alternative structures at the local level. Decay and renewal are the 
leitmotifs. This raises two issues which will be addressed in greater detail below. 
The first concerns the extent to which people in peripheral communities like 
Likpe may be judged to have disengaged from national affairs. The second 
centres on the ability of what one might call the 'informal political sector' to 
substitute for formal governmental institutions. There is an obvious parallel here 
with the preceding Chapter in that both explore aspects of withdrawal from the 
state.
6.1. Expectations in Retreat
6.1.1. The Promise of Development Revisited
In the early 1970s, debate in the Volta Region focussed more squarely than ever 
on a perceived lack of development by comparison with the rest of southern 
Ghana. This was not entirely a figment of the imagination, as is clear from some 
basic indicators. One study carried out in the mid-1970s placed the Region sixth 
on a scale of development, although it was the third largest in terms of 
population.^ The Region had the fewest consumers of pipe-borne water in 1970 
with the single exception of the Upper Region.^ Only the Brong-Ahafo, Northern 
and Upper Regions had a smaller number of doctors and dentists,^ And while 
the Volta Region was renowned as a net exporter of skilled manpower, it ranked
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only fifth with respect to school attendance.^ These were largely the legacies of 
British trusteeship, although opinion was as inclined to blame the vagaries of 
post-independence politics. In an article published in the Legon Observer late in 
1969, for example, one author attributed the problem to the vindictiveness of 
Nkrumah.^ This article captures the acute sensitivity over the balance of national 
power in 1969, a condition that was inflamed by the subsequent actions of the 
Busia regime.
The coup of January 1972 was welcomed in the Volta Region, as was the 
inclusion of three Ewe officers on the National Redemption Council (NRC) 7 The 
honeymoon endured for as long as two years primarily because of the skill with 
which the NRC massaged popular expectations.^ It breathed life back into the 
Nkrumahist vision of state-led development, which had been under attack since 
1966, and placed renewed emphasis upon closer Regional balance. Four 
initiatives impinged directly upon the Volta Region. The first was the Operation 
Feed Yourself (OFY) programme which was supposed to effect an agricultural 
revolution by means of a mixture of direct state intervention and incentives to 
private commercial and peasant farmers. The Volta Region, embracing as it did a 
unique range of ecological zones, was potentially a major beneficiary of the 
programme. Secondly, the NRC announced the formation of Regional 
Development Corporations (RDCs), whose role was to invest in agricultural, 
commercial and industrial ventures in the absence of adequate private capital. 
The RDCs were to exploit resources outside of the urban centres, and to that 
extent were expected to contribute towards a more even pattern of development. 
The VRDC was established in July 1973.
Thirdly the NRC rehabilitated the decentralization proposals which had been 
advocated by the Mills-Odoi Commission as far back as 1967. ^  The Busia regime 
had failed to implement the structural reforms that were implicit in the 1969 
Constitution, so as to deny the opposition a foothold at the local level. At the time 
of the coup, local government remained under the direction of appointed
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management committees, whose loyalty to the centre could be assured.10 The 
Acheampong regime proposed creating 58 new District Councils that would 
serve as the foundations of a new administrative structure. Seven of these were to 
be located in the Volta Region. The District Councils, which would ultimately be 
elected, would be entitled to funding from the Regional Councils. They would in 
turn manage a wider range of services through a subordinate tier of Local 
Councils. A step towards making the District Councils financially viable was 
taken in 1974, the year the new structure was put in place, when the NRC agreed 
to pay the wages and salaries of all local government staff.
At a durbar in Ho in July 1972, Acheampong also announced a series of 
infrastructural projects which central government planned to implement in the 
Volta Region.^ The most noteworthy was a tarred trunk road running from 
Ve-Golokwati through Hohoe and Jasikan to Papase, that would ultimately be 
extended to Bimbilla in the Northern Region. Further south, there were plans to 
connect Asikuma and Kpeve through Peki. The combined result would be to 
place the Jasikan and Krachi Districts within easy reach of the Regional capital 
and within a day's reach of Accra. In addition, the NRC proposed to tar all roads 
that ran adjacent to the frontier with Togo. This was primarily intended to 
facilitate surveillance, but it might also be expected to benefit many isolated 
communities. Finally, Acheampong proposed that any town with a population of 
greater than 2,000 people should be eligible to receive a piped water supply, 
while shallow wells with pumps would be installed in less populous
communities.^
The immediate effect of these announcements was to revive an interest in what 
the state had to offer. This was manifested in the flowering of voluntary and 
development associations, whose principal aim was to attract Government 
support for one project or another.-^ Equally indicative were the efforts of 
leaders of thought within the Region to solicit the goodwill of the NRC. The 
President of the Regional House of Chiefs, Togbe Adja Tekpor VI of Avatime,
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used the occasion of the visit by Acheampong's to Ho to demand careful 
consideration of Regional needs.^  The following month, some 300 leading 
citizens met at Ho to discuss the formation of a Regional association that could 
both mobilize resources within the Region and advise the administration on its 
development priorities.^ The Volta Region Development Association (VORDA) 
was formally inaugurated in January 1973 under the benevolent gaze of Major 
Habadah, the Regional Commissioner. The association was headed by an 
eminent selection of intellectuals and former politicians from the Second 
Republic, notably Dr. G.K. Agama (former leader of the Parliamentary 
Opposition), Sam Okudjeto and Dr. Obed A sam oah.^ Its ability to function as a 
pressure-group was, however, impaired by the breakaway of a rival Volta Youth 
Association (VOYA) in August 1973. The latter received the assent of a newly 
appointed and possibly unwitting Regional Commissioner, Colonel E.O. Nyante. 
During the next year, as the rival associations vied for favour they competed in 
denouncing the secessionist movement and in expressing fulsome approval of 
Government policy. ^  The Ewe members on the NRC were no doubt reassured 
pleased by these exhibitions of loyalty, but they were also embarrassed by the 
in-fighting. The efforts at mediation by Brigadier Ashley-Lassen were rewarded 
in December 1974 when VORDA and VOYA merged to form a single Volta 
Development and Youth Association (VODYA).
The gulf between popular expectations and the performance of the Acheampong 
regime was, however, apparent by the time the Supreme Military Council (SMC) 
took office in October 1975. Much of the blame can (as has already been pointed 
out) be attributed to corrupt practices sanctioned at the highest levels of 
government. At the end of 1975, for example, work on the Hohoe-Papase road 
was reported to be at a standstill since the contractor had received an advance 
and was unwilling to complete the project:
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"The <fi6 million 45 miles Hohoe-Dodi-Papase road... was awarded 
on contract to an Accra-based contractor in 1972, But the job which 
was scheduled to be completed last year is still at its initial stages.
Not even 30 per cent of the contract has been completed. That 
contractor moves his workers to the road to do a 'ghost' job only 
when a Regional Commissioner or a member of the government is 
to visit the site. The PWD officials say it's unlikely the contractor 
will be .able to complete the contract even when given another five 
years."iy
This report which appeared in a state-owned newspaper merely hinted at the 
inviolability of the contractor, but it is possible to be more specific. Colonel John 
Kabore, who was appointed Regional Commissioner in January 1974, brought 
pressure to bear upon defaulting contractors in different parts of the Region.^ 
He was suddenly removed from office in October 1975, it is alleged, because his 
excessive zeal had inconvenienced Acheampong who had a personal interest in 
the firm responsible for work on the road .^
Nevertheless, it is possible to overvalue the significance of corruption as an 
independent variable. As indicated in the previous Chapter, corrupt practices 
were themselves embedded in structural economic conditions and were merely 
reinforced by the state controls that proliferated to cope with the crisis. In the 
Volta Region, the OFY programme notched up some early successes, even if 
those who reaped the rewards were commercial farmers (including members of 
the r e g i m e ) ^  rather than the peasants. In the grasslands that lie between 
Kpandu and Hohoe there was an expansion of mechanized rice and maize 
farming. But an analysis of the relevant Ministry of Agriculture files reveals that 
the early expansion of output had stalled by the mid-1970s. The reports of 
agricultural officers contained regular complaints about the scarcity of tractor 
parts, the dearth of farm credit, an inadequate supply of fertilizers and the 
difficulty of transporting crops to m arket.^
Each of these factors was inextricably bound up with the economic environment 
of the time.
Local government reforms foundered for a similar complex of reasons. The 
Acheampong regime hesitated to implement the promised reforms for fear of
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infiltration by an increasingly strident opposition movement. Harris has argued
that the failure to establish the Regional and Local Councils was in fact conducive
to a more productive relationship between the District Councils and the
unofficial fourth tier of Town/Village Development C om m ittees.2^ The real
problems began when galloping inflation eroded District Council finances,
inflating costs and rendering proper planning virtually impossible. As the
Councils cut back on expenditure, so evasion of local taxes became more
widespread. The resultant vicious circle was highlighted an editorial in The Daily
Graphic during 1977:
"Many local authorities do not make enough revenue so they 
cannot provide amenities, and because the people do not see the 
amenities they dodge the payment of levy... We hope the local 
government authorities do see, as we see, the clear evidence of 
apathy amongst most of the people towards their local authorities 
and their systems. The old sense of belonging to this or that local 
authority has evaporated; most rural folkhave simply stopped 
thinking of the existence of 'our council"'25
When the Government finally decided to open the District Councils to elections
in 1978, popular alienation was manifested in a very low turnout.2^ Finally, the
VRDC never raised sufficient capital to embark on large investment projects, and
so was reduced to trading in essential commodities.2^ During the Second
Republic, the VRDC became the centre of a corruption scandal involving the
allocation of cement.
6.1.2. Reactions to Military Kleptocracy
The years during which Acheampong presided over the SMC were characterised 
by more overt challenges to military rule. These culminated in the palace coup 
led by Lt.-General Akuffo in July 1978 and ultimately in the complete overthrow 
of the SMC a year later. Against the background noise of urban protest, the 
gentler hum of Regional politics has largely gone undetected. What is of concern 
here is how communities in the overwhelmingly rural Volta Region reacted to 
the course of events.
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A surface reading of Regional politics might suggest that the warnings of an
ethnic backlash, as expressed by the writer in the Legon Observer, were in
danger of being brought to life. The Acheampong regime raised the spectre of
Ewe 'tribalism', which David Brown attributes mostly to a search for
scapegoats.^® While there is much truth in this, the spectre was not entirely
without substance. By the mid-1970s, a section of the Ewe elite, especially within
the military, was couching its opposition to Acheampong in ethnic language. It
should be clear from earlier Chapters that the Ewe had never really been forged
into an ethnic community. Hence this period witnessed some more or less
conscious efforts at defining the terms of Ewe ethnicity. An example would be
The Ewes of West Africa by C.M.K. Mamattah, which was published in Ewe and
English around 197 7 The work combined an eclectic mixture of oral traditions
with a catalogue of the individual and collective achievements of the Ewe people.
Significantly, it also emphasized the close links that existed with minority
communities.®® It embodied a potentially subversive strain in its assertion that
the Ewe people constituted a single cultural unit as far east as the Nigerian
frontier. This echoed the claims of the erstwhile Ewe unification movement. Yet
the author distanced himself from the secessionist cause. Insofar as the book
contained a central thesis, it was that the active participation of the Ewe in
national life was crucial to the future prosperity of Ghana: all that was demanded
was equal treatment:
"The Ewes are skilled mechanics and bom administrators. Without 
their borrowed skill for constructional work... Ghana would have 
remained the poorer in development. The Ewes must not be 
allowed to secede: if that ever happens, Ghana without them can 
never stand as a nation... The Ewes in Ghana are the cream of 
Eweland: they have built Ghana into the edifice she is today and 
they must remain a part and parcel of Ghana, pricking up the 
conscience of the State of Ghana to develop their Volta Region into 
a showpiece."®1
At one level, this was a restatement of the desire to be accepted back into the 
national fold. At a deeper level, it contained a coded message to the Ewe and 
their neighbours to close ranks.
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A book which casts further light on the politicization of ethnicity is the personal
account of the Acheampong years by Kofi Awoonor. It deals primarily with the
disaffection of the Ewe within the military and his own involvement in an
alleged coup p lo t.^  Although the Region was actually over-represented in
Government after June 1977, when Captain Joy Amedume joined E.K. Utuka on
the SMC, both the reshuffle of 1975 and the trial of the plotters the following year
reinforced ethnic strains within the military. Like Brown, Awoonor stresses the
element of scapegoating, but his account is distinctive for the objective quality it
attributes to ethnic stereotypes:
"In 1975, the Ewes were the most logical candidates [for 
scapegoating]: notorious coup-makers, they express the most 
democratic tendencies within the national structure. Coming as 
they are from traditions of fierce democracies, and representing a 
sizeable percentage of both the intellectual and antimilitary 
establishment sensibilities in the country, they are tailormade for 
the firstlme of victims for a tottering and economically bankrupt 
regime"3^
In the final analysis, the idea that there was a unified Ewe voice proved as
contentious as in the late 1940s. Ethnic discourse acquired some currency in the
barracks, but while the military structure was not quite hermetically sealed it was
sufficiently impermeable to absorb and to muffle most internal tensions. Where it
is possible to identify a wider Ewe grouping, it turns out to revolve around ties of
friendship and kinship centred on a single town, namely Keta.^4 During the
1970s, the Anlo Ewe still predominated in the upper echelons of the civil service,
the professions and the military. This was a source of some pride to people from
that area. Thus Mamattah wrote:
"Contemporary times have produced a massive upsurge of well 
educated men and women and may be regarded as the age of 
excellence for the Ewes as a whole m all walks of life: business 
executives, consultants, skilled artisans, architects, graduate 
teachers, jurists, administrators, politicians, medical personnel, 
diplomats, linguistic experts, industrialists, traders, spiritualists, 
sportsmen ana sportswomen, creative geniuses etc. etc. exist 
galore. ^
If one considers a list of the leading public figures drawn from the Volta Region 
from 1966 onwards, the overwhelming dominance of the Anlos is indeed striking 
(See Table 6.1). Major-General Utuka and Major Agbo were the only two
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personalities who did not hail from Keta and the area to the immediate north of 
the lagoon. Since Agbo was from Peki, it is possible to identify only one 
individual from former British Togoland who gained access to the highest public 
offices. The middle and northern sectors were better represented in the civil 
service, the legal profession and in academia, as a result of a process of 
incorporation which gained momentum in the 1960s. But even here the Anlos 
were preponderant. When Kofi Awoonor acknowledges a 'vague sense of group 
solidarity1, he is arguably highlighting an Anlo rather than a specifically Ewe 
traitp6
Table 6.1:
The Origins of Eminent Public Figures From the 
Volta Region, 1966-1979
Name Position Place of Origin
Lt.-Gen. E.K, Kotoka NLC Head Fiaxo, Anlo
A.K. Deku NLC Member Denu, Anlo
J.W.K. Harlley NLC Member Anyako, Anlo
M.K. Apaloo Member of Constitutional born in Togo, 
Commission from Anlo
Komla Gbedemah Leader of NAL born Nigeria, 
from Anyako, Anlo
Major Selormey NRC Member Dzelukope, Anlo
Major Agbo NRC Member Peki
Brigadier Ashley-Lassen 
Chief Defence Staff
NRC Member born Nigeria, 
from Amo?
Major-General E.K. Utuka SMC Member Likpe
Rear-Admiral J. Amedume SMC Member Anlo
F.K. Apaloo, Chief Justice Keta, Anlo
Brigadier A. Kattah Focus of successive 
coup plots
Wuti, Anlo
Captain K. Tsikata Participant in 
successive coups
Keta, Anlo
(Source: Ghana Who's Who, 1972-73: Mamattah. The Ewes of West 
Africa, Volume One)
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This pattern is significant because it helps to explain the lukewarm, and 
occasionally hostile, attitude displayed towards Ewe ethnic entrepreneurship 
inside the Volta Region. In the central and northern districts, there was a 
widespread feeling that southern politicians and administrators had pursued 
their sectional interests without regard to the rest of the Region. The evidence of 
uneven development was abundantly obvious to anybody who travelled from 
one end of the Region to the other. The main roads were fairly good as far as 
Hohoe, but thereafter they deteriorated markedly. Beyond Hohoe there were no 
tarred roads, despite the fact that Buem produced the only important cash crop 
in the Region. The existing dirt roads were virtually impassable at times of the 
year due to the rains and the damage inflicted by heavy lorries. Early in 1972, for 
example, it was reported that lorry drivers had abandoned the stretch from 
Hohoe to Jasikan via west Likpe because of pot-holes that were eight feet deep in 
p laces.^
In 1970, the Regional Chief Executive, A.S. Kpodonu (an Ewe from Ho), was 
confronted with demands for a separate Region embracing the Jasikan and 
Krachi D istricts.^ These demands subsided when the incoming NRC took up 
the many of the requests of the northern districts with respect to infrastructure. 
However, in the scramble to capitalize on the more conducive political climate, 
intra-Regional tensions surfaced once again. Kwaku argues that VORDA and 
VOYA divided along class lines: that is, professionals and intellectuals controlled 
VORDA, whereas businessmen preferred to form their own pressure group. 
According to Kwaku, VOYA saw private investment as the key to Regional 
development and an expansion of employment opportunities, whereas VORDA 
advocated long-term planning in association with the Regional b u r e a u c r a c y .^  
However, there would appear to have been more at stake. The VORDA 
leadership claimed in a public advertisement in 1974 that although it had 
established a Keta branch, VOYA had no presence in the north of the Region.^ 
The VOYA leaders, on their side, denied that their organization was a cover for
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southern hegemony. The intensity of debate on this score is an indication that 
sectional affiliations were indeed salient. This would also be consistent with the 
contrasting visions of Regional development outlined by Kwaku. It is 
understandable that individuals drawn from the relatively deprived northern 
sector should have favoured direct state intervention. By contrast, southern 
businessmen like Hope Yormekpe (the Vice-President of VOYA) were more 
likely to favour an entrepreneurial approach, which might reconcile the 
development of their home areas with personal strategies of accumulation.
Again, it may not be coincidental that when the rift was healed in 1974, the 
President of VODYA had a foot in both camps. That is, V.W.K. Agbodza was a 
highly successful businessman, but originated from Kpandu in the middle of the 
Region.^ Even then, the alliance failed to last and for the rest of the decade there 
was no effective organization that could lobby for the Region as a w hole.^
Several of the minorities were acutely sensitive about appeals to Ewe unity, 
following a renewed bout of disputes over chieftaincy. From the start, 
Acheampong treated the chiefs as a bridge between the centre and the rural 
population. In 1972, they were restored to a one-third share of the seats on the 
reconstituted local government management committees. In due course, 
Acheampong also came to rely on the Regional House of Chiefs to rally opinion 
against secession. But chieftaincy affairs remained shrouded in a great deal of 
confusion, the origins of which go back to British policy.
Membership of the Houses of Chiefs was intended for Paramount Chiefs, defined 
as chiefs who were not subordinate to any other stool - except in Ashanti where 
the position of the Asantehene was unique. In the Volta Region there were three 
Paramouncies whose status was not in dispute: those of Anlo, Peki and Krachi. In 
addition, there were the heads of the amalgamated states who came to be 
regarded as Paramount Chiefs, although that had never been the original 
intention: these were the chiefs of Buem, Ho, Kpandu and Avatime. Finally, there 
were the former Headchiefs who had refused to join the amalgamated states,
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even if they later consented to join a Native Authority. They were not formally 
subordinate to any other stool and therefore qualified as Paramount Chiefs. 
However, the communities which had amalgamated under British pressure were 
resistant to such an interpretation. The aspirant chiefs, on the other hand, argued 
that because they were ethnically distinct, they were entitled to separate 
representation. Although the exact timing is unclear, it is around this time that 
reference to membership of a common Guan culture became popular amongst 
the Central Togo minorities. The Nkonya had long been classified as part of the 
Guan language group. Now the Bakpele and their neighbours asserted that they 
too were Guans. The foundation of a Guan Historical Society, with the active 
participation of some chiefs and intellectuals from the Region, needs to be seen 
against this background. So too do the first attempts to translate Biblical texts into 
the Lelemi and Sekpele languages.
In 1973, the Government established the Volta Region Chieftaincy Affairs 
Committee under the chairmanship of Nana Agyeman Badu in order to ascertain 
who were Paramount Chiefs according to customary law and who was therefore 
entitled to sit in the House of Chiefs. The Report was never released because of 
the controversy surrounding its findings. Nevertheless, an Executive Instrument 
of 1974 did grant the Headchiefs of Likpe, Gbi, Tapa, Anfoega, Santrokofi, Ve 
and Nkonya the right to membership of the House of Chiefs.4^ The ongoing 
debate surrounding their status ensured that the issue of ethnic identification 
remained emotively charged.44
A more likely channel for popular discontent than ethnicity was the nationwide 
campaign, directed by students and professional groups, to return the country to 
civilian rule. It was their pressure that forced Acheampong to frame the Union 
Government proposals and to submit them to a referendum in 1978. The outcome 
appeared to prove that Ghanaian civil society was still very much alive, and yet 
much is obscure about the scope of rural participation. It is possible to identify 
people from the Volta Region in the ranks of the Association of Recognized
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Professional Bodies (ARPB), the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS), 
the People's Movement For Freedom and Justice (PMFJ) and the Front For The 
Prevention of Dictatorship (FPD).^ It is less easy to gauge the reaction of the /  
majority of its citizens. The fact that 56% of eligible voters in the Region chose to 
abstain in the referendum can certainly be interpreted as a lack of support for the 
'Unigov' proposals. Equally, it may signify a lack of interest in the entire political 
process ^  There is evidence that some communities treated the referendum not 
so much as a chance to expel Acheampong as to hold him to his earlier promises. 
In the months leading up to the poll, Peki was reassured that the tarred road 
linking Kpeve and Asikuma would be completed, while Hohoe was granted its 
wish to secede from the Kpandu D istrict.^ Acheampong was also careful to 
mollify the residents of Kpandu with promises of a new hospital and a nurses 
training school.^ This was in addition to the financial and other incentives 
offered to specific rural notables, who could (or so the SMC believed) deliver the 
vote. The turnout clearly indicates a degree of scepticism about the ability of 
Acheampong to deliver on its promises. Nevertheless, if there is any validity at 
all to the voting figures, and this is admittedly questionable,^ they suggest that 
substantial numbers of people may have repaid the anticipated debt to 
Acheampong. The set of results least favourable to the SMC recorded a 49% 'Yes' 
vote. Although substantial doubts must remain, such behaviour would be 
consistent with a deep-seated cynicism towards politicians and soldiers alike. It 
may be helpful at this juncture to narrow the focus once again.
6.2. The Bakpele and the Shrinking State
6.2.1. Major-General Utuka and the Education of Likpe
By January 1972 the Bakpele, like so many others in the Volta Region, were 
disillusioned by their experience of the political process. It seemed that on each 
occasion they had been presented with a choice, they had ended up drawing the 
short straw. The election of Dr. Obed Asamoah to Parliament in 1969 seemed at 
first to present grounds for optimism, but it quickly became apparent that he was
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powerless on the opposition benches. The Regional Chief Executive, A.S. 
Kpodonu controlled the lines of communication to Government and he made it 
abundantly clear that communities who supported the opposition could not 
expect favourable consideration. The Bakpele had constructed their own Likpe 
Secondary School (LISEC) without Government assistance, but they required 
official recognition if it was to be staffed with paid teachers. Kpodonu refused to 
co-operate unless the Bakpele transferred their allegiance to the Progress Party. 50
To make matters worse, Dr. Asamoah was politically neutralized in 1971 by 
virtue of his involvement in a corruption trial. He was charged on twenty-two 
counts of deceit and one of abetment in the submission of fraudulent claims for 
compensation to the Volta River Authority.^ The fraud had been perpetrated by 
Mensah Lemboe, the Matehene, while he was employed in the Lands 
Department. As a lawyer, Asamoah had countersigned the photographs 
accompanying the compensation claims and was thereby implicated. At the time 
the military struck in 1972, the trial was still in progress. When the court did 
make its ruling in February of that year, Asamoah was actually acquitted, 
although Lemboe and five others received prison sentences. By this time, 
however, the political circus had moved on. Asamoah returned to private legal 
practice, after which his influence in Regional affairs was effectively limited to 
his membership of VORDA,
The Likpe Traditional Council, perceiving a change in the political climate, 
despatched telegrams of support to the NRC and to the new Regional 
C o m m is s io n e r .^  Attention then focussed on turning the broad promises of the 
regime to maximum advantage. In the first instance, the strategy was to appear 
enthusiastic about self-help. Towards the end of 1972, a reporter commented 
favourably upon the communal development efforts of Likpe-Abrani and 
contrasted this with the lack of activity in Hohoe, a comparison which was no 
doubt p o p u la r .5 3  However, the Bakpele were competing with communities that
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were more populous and frequently had powerful patrons on their side. 
Consequently, Likpe had little to show for the first years of military rule.
With time, the Bakpele became aware of a new star in the firmament, in the guise 
of Brigadier E.K. Utuka. He had been born in Mate in 1937, which meant that he 
was still only 35 years old when Acheampong seized power. He had attended 
Sandhurst and had then served with the Ghana Army during the Congo crisis.^ 
He was commissioned as a Second-Lieutenant in July 1961.^5 By the time of the 
coup, Utuka had risen to the rank of Lt.-Colonel in command of the Second 
Battalion at Takoradi.^ At this stage he did not land a political appointment, but 
was placed in charge of the Teshie Military Academy and then in 1973 was sent 
abroad to the Royal College of Defence Studies. By this time, he already 
commanded some influence. Nana Soglo Alio III was, for example, employed by 
the Cocoa Marketing Board in 1973 on the strength of his recommendation,^ A 
more substantial plea for help soon centred on the Likpe Secondary School.
LISEC was due to be absorbed into the state system in 1974, following years of 
lobbying. But recognition was abruptly withdrawn by Colonel E.O. Nyante, the 
Commissioner For Education and Culture, and conferred upon the Worawora 
Secondary School to which town the teachers were diverted. The ostensible 
reason was that the LISEC facilities fell short of the required standard. The 
Bakpele allege, however, that Nyante had acquired rice farms in the vicinity of 
Worawora during his tour as Regional C o m m is s io n e r .^  Since only one school 
could be absorbed that year, Nyante had responded to pressure from his adopted 
community. Alarmed by this unwelcome and unexpected development, Nana 
Soglo sent a cable to Utuka in Britain, urging him to intercede. Although Utuka 
did not deliver an immediate victory, he did pay for the installation of an 
electricity plant at LISEC, allowing the school to be absorbed into the state system 
in 1976.59
At the beginning of 1975, Utuka succeeded Fred Akuffo as Commander of the 
Border Guards and later that year was appointed a member of the SMC. The
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Bakpele now had one of their sons in the very engine-room of government, 
something which (it was noted with some glee) Hohoe had never achieved. This 
was all the more significant because Utuka was the only representative from the 
Volta Region serving on the ruling council. For the first time, the idiosyncratic 
style of the Acheampong regime seemed likely to benefit Likpe. Pressure was 
exerted upon Utuka from all sides of the community. The young men looked to 
him to secure them employment with the Army or the Border Guards. Others 
approached him for financial help to enter trade or to acquire a vehicle plying 
one of the routes to Hohoe. The community as a whole wanted better roads and 
improved social amenities. Everybody was aware that Utuka could meet these 
requests only by abusing his official position. This worried some people, but the 
rules of the political game had changed. Since every other official seemed to 
derive the maximum advantage from his position, it was only sensible for Utuka 
to do the same. Major Agbo was held up as a model for Utuka to emulate. If 
Agbo had secured a tarred road for Peki, it was argued, then surely Utuka had at 
least a right, and maybe even a moral duty, to do his best for Likpe which had 
waited so patiently and for so long.^O
At first, Utuka appeared to vindicate the faith that had been placed in him. He 
was credited with some achievements that possibly had little to do with him. The 
tarring of the Hohoe-Kute road via east Likpe had been planned as early as 1972. 
Equally, Mate was large enough to qualify for the installation of a water supply, 
although maybe that work would never have started without his personal 
intervention. It steadily became apparent, however, that there was the world of 
difference between the adoption of a project and its eventual realization. In 
Likpe, as in the rest of the Region, official projects repeatedly stalled through 
shortages of basic materials and naked corruption. The water supply project 
proceeded very slowly until Utuka was dismissed from office, after which it was 
taken off the books.61 Similarly, the east Likpe road was tarred as far as 
Likpe-Nkwanta, the first village after Hohoe, after which work ground to a halt. 
Many people in Likpe were inclined to blame Utuka himself for these failures. At
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the very least, he was regarded as being too timid. The following observation is 
typical:
"Utuka wasn’t bold enough. In Peki, Agbo is praised more than the 
Paramount Chief, but what does Mate have to show for Utuka 
being in Government?"62
Others were rather less charitable. Utuka had acquired a reputation as one of the 
more corrupt members of the Acheampong regime. As head of the Border 
Guards, he was uniquely placed to profit from smuggling activities. As Chairman 
of the National Food Distribution Committee, he controlled access to essential 
commodities.6^ It was common knowledge that his own wife had accumulated a 
personal fortune by trading in these very commodities. The negative image of 
Utuka fed back into the local arena where they provided an explanation for the 
obvious lack of movement on the development front. Utuka was suspected of 
being too absorbed with his personal affairs to care much for the welfare of his 
people. Although he was reputedly very wealthy, there were few signs of his 
opulence in Likpe. This merely seemed to demonstrate that his heart was not 
really in the community.
On the occasions when Utuka did exercise his personal influence, he exposed 
himself to the charge of partiality. He was accused by the youth of paying 
excessive attention to the chiefs and elders. In the rest of Likpe, he was perceived 
as showing special favour to Mate people. On one occasion, Utuka offended the 
inhabitants of Bakwa when he threatened to withdraw his assistance in the 
construction of a bridge because of what he regarded as a lack of village 
co-operation. The young men of Bakwa were especially aggrieved at his 
unwillingness to assist them in the search for employment, forcing many of them 
to leave for Nigeria. The echoes of longstanding village conflicts are readily 
apparent:
"There are differences of opinion about Utuka in Likpe. Uyuka was /  
more interested in Mate and the other towns than Todome and /
Bakwa. Some young boys wanted to get into the Army, but only the 
Mate boys got in."6^
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Although the temptation to blame Utuka was great, a more disturbing possibility 
slowly dawned on the community: namely that state apparatus was beyond the 
manipulation even of those who wielded formal power. Utuka should have been 
able to apply effective pressure for the completion of the border road between 
Hohoe and Kute, in his capacity as head of the Border Guards and as an 
influential member of the SMC When he broached the issue, it transpired that the 
contract had been awarded to a mistress of the Regional Commissioner, Colonel 
Amevor. The latter reputedly warned Utuka that he should drop the issue or 
Likpe would be blacklisted from future development projects.6^ The road was 
never completed and it would appear that the contractor was never brought to 
book.66 Aside from corruption, state agencies were frequently incapable of 
performing the basic tasks assigned to them. Without a modicum of bureaucratic 
rationality, it was not possible to exploit the proximity to state power that Utuka 
clearly enjoyed. By the time of the Union Government referendum, the Bakpele 
had lost faith in Utuka and were more sceptical than ever about the pursuit of 
politics. In July 1978, a couple of weeks after Acheampong was forced to resign, 
Utuka was himself dismissed from office and retired from the Armed Forces. The 
overthrow of the Akuffo regime on 4 June 1979 was followed by the arrest of 
Utuka and others who had held governmental posts since 1972. On 16 June, 
Utuka received no more than a summary trial and was then executed alongside 
Acheampong at Teshie firing range, his place of work during the early days of 
the ousted regime.6^
Following the seizure of his assets, the Bakpele began to suspect that Utuka was 
not as personally corrupt as had previously been believed. Surprisingly, his 
property outside Likpe turned out to be less extensive than everyone had 
assumed.6^ Consequently, the neglect of Likpe could not be as confidently 
attributed to his personal greed: instead, it reflected the built-in irrationality of 
the system.
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The Rawlings takeover of June 1979 and the campaign to restore efficiency and 
probity to the state machinery were observed with some interest. The new regime 
argued that it was necessary to make an example of individuals who had abused 
their official positions. Despite the genuine shock surrounding the death of 
Utuka, the Bakpele apparently agreed (see Table 6.2). The community also turned 
out to vote in the 1979 elections, albeit with diminished optimism. In order to 
understand this apparent willingness to resume participation in the rituals of 
national life, it is necessary to expose the inner workings of community politics at 
this time.
Table 6.2:
Responses to the Question "What is Your Opinion 
on the Coup of June 4 1979 and the Events 
That Followed?"
Options Number Percentage
1. Coup was unjustified: 5 1.70%
2. Coup was justified, but 
need not have been so bloody: 134 46.70%
3. Both the coup and the 
shedding of blood were 
unavoidable: 148 51.60%
Total: 287 100.00%
(Source: Likpe survey, 1986)
6.2.2. The Myth of Local Autonomy
In the view of Naomi Chazan, what was distinctive about the 1970s was the 
withdrawal of many communities from an unresponsive state into more local 
theatres of political activity, where common values and agreed rules persisted. 69 
Although her schema is distinctly plausible, not least because of what is known 
about the durability of local attachments, Chazan does not marshal any direct 
evidence in support of her thesis. Rather, it is a model derived inductively from a
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functionalist logic. Withdrawal from the state has to be demonstrated empirically 
and in the absence of a corpus of local studies for this period, it would be wise to 
exercise caution. The evidence from Likpe that is presented here offers only 
qualified support for the Chazan thesis.
It is true that there were structures in Likpe that assumed an importance far 
beyond what was sanctioned by the state. Firstly, chieftaincy remained a 
significant focus of identification. Although the Bakpele did not possess a deeply 
rooted chiefly tradition stretching back to the nineteenth century or before,
British policies assisted in the creation of a tradition. Ghanaian chiefs were forced 
to disgorge the bulk of their powers during dyarchy and after in d e p e n d e n c e .^
In 1959, the chiefs forfeited direct representation upon local councils. The year 
before, the Local Courts Act denied them the authority to preside over local 
disputes. Deprived of executive and judicial responsibilities, the chiefs were left 
as little more than figureheads whose primary function was to act as spokesmen 
for community interests. Yet within Likpe, as in the rest of the country, the 
institution lost none of its legitimacy. Indeed, the 1950s was a period when many 
new chiefly traditions were being introduced. Nana Soglo Alio II and his brother, 
Nana Soglo Alio III imported the entire panoply of Akan chieftaincy, including 
wing titles and linguists. This was of more than merely symbolic importance, as 
the chiefs sought to fill the space vacated by the state. Concerned about levels of 
petty crime, and conscious of the limitations of the Police based in Hohoe, older 
members of the community looked to the chiefs to enforce respect for property 
and to uphold local values. Writing in 1979, Anyomi identified a hierarchy of 
unofficial 'courts1 in Likpe, ranging from the clan level to the court of the Okakple 
him self.^ These to some extent substituted for the formal structures of Police 
and judiciary.
Secondly, the Town Development Committees (TDCs) proved their 
indispensability as instruments of community development. The TDCs trace their 
origins back beyond the adult literacy campaigns of the early 1950s/^ In Likpe,
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as elsewhere, they carved out a niche in community development in competition 
with local authorities. According to Amonoo, they accounted for approximately 
46% of total expenditure on community development projects between 1957 and 
1962/3 In recognition of their vitality, Nkrumah brought the TDCs under party 
control in 1962, after which the bulk of development work at the village level was 
channelled through them /^  After the 1966 coup, the TDCs were subjected to 
close political scrutiny, but managed to escape incorporation into the formal local 
government structure.
By the end of the 1970s, there was widespread dissatisfaction in Likpe with the 
performance of the Jasikan District Council, which raised local taxes but did little 
in return for the villages. The distance from Jasikan, compounded by transport 
bottlenecks, meant that Likpe was effectively cut off from the headquarters. A 
longstanding debate about the traditional affiliations of the Bakpele was 
reopened in 1979, when a number of chiefs insisted that Likpe should join the 
newly created Hohoe D i s t r i c t / ^  When the District boundaries were not redrawn, 
the Bakpele withdrew their support from the Jasikan District Council and 
concentrated their attention on the TDCs. The latter performed a great deal of 
routine but essential maintenance work on school buildings, market stalls and 
roads by means of weekly communal labour. The TDCs also endeavoured to 
carry out more ambitious development projects, some of which were specific to 
the villages and others of which were of general concern. The Likpe Secondary 
School was the most impressive monument to local initiative. Its construction 
was funded partly through additional levies, contributed by the Bakpele resident 
outside as well as inside the community, and partly through the assistance of the 
Canadian High Commission. The TDCs and the chiefs usually co-operated 
closely, although there were bound to be occasional disputes over territory. The 
chiefs beat gong-gong on behalf of the TDCs in order to ensure maximum 
turnout at communal labour, and they enforced penalties for absenteeism. The 
chiefs in turn derived much of the credit for the completion of projects that were 
planned and executed by the TDCs.
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These were genuine innovations that arose as a response to the incapacitation of 
the state. Nevertheless, withdrawal did not provide a real solution to the 
manifold problems confronting the Bakpele. One reason is that, contrary to the 
views of Chazan, there was surprisingly little agreement upon the rules of the 
political game within the community. To the wider world, the Bakpele often 
presented a united face, but old antagonisms continued to play themselves out 
on the local stage. This was true of the Likpe stool dispute that was examined in 
Chapter Three. Following an aborted reconciliation effort in 1970, relations 
between the village of Abrani and the Okakple were virtually severed. Nana 
Akototse IV refused to recognize Nana Soglo Alio III as Okakple and the latter, in 
turn, would not allow him to take his place on the Likpe Traditional Council 
without having sworn an oath of allegiance. In 1973, the Likpe Scholars Union 
was invited to arbitrate but neither side was prepared to compromise.^ A 
durbar held in February 1978 to celebrate the promotion of Utuka to the rank of 
Major-General was disrupted when Nana Soglo refused to allow the Abranihene 
and his entourage to enter M ate/^  To complicate matters, a second front was 
opened in Mate itself. As noted in Chapter Three, a section of the Kalalenti clan 
which had consented to the enstoolment of Nana Soglo remained in Mate and 
was rewarded by the creation of a separate stool. The first Matehene was Mensah 
Lemboe who was imprisoned in 1972 for his part in the Volta River 
compensation fraud and then destooled. When he emerged from prison, he 
denounced the creation of Mate stool as a subtle ploy to monopolize the 
Paramouncy within the Kalegato clan. The Lemboe family thereafter set its sights 
on the Likpe stool. Other chiefs within Likpe themselves suspected that Nana 
Soglo was aiming to rise above his position of primus inter pares. In 1979, the 
Abranihene sent a circular to the other chiefs accusing Nana Soglo of behaving 
dictatorially. The Benkum division, comprising the villages of Todome and 
Bakwa, took the cue and demanded a right to secede from Likpe and to link up 
with Hohoe instead/®
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Local politics was also poisoned by a revival of the Agbozome dispute which had 
been smouldering since Nana Sekyere abandoned the unification cause and 
returned to live in his village. The Vute clan had refused to accept him back as 
chief. Yet Nana Sekyere had solicited the backing of the Basio clan and had 
thereby secured the endorsement of Government. When the Likpe stool dispute 
erupted, Nana Sekyere and the Basio clan heads supported the claims of S.Q. 
Mantey, while Vute clan rallied to the cause of Nana Soglo Alio n. When Nana 
Soglo Alio III succeeded, he repaid this debt by lobbying central government for 
the recognition of the Vute clan head as a chief in his own right. ^  At this point, 
the Basio clan severed its alliance with Nana Sekyere and sought a similar status 
for its own head. In November 1970, the Likpe Traditional Council approved the 
enstoolment of Nana Udzu Kakpeyi II and requested his recognition by 
government as Basiohene. In May 1974, Nana Kakpeyi was officially gazetted as 
a chief alongside Nana Osei Akoto IV of Vute clan.^0 The result was a great deal 
of confusion over the ranking of the three chiefs within Agbozome. The Vute and 
Basio clans believed that they had established complete autonomy (although they 
inhabited the same village), whereas everybody else accepted the seniority of the 
Agbozome chief. Matters came to a head when Nana Sekyere I died and was 
succeeded by Nana Sekyere II in 1974. The newly gazetted Basiohene and 
Vutehene refused to recognize Nana Sekyere II despite the mediation efforts of 
the Likpe Traditional Council.
The conflict within Agbozome is significant because it illustrates a dependence 
on the arbitraments of the state. The competing factions extended their struggle 
beyond Likpe for the reason that there was simply no agreed procedure for 
reaching a binding settlement within the community. The Ghanaian state not 
only presided over a set of arbitration procedures, but on a more mundane level 
it commanded access to all the documentation pertaining to the case.^ The state 
monopoly over information, adjudication and in the final analysis force, 
propelled local actors towards the centre.
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As early as February 1975, Nana Soglo petitioned the House of Chiefs to seek the 
withdrawal of recognition from the chiefs of Vute and B asio .8 ^  The Basiohene, in 
particular, fought back with a great degree of acumen. On the one hand, he 
turned the fashionable myth of Guan origin back upon the Likpe Traditional 
Council, claiming that his people were a neglected minority. In 1976, he 
submitted a declaration to the following effect:
"On 27 November 1974, Traditional Council voted to withdraw 
recognition of Basiohene for failing to support a constitution for 
Agbozome drawn up by Omanhene and Jtiis people. That all the 
chiefs who voted at the meeting on that occasion were of Guan 
origin... That on the basis of the divisions which make up Likpe 
today, Basio is not a clan but an Akan minority group, and Likpe is 
predominantly Guan... That on the basis of the above that since the 
Guans form the dominant part of Likpe and die Basios are an Akan 
minority who are always tfeing oppressed..."83
On the other hand, the Basiohene enthusiastically endorsed the Union 
Government proposals in a brazen attempt to extract favourable consideration 
from the Acheampong regime. Since Major-General Utuka was personally close 
to Nana Soglo, it was necessary to adopt this more circuitous route to the centre. 
Although he could not adduce any evidence to prove the disloyalty of his 
opponents, Nana Kakpeyi endeavoured to sow the seeds of doubt. His tactics are 
clear from the following letter which was addressed to Nana Soglo, but clearly 
intended for government consumption:
"May I explain that since my recognition by this Government in 
1974, my people and myself have looked towards the present 
Government as our Reaeemer and we would continue to follow 
and obey the wishes of this Regime. Hence we voted YES decisively 
despite persuasions from the opposite side. We made up our minds 
long ago to accept the Union Government Concept instead of the 
Party System. I nope that you are aware that I personally suffered 
under the latter system when one of your Lawyers went to see the 
P.P. Regional Commissioner at Ho to stop forwarding my form for 
Gazetting to the Castle... Furthermore, barely a week after the 
Referendum, your favoured Chief Nana Kofi Sekyere II and his 
associates caused the arrest of our people by the Hohoe Police1,84
The reference to the Police is significant in this context. When the Likpe
Traditional Council impeded the Vutehene and the Basiohene from exercising
their customary rights, they successfully took the case to court. At the end of
1978, Nana Soglo Alio HI was defeated and left with a substantial bill for legal
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costs.^  Throughout this protracted struggle, the courts, the Police and the 
central administration were all involved and helped to determine the final 
outcome.
By contrast, the one institution that was supposed to embrace all sections of 
Likpe was greatly enfeebled by the end of the decade. Abrani and many of the 
residents of Agbozome were in rebellion against the Likpe Traditional Council, 
whilst secessionist rumblings emanated from Todome and Bakwa. Given that 
Nkwanta was a stranger village, owing allegiance to Bakwa, one can conclude 
that as much as half of Likpe was pulling away from the control of a Council 
which was regarded as too firmly in the grip of Nana Soglo Alio III.
These political fissures inevitably impaired the ability of the Bakpele to assume 
the full burden of development that had been shed by central government and 
the Jasikan District Council. In such a deeply divided village as Agbozome, the 
activities of the TDC were continually disrupted by the outbreak of hostilities. In 
Likpe as a whole, the principal occasion for fund-raising was the annual Easter 
rally held in rotation between the villages. During the decade under 
consideration, every single rally was marred by the refusal of one or more of the 
villages to participate in p ro c e e d in g s .* ^
Recurrent bouts of conflict were not of course the only factor in the equation. As 
importantly, the economic environment interposed barriers between the Bakpele 
and the fulfilment of their objectives. Economic involution meant that it was 
more difficult than ever for members of the community to contribute funds on a 
regular basis. The collapse of wages and salaries similarly made it impractical for 
Bakpele working outside to send cash home. The Bakpele who went to work in 
Nigeria often earned higher incomes, but were to some extent beyond the call of 
the community. Thus, the raising of funds for a specific project was typically a 
protracted affair. The community would struggle to meet a target, only to see the 
savings consumed by the inflationary spiral. This helped to engender a sense of
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demoralization. The Bakpele knew that they could maintain roads and school 
buildings through communal labour, but that they could not realistically embark 
on more ambitious development projects without external assistance. The 
Ghanaian state may have been an unlikely candidate by 1980, but it nevertheless 
served as a gateway to other, richer pastures. Following the success with LISEC, 
the Bakpele regarded the foreign embassies and aid agencies as potentially the 
juiciest pickings. By the early 1980s, therefore, the Bakpele were not merely 
relying upon their own efforts, but actively seeking new alliances outside the j 
community: local autarchy was never considered as a serious option. j
6.2,3. The 1979 Elections Revisited
In the light of the evidence presented thus far, it is easier to solve the riddle of 
why it was that Ghanaians bothered to participate in the 1979 elections at a time 
when government apparently had so little to offer. Those who have examined the 
elections have failed to agree on the level of enthusiasm for the exercise. Where 
Richard Jeffries detected 'keen interest', Naomi Chazan found evidence of mass 
alienation.**^ There is even some confusion over the rate of participation. 
According to the figures produced by Chazan, the number of voters considered 
as a percentage of the total electorate fell from 47.25% in 1969 to about 32% in 
1979. Using the same census reports and electoral statistics, David Brown 
concludes that the rate of participation had barely changed.**** In the absence of 
details of the size of the electorate, it is not possible to compare rates of 
participation in Biakoye constituency. Nevertheless, one can deduce that there 
was only a slightly lower turnout by comparison with 1969, which deserves some 
explanation.*^
Within Likpe, a willingness to participate was due to an interplay between two 
factors. The first was an awareness of continuing dependence upon resources 
(political rather than economic) that were still in the gift of the state authorities. 
To abstain from the elections risked losing ground to rivals within Likpe and
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competitors outside it. Secondly, rival political parties did appear to pose some 
alternatives.^ The Bakpele were presented with three major options. They could 
vote for the United National Convention (UNC). This combined the appeal of 
Parliamentary candidate from Likpe, namely Dr. Obed Asamoah, with the 
personal attractiveness of Willie Ofori-Atta as Presidential hopeful. Alternatively, 
the Bakpele could support the Popular Front Party (PFP), which had a historical 
link with the unification movement and with the Progress Party. Thirdly, they 
could vote for the Peoples' National Party (PNP), which sported a national image 
and openly proclaimed its descent from the defunct Convention People's P a r ty .  ^ 2 
The associations of these three major parties were sufficiently varied to inject a 
measure of interest into the campaign.
The PFP campaign in Likpe faced the most serious obstacles. The candidate was 
unfamiliar and could no longer count on the defunct Togoland Congress 
networks. Furthermore, the Busia era was far from a fond memory. This partly 
explains why the Bakpele recoiled from the Akan banner at the same time as they 
disassociated themselves from the Ewe tag: both had brought political 
misfortune. To be Guan was to be non-aligned. Nevertheless, since it was widely 
believed that the PFP would win, many people were keen to fall on the right 
side.92 This partly explains the respectable performance of the party in several 
constituencies. The most surprising feature of the election was the grudging 
support extended to Dr. Obed Asamoah. The latter could count on the votes of 
his kinsmen in Bala and Kukurantumi, as well as the endorsement of Nana Soglo 
in Mate. But the rest of Likpe was hesitant. Many voted for Dr. Asamoah 
half-heartedly, taking the view that "the devil you know is better than the angel 
you don't"
The 1979 results mirrored the pattern of the Second Republic, when established 
political figures were humbled. On this occasion, Sam Okudjeto and R.K. Mensah 
lost the seats they had captured in 1969, while G.K. Agama only narrowly 
defeated someone recently out of University.^ The PNP capitalized on the desire
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for yet another fresh start, by selecting more youthful candidates with a clean
slate, precisely as the NAL had done a decade before. Dr. Asamoah was himself
the victim of this trend. In the assessment of Nana Agya Mensah:
"Almost all Likpe supported the PNP even though Dr. Asamoah 
was from our area. It was not because we thought it was the old 
CPP, but because we wanted something new. We wanted to build a 
new thing together.''^5
Most importantly, the disloyalty of the Bakpele reflected the learning experience
of the Utuka years. The Bakpele were now alert to the limitations of patronage
politics. Although politicians might make promises, it was understood that the
likelihood of their delivering the goods was decidedly limited. This was due not
just to duplicity on the part of the politicians, but also to the unpredictability of
the state machinery. One reason why the PNP was attractive was that it promised
to follow the best precedents of the Nkrumah regime, which had (during its more
constructive moments) left a mark on the Region - even if the prominence of
Imoru Egala was a reminder that the CPP had always manifested a seamier
side.96 Despite the observation of Nana Agya Mensah, many respondents
stressed the CPP lineage of the PNP as the decisive consideration in their
decision to vote for that party. With echoes of the 1950s, one informant
emphasized that party loyalty came first:
"Dr. Amoah [from Nkonya] was the candidate, so I had to vote for 
him. I would never vote for anyone who is not in my p a r ty .""7
For this reason, Nana Agya Mensah and others tried to persuade Dr. Asamoah to
enlist with the PNP. His failure to do so lost him many votes in Likpe, and
ultimately cost him the seat (see Table 6.3).
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Table 6,3:
The Results of the 1979 Election in Biakoye Constituency
Candidate Party Votes Received
Dr. Kwabena Adjei PFP 3,363
Dr. Kwadjo Amoah PNP 4,026
Dr. Obed Y. Asamoah UNC 4,010
S.S.S. Atta TFP 170
B.D.Y. Nyame ACP 397
S.K. Yirenkyi SDF 1,570
(Source: Legon Observer, 27 July 1979, p.264)
Although many Bakpele were prepared to wear party tee-shirts and to sing party 
songs, enthusiasm for the poll was tempered. The disappointments of the 
previous decade had nurtured a vein of cynicism. For many people, the gifts of 
free palm-wine and food were what the election was really about, since nobody 
could be confident of what would follow. David Brown identified a 'bingo 
mentality1 in the Region, in which voters reckoned hey had nothing to lose by 
participating and stood a remote chance of reaping a w in d fa l l .T h is  
explanation advances our understanding of Bakpele political behaviour. Since 
there was no alternative to involvement in the state nexus, there seemed little 
point in abstaining from politics.
6.3. Conclusion:
During the course of the 1970s, confidence in the public realm reached its lowest 
ebb. During the Nkrumah years, the Bakpele had become accustomed to the idea 
that politics was about unlocking access to a relatively well-endowed state. At 
the time, the promises had consistently outstripped the benefits that actually 
accrued to the community. Yet this was a comparative success-story against what
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was to follow. Under the Busia regime, the Bakpele found themselves pointedly 
excluded from access to public resources. The advent of the NRC was greeted 
with approval, but the military state soon revealed itself to be an unreliable 
partner. Just as conditions were becoming acute, Major-General Utuka was 
catapulted into the front line of the SMC. Ultimately, though, even Utuka was 
unable to cut through bureaucratic inertia or escape the tug-of-war between the 
coteries of special interests.
The Bakpele, like the other minorities, found it expedient to redefine the terms of 
their identity. A neutral Guan label was more attractive than association with a 
notional Ewe community or an Akan ethnic bloc. The former had taken them for 
granted, while the latter were unable to see them as anything other than 
extensions of the Ewe. Although fission might be mistaken for a shrinkage of the 
political arena, in reality the Bakpele found little succour in the so-called 'exit 
option'. As noted above, Chazan has presented no real evidence for a withdrawal 
from the state. In fact, a large corpus of local research, which has dwelt on the 
divisiveness of local arenas, makes the scenario an unlikely one. Chazan is right 
to highlight the vitality of parallel institutions, but is mistaken in believing that 
these could be self-contained. In Part One of this thesis, it has been argued that 
local politics was not simply an extension of local factional squabbles. That 
should not blind one to the fact that factionalism has been an ongoing feature of 
local politics and has given the state a toe-hold at the periphery.
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Part Three: Revolution, Reform and The Re-engagement of 
Likpe, 1982-1986
The Third Republic may one day be seen as a watershed in modem Ghanaian 
history. In 1979, well-wishers of the incoming Limann administration hoped that 
any such claim to historical significance would rest on the proven viability of 
democratic institutions. What is likely to be remembered is the economic 
dislocation and political alienation which culminated in the second military 
takeover of Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings on 31 December 1981.
The deepening crisis did not give rise to separatist tendencies in the Regions. It 
did produce discontent in the towns, which translated into support for the 
initiatives of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). By 1982, there 
was a perception that drastic surgery could no longer be avoided. To that extent, 
'revolution' represented something other than a mere political slogan, although 
the precise meaning thereof was sketchy and ultimately became the subject of 
rancorous debate. The countryside was strangely quiescent. Yet the PNDC had 
no hope of negotiating a way out of the impasse it had inherited without 
establishing a modus vivendi with the peasants who fed the towns and produced 
the cash crops that oiled the wheels of the national economy. The Rawlings 
regime was fortunate in that rural communities, such as Likpe, were every bit as 
keen to keep the channels of communication open - an important point which 
follows on from the argument in Part Two. The last two Chapters deal with 
efforts to define the common ground.
Over recent years, the diversion of the 'December 31st Revolution' from its 
originally somewhat meandering course has spawned a fierce debate between 
the PNDC and its critics. Whereas the latter have claimed the Revolution was 
quite simply betrayed, Rawlings and his allies insist that the change of direction 
was a necessary adaption to stubborn realities. Insofar as alternative models of 
integration are at issue, this debate falls within the remit of the thesis. Chapter
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Seven examines renewed efforts to eradicate smuggling, while Chapter Eight 
explores the reaction of the Bakpele to the political initiatives pushed in their 
direction.
Chapter Seven:
The Political Economy of Social ControkSmugglers, Social 
Mercenaries and State Power in Likpe
Much of the literature on the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) deals 
with questions of popular participation: how extensive it was in 1982 and 
whether it was abridged or expanded in subsequent years. This is 
understandable given the early pre-occupation with 'people's power'. What is 
often missed is that, from the moment of its inception, the Revolution was also 
about tightening the bonds of social control. In the border zones, the PNDC 
struggled to choke off the flow of illicit trade, for which many of the ailments of 
the country were blamed. The Government borrowed some of the coercive tactics 
of its predecessors and, when these did not work, it invented a few of its own. 
Yet, state coercion was never regarded as an entirely satisfactory solution. It had 
a poor record and it risked alienating the very 'people' in whose name the 
Revolution had been declared. The regime tried to carry border peoples with it. 
This Chapter deals with the shifting balance between coercion and co-operation. 
Because smuggling is so closely bound up with the wider economic environment, 
it is desirable to devote some space to the debate over recovery strategies.
7,1. Economic Crime and 'Peoples' Power' in 1982
7.1.1.1982: A Year of Indecision
Revolutions tend to occur when political systems are at their most vulnerable, as 
a result of war or internal crises. For this reason, many people considered Ghana 
ripe for revolutionary change, even if they had their doubts about a process that
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was initiated by the military.^ The context of the December 1981 coup was a 
steady deterioration of the economic environment Domestic manufacturing had 
plummeted to 63% of 1977 levels and to below 25% of capacity utilization.^ More 
than 70% of the vehicle fleet was off the roads because of a lack of spare parts. 
Both were a consequence of the foreign exchange squeeze, which was in turn 
related to falling cocoa exports. Production of the crop was estimated at only
220.000 tonnes in 1981/2, compared to a peak of 571,000 tonnes in 1964/5 and
396.000 tonnes in 1975/6, and much of this was smuggled out of the country. 
Finally, at a time when national food consumption regularly outstripped 
production, limited surpluses remained locked up in the countryside for want of 
transport.^ It is symptomatic of the erosion of rural-urban exchange networks 
that food prices were a driving force in the inflationary spiral, which was 
manifested in a price rise of 120% in 1981.^
The Limann regime, which had won the 1979 elections without tabling a plan of 
action, was seized by paralysis. The subsequent outbreak of ideological and 
generational feuding within the ruling party inhibited President Limann from 
taking decisive action once the reins of power were in his hands. The haphazard 
character of decision-making is amply illustrated through the example of the 
cocoa industry. Despite Parliamentary pressure in favour of a producer price rise, 
it was not until 1981 that the Government acted. Limann then raised the price 
from #120 to #360 per load (or from #4,000 to #12,000 per tonne). But having 
rejected the devaluation conditions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
fear of a political backlash, the Government was unable to sustain the increase. 
With the world price hovering at around #5,000 per tonne at official rates of 
exchange, the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) incurred deficits that ran to #7 
billion by the end of 1981.^
The crisis impinged most directly upon wage and salary earners in the urban 
centres. Although backyard gardening provided some relief, the majority were 
fully at the mercy of the market. The PNDC therefore attracted its most loyal
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following amongst students, lower civil servants, workers and of course soldiers, 
all of whom looked to the regime to deliver them from their predicament. The 
one person who managed to straddle these diverse urban constituencies was 
Flt-Lt. Rawlings. To the annoyance of the PNP, Rawlings declined to absent 
himself on a course overseas and, in spite of his own enforced retirement, 
remained in touch with his base amongst the lower ranks.^ At the same time, he 
circulated within the radical political milieu centred on the University of Ghana. 
The Legon campus had witnessed a flowering of Marxist political organizations 
and study groups since 1979, the most important of which were the June 4 
Movement (JFM) and the New Democratic Movement (N D M )/ Despite their 
differences, they shared the view that the crisis was a structural consequence of 
peripheral capitalism which inhibited genuine development and spawned a 
parasitic comprador class.® These ideas had some impact on Rawlings who 
consented to become the Chairman of the JFM.^
The PNDC was composed in such a way so as to reflect a broad spectrum of 
urban interests. Ethnicity was dismissed as a matter worthy of public attention, 
although the regime did develop some awareness of the need for an informal 
balance. The seven member council consisted of four military men and three 
civilians, including a trade unionist and a priest. Apart from Rawlings, two 
other members of the JFM were represented on the PNDC. ^
In order to harness the political energy generated by the coup, Rawlings called in 
early January for the formation of Worker's and People's Defence Committees 
(P/WDCs) at the workplace and in each community. Yet when it came to the 
countryside, the PNDC operated from a base that was almost as narrow as that of 
its military predecessors. Since the rural response was guarded, a priority of the 
PNDC was to implant itself in the villages by means of the PDCs. Not since the 
days of the CPP had a serious effort been made to establish permanent political 
structures at that level.
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The uneven depth of revolutionary fervour coloured the behaviour of the regime 
during the first year. The PNDC wanted to ease the plight of its urban 
constituency, but the economic environment was not so easily transformed.
Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, the Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, later 
observed of economic policy in 1982 that it was "essentially a holding action 
aimed at containing the ravages of the crisis".^ Like Limann, Rawlings had 
assumed office bereft of a reasonably coherent economic strategy. In what was 
essentially a firefighting exercise, the regime concentrated on reining in inflation 
and restoring some order to public finances. With a deficit of £8 billion looming, 
it was forced to suspend the budget for the entire public service in March and to 
implement emergency financial measures. The revised mini-budget of May 
aimed to instil greater financial discipline in the public sector and to widen the 
tax net. Furthermore, in an effort to curb inflation, the PNDC withdrew the 050 
notes from circulation and introduced the Akuafo Cheque to replace cash 
payments to cocoa farmers.
Since neither of these measures brought much relief, the PNDC was forced back 
upon short-term expedients. Perhaps unconscious of the assumptions it was 
making, the regime defined 'economic crime' in a way that often discriminated 
against rural p r o d u c e r s * ^  With echoes of 1979, market women were accused of 
creating artificial shortages which enabled them to charge inflated prices. In 
January, Rawlings urged traders to reduce their prices, on the grounds that 
ordinary people could no longer afford essential goods, threatening direct action 
if they failed to comply. Price controls were imposed on a range of essential 
commodities, including most basic foodstuffs. These controls were enforceable 
by the Police as well as the PDCs.15 Although the worst excesses of 1979 were 
not repeated, many market women were victimized for selling too high. Because 
control prices were unrealistic, traders had little option but to flout the 
regulations. If they ceased trading, they exposed themselves to the charge of 
hoarding or deliberately blocking the supply of food to the t o w n s .T h e i r  only
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other option, since profit margins were typically narrow, was to depress the price 
they paid to the farmers.-^
It was not uncommon, however, for traders to find themselves in the weaker 
bargaining position. One concrete example of how price control operated comes 
from Ve-Hoeme, near Hohoe. The official PDC newspaper, Nsamankow. 
reported that traders and farmers had deserted the local market to avoid price 
controls. The paper bemoaned the fact that traders visited the farms to purchase 
foodstuffs at higher prices which were then passed on to urban consumers. 
Without a hint of irony, the report presented PDC efforts to force people back 
into the official market as a defence of "oppressed and exploited" farmers.
The PNDC committed the same order or error in its handling of smuggling, 
which is the real concern of this Chapter. As has been noted in Chapter Five, an 
awareness of the futility of crude coercive measures had begun to dawn on the 
politicians of the Third Republic. But what seemed like a willingness to 
compromise with potential criminals was an anathema to the revolutionary 
zealots of 1982. Their contention was that smuggling was a social disease that 
had to be eradicated at all costs. In the words of Rawlings:
"Smuggling has become the number one enemy of our country.
Cocoa is smuggled. Rice is smuggled. Maize is smuggled. Imported 
tractors and bicycles are smuggled. The smuggling does not only 
reduce our foreign exchange earning, but also increases our import 
bill... The unpatriotic Ghanaian smuggler has created a situation 
where Government's ability to provide such essential goods as 
kerosene, cloth, cutlass, drugs etc. has been greatly hampered, 
because we have to import not only for our local population, but 
also for our neighbours who get it through smuggling. No nation 
can afford this. And unless we put a decisive stop to it, our efforts 
at national reconstruction and transformation of the economy will 
be seriously undermined."
A predisposition to deal firmly with offenders was shared by representatives of 
diverse ideological tendencies within the regime. Rawlings visited the Volta 
Region early in September and promised "drastic revolutionary measures" to 
eliminate smuggling, because of the havoc it had inflicted on the national
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e c o n o m y .2® Similarly Chris Atim inaugurated the Interim National 
Co-ordinating Committee (INCC) in February, with an injunction to the PDCs to 
pay particular attention to the border towns "through which real damages to the 
national economy are perpetrated".^ Later in the year, he announced that 
People's Tribunals were to be established in every border town in order to 
expedite the punishment of o f  f e n d e r s .  22 The message was repeated by 
government officials at every available opportunity. Going further than most, the 
Brong-Ahafo Regional Secretary pronounced that smugglers would be shot and 
their farms forfeited to the state.23 in short, the arrival of the PNDC heralded a 
return to what one might call the machismo of state power.
Although the theme of social control (paradoxically enough) establishes a 
continuity between the Revolution and its antecedents, the PNDC did add a 
distinctive gloss of its own. On the one hand, the regime believed it could effect a 
dramatic improvement in the performance of state agencies through 
consciousness-raising. The Border Guards were under a cloud because of the 
rampant smuggling of the Third Republic. Their failings were partly blamed on 
the venality of senior officers. On the other hand, the Defence Committees came 
to be seen as a means to instil higher levels of political awareness into the Armed 
Forces (including the Border Guards) and P o l i c e .  24 Yet the Commander of the 
Border Guards felt compelled to point out that it was physically impossible for
3,000 Guardsmen to properly monitor traffic along a frontier of 49,600 km.25 This 
was clearly a valid submission and in order to assist the Guards, the Army and 
the Police Task Force were despatched to the border areas. On the other hand, 
Government aimed to secure the active collaboration of border peoples. This was 
not an entirely original thought. In 1976, Utuka had mooted a plan to form 
'people's anti-smuggling teams' in border villages, while the PNP had advocated 
vigilante s q u a d s .26 There is no evidence that they were ever operational. By 
contrast, the PNDC was aiming to place considerable responsibility on the 
shoulders of the PDCs. Rawlings made this explicit in his first major speech on 
the subject of the PDCs:
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"... we are asking for local Defence Committees at all levels of our 
national life - in the towns, in the villages, in all our factories, office 
and work places and in the barracks. Tnere is an immediate task for 
these committees, that of defending this Revolution and ensuring 
the exposure of saboteurs. Especially in the border areas, we are 
requiring people to form Defence Committees to begin to assist 
Border Guards and Police to guard our borders ." 2 7
This was repeated in the first set of PDC Guidelines:
"The PDCs are to expose all smugglers, black marketeers, hoarders 
and profiteers, and criminals of all shades and categories, and 
organise the people to deal with such saboteurs, with revolutionary 
discipline ." 2 8
An in-built advantage of the PDCs was that they were supposed to be firmly 
rooted in their respective communities. This meant that they would be privy to 
local secrets about the identity of smugglers and their preferred routes.
The billion cedi question (to appropriate a phrase) was whether border folk could 
realistically be expected to undercut their own livelihoods. By reading between 
the lines of official reports and the utterances of Government officials, it is 
possible to distil two sets of answers to this question. The first assumed a clear 
social division in the countryside between peasant farmers, on the one hand, and 
rich farmers, traders and transport owners on the other. It also assumed that 
these rural accumulators had the principal stake in contraband. This owed 
something to the folklore about 'big men' who regularly sent truckloads of 
smuggled goods through official check points under the beneficent gaze of the 
Border Guards. The leadership of the INCC (and later the National Defence 
Committee) reckoned that ordinary peasants would relish the opportunity to 
expose the powerful minority who had consistently exploited them.
Secondly, Government strategy was premised on the belief that it was possible to 
educate peasant smugglers about the harmful consequences of their actions. The 
difficulty here was that the PDCs had little to offer on top of appeals to 
patriotism. The PNDC was most reluctant to grant cocoa farmers higher prices at 
a time when public finances were already in a state of disarray and when 
devaluation was still a taboo subject. To have stabilized prices at 1981/2 levels, 
the PNDC would have needed to raise nominal producer prices in line with
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inflation. Instead, it sought to lower them still further. Rawlings assisted seven 
national farmers' associations to amalgamate into an umbrella body, the Ghana 
Federation of Agricultural Co-operatives (GAFACO-OPS), and then tried to 
persuade its leaders to accept a reduction in price for the coming s e a s o n . ^  The 
rationale was that Limann had tripled prices in expectation of a devaluation that 
never came. The Chairman of the PNDC was politely rebuffed, but the 
newspapers later carried reports of farmers voluntarily accepting price cuts in the 
national interest. This had all the hallmarks of a clumsy attempt at 
stage-management.30 In the event, the 1981/2 price was left unchanged, while 
the cost of farm inputs was raised .^  The latter was justified on the grounds that 
a minority of farmers benefited from subsidies and that it was a small sacrifice to 
make in view of the concession on p r i c e s . ^  The net effect was to depress cocoa 
incomes still further. The introduction of the Akuafo Cheque, which replaced 
cash payment to cocoa farmers during the 1982/83 season was hailed as a boon 
for farmers who had been issued with chits whenever the buying agents ran out 
of cash. But this was not underpinned by an adequate spread of banks in the 
rural areas.
As was noted in Chapter Five, critical shortages of consumer goods became the 
key factor in the smuggling equation during the 1970s. In 1982, there was talk of 
selling goods directly to border communities, but this was beyond the capacity of 
the PNDC at the timepS A proposal for a chain of People's Shops was 
incorporated into the December statement on economic policy, but it was not 
activated until 1983.^ In the final analysis, therefore, the PNDC did very little in 
its first year to ameliorate the conditions that gave rise to smuggling.
7.1.2. A Qualified Success: The State and PDCs in Likpe
In November 1982, Likpe briefly dominated the national headlines when it was 
revealed that CMB purchases had risen sharply since the start of the new cocoa 
season. Whereas the CMB had purchased a total of 191 tonnes in the 
Likpe-Kukurantumi district during the 1981/82 season, the haul for the first two
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weeks amounted to 317 tonnes. In the neighbouring New Ayoma district, the 
CMB had bought 90 tonnes as against 72 tonnes.^  These statistics belonged to a 
wider pattern, insofar as Regional purchases rose from 1,683 tonnes in 1981/82 to 
3,776 tonnes the following crop year (See Table 7 .3 ) . ^  in the case of coffee, 
purchases during the 1982/83 season were five times higher than the previous 
year and the best since the 1977/78 season (see Table 7.2). Although the CMB 
was still encountering difficulties handling the crop, these figures were taken as a 
vindication of key elements of Government policy .^ The questions to be 
considered are, firstly, why the PNDC apparently succeeded where others had 
failed; and secondly, why it failed to capitalize on its early achievements.
Table 7.1:
Cocoa Purchases in Likpe-Kukurantumi District By Society, 
1977/8-1984/5 (tonnes) ______
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
(a) Likpe:
Kukurantumi 179 113 69 1 2 16 60 28 6 2 1
Abrani 91 76 40 8 16 48 18 4 1 0
Nkwanta 90 44 55 1 2 7 24 9 4 3
Bakwa 39 18 30 8 4 1 1 5 2 2
Bala 67 25 24 8 5 8 8 2 3
Mate 72 32 34 1 0 6 1 2 1 2 3 2
Koforidua 130 41 39 5 17 35 6 2 3
Agbozome 175 58 57 4 17 25 8 1 6
(b) Akpafu:
Sokpo 76 48 48 6 8 42 53 n.a. 1 0
Adorkor 213 115 92 3 18 91 99 n.a. 32
(c) Buem:
Old Baika 294 2 2 2 225 1 2 26 127 41 4 18
New Baika 115 79 75 5 9 4 7 2 0 2 5
Total: 1,541 871 788 93 149 490 307 n.a. 115
(Source: Cocoa Board, Regional Office, Hohoe)
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Table 7.2:
Coffee Purchases in Volta Region, 1980/81-1982/83 (tonnes)
Society 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83
Hohoe 14.5 0.9 14.3
Leklebi 6.3 0.9 0 . 8
Logba 3.6 0.9 14.6
Likpe-Abrani 2.3 0.3 2 . 8
Kute 4.6 0 . 6 3.9
New Ayoma 2,3 0 . 6 3.3
Jasikan 7.7 1.4 6.9
Ahamansu 2.3 0.3 1.9
Kadjebi 5.3 1 . 8 1.5
Kpedze 3.6 0 . 6 8 . 6
Vane 9.5 0.4 11.4
Ashanti-Kpoeta 4.4 2 . 0 8 . 2
Vakpo 4.4 1.7 1 1 . 0
Bowiri 16.6 1 . 6 7.9
Ho/Peki 11.7 - -
Ho 0.5 1.9 -
Peki - 4.7 9.8
Apesokubi 6.4 2 . 0 2 . 1
Worawora - 2.3 1 , 8
Dain Town 1 . 1 0.9 7.8
Total: 106.6 23.5 120.5
(Source: COCOBOD, Hohoe)
It is, of course, possible that rising CMB purchases did not represent lower rates 
of smuggling, but higher levels of output. There are, however, two pieces of 
evidence that suggest this is unlikely. If more favourable weather conditions had
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affected yields one would have expected this to manifest itself throughout the 
sub-region. In fact, Togolese cocoa production fell from 11,000 to 10,000 tonnes 
over this period (see Table 7.3). Similarly, production elsewhere in Ghana 
continued its descent. Since the Volta Region was aberrant, it is reasonable to 
surmise that political factors made the difference. Given that the PDCs were a 
new variable in the equation, it seems logical to look to them for an answer. 
During fieldwork, former PDC Chairmen and Secretaries from five Likpe villages 
were interviewed and their testimony suggests that the impact of the PDCs had 
been marginal. Although a discussion of the social basis of the PDCs belongs 
more properly to the next Chapter, it is necessary to make some preliminary 
observations at this juncture.
Table 7.3:
Purchases of Cocoa in the Volta Region and Togo, 
1979/80 to 1985/86 (tonnes)
Crop Year Volta Region Togo
1979/80 4,776 16,000
1980/81 1,496 16,000
1981/82 1,683 1 1 , 0 0 0
1982/83 3,776 1 0 , 0 0 0
1983/84 2,656 17,000
1984/85 n.a. 1 0 , 0 0 0
1985/86 876 14,000
(Source: Cocoa Board, Accra; Gill and Duffus, Cocoa Statistics, 
April 1981 and November 1989)
A problem was that official images of rural society were at variance with realities 
in Likpe. Within the PDC Guidelines it was simply assumed that a community 
consisted of the sum total of people resident within a particular locality. Yet there 
were farm labourers who had spent most of their lives in Likpe, but who were 
not counted as full members of the community. Their distinct status was
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underlined by their isolation on the farms, from which they emerged on market 
days. They were for the most part excluded from social events and political 
deliberations. The partial exception to this pattern was Nkwanta, which was 
settled around 1950 by strangers from Anlo and French Togoland. Although they 
originally entered as labourers, some had managed to acquire their own land and 
a more permanent stake in the area. They were incorporated into the political 
structure through an odikro appointed by the Bakwa chief. Elsewhere, the 
strangers were integrated into the life of the community through their ties to 
individual employers. The significance of these details lies in the fact that when 
the PDCs were founded in Likpe, the farm labourers were never canvassed as 
potential members. Since many of the labourers were suspected of stealing cocoa 
beans, their exclusion may have made it easier for the PDCs to deal 
dispassionately with smuggling. On the other hand, it was highly unlikely that 
the labourers would co-operate with this aspect of PDC activities.
The upper echelons of the INCC/NDC also applied a framework of community 
politics that did not always fit local conditions. Maxwell Owusu has observed 
that the PDCs were conceived of as a modern equivalent of the Asafo companies 
which had served as the focus of anti-chiefly agitation during the colonial period 
and after.38 The continuity lay in the deliberate exclusion of the chiefs and in the 
expectation that the youngmen would use the PDCs to launch an assault on local 
power structures.39 The reality is that it was the young men and women of Likpe 
were the most deeply immersed in smuggling for reasons that have already been 
identified. Consequently, their reaction to PDC campaigns was decidedly 
lukewarm as the Mate Secretary noted:
"The concept [of the PDCs] stood against malpractices, 
embezzlement and smuggling. The smugglers didn't like the idea.
We met opposition on that. The drivers also didn't like us because 
of the pressure we put on them to reduce fares. And some market 
women didn't like it because of education to reduce prices of 
foodstuffs. Some youth supported the PDC by slogan only, since 
they might be smugglers, wnereas old people don t smuggle."41'
Most of the Likpe PDCs were in fact formed on the initiative of the chiefs.
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A further peculiarity of the Likpe PDCs was that they were established along 
clan lines. Each village had a PDC executive consisting of a Chairman, Secretary, 
Treasurer and someone who was in charge of communications. In 1982, these 
positions were parcelled out amongst the constituent clans who wanted to ensure 
that they were not cut off from a possible locus of power. This made the PDCs 
especially vulnerable to the infiltration of kin pressures, especially in the context 
of genuine hardship. The Danyi villages remained the principal source of 
essential commodities for which local substitutes were not available. Again the 
headloading of goods between villages on either side of the frontier provided a 
vital source of income for the young men and women of the community. The 
extent to which young men were excluded from cocoa farming is clear from the 
data summarized in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4:
Distribution of Cocoa Holdings Amongst Bakpele 
Men, By Age and Acreage, 1986 
________________________ (Total: 205 respondents)________________________
Age None Below 3 3-4.9 5-9.9 10-19.9 2 0 +
Below 17 5 0 1 0 0
30 years 73.9% 21.7% 0 % 4.4% 0 % 0 %
30 to 16 2 0 6 1 1 0
39 years 36.4% 45.5% 13.6% 2.3% 2.3% 0 %
40 to 8 29 1 5 1 0
49 years 18.2% 65.9% 2.3% 11.4% 2.3% 0 %
50 to 2 26 3 3 0 0
59 years 5.9% 76.5% 8 .8 % 8 .8 % 0 % 0 %
60 to 1 18 3 6 2 0
69 years 3.3% 60.0% 1 0 .0 % 2 0 .0 % 6.7% 0 %
70 and 1 18 2 5 3 1
over 3.3% 60.0% 6.7% 16.7% 1 0 .0 % 3.3%
(Source: Survey of Likpe, 1986)^1 
(Note: For basis of survey see Appendix to thesis)
Moreover, the cocoa farmers were hit harder than ever by black pod disease in 
1982. The farmers could cushion some of the financial blow if they traded more
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of their crops on the black market. During the 1981/82 main crop, the Togolese 
price was only slightly higher than that offered by the CMB, but it widened 
during the mid-crop and a sizeable gulf had opened up by the beginning of the 
main crop in September. Over 1982 as a whole, Togolese prices averaged around 
£907 per load as against the £360 of the CM B.^ The differential was enough to 
enable smugglers to offer farmers an attractive price, to pay their carriers and still 
to reap an adequate return.
The introduction of the Akuafo Cheque if anything worsened the plight of the 
Bakpele farmers. On a visit to the Volta Region in September, Rawlings promised 
to establish a Rural Bank at Likpe-Kukurantumi.^ The United Rural Bank 
commenced operations that year, with the Bank of Ghana as its principal 
s h a r e h o l d e r . ^  Nevertheless, the Bank was only accessible to the farmers of west 
Likpe. The inhabitants of Mate, Bala, Todome, Bakwa, Nkwanta and Avedzeme 
had to travel for miles on foot, since there were no direct transport links to 
Kukurantumi. Those who made the pilgrimage commonly found that the Bank 
was unable to dispense cash. Older men who feared being waylaid on the way 
home, felt obliged to travel to Hohoe which was expensive and inconvenient at a 
time when there were fewer vehicles plying the routes.
For all these reasons, virtually anybody who was caught smuggling could justify 
their actions and elicit a sympathetic response from their kinsmen within the 
PDC. In 1983, the Mate Chairman was forced to resign after having released some 
smuggled goods that belonged to a relative of h is .^  Another Mate Secretary, 
who chose to resign rather than give way to these pressures, coined the following 
cynical dictum:
"If you speak the truth, you become the enemy of the people. If you
follow them blindly, you'll be loved.'"*®
Whenever members of the executive did intercede on behalf of kin, they exposed 
themselves to charges of favouritism. Thus, the only way in which the PDCs
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could maintain any internal cohesion was by turning a blind eye to the 
transgressions of their fellow villagers. The PDCs held public meetings at which 
they relayed what they had been told at the District headquarters about the 
pernicious effects of smuggling, but that was often the extent of i t  Nevertheless, 
the PDCs were not entirely passive. Many Bakpele resented the way the Lolobi, 
Akpafu and Buem used Likpe as a conduit for their own illicit practices. Some of 
the PDCs therefore concentrated on frustrating the efforts of outsiders. As a 
result, the Abrani and Agbozome PDCs accumulated sufficient proceeds to 
finance the construction of a kindergarten and other village amenities. 4 ' 7 
However, since the professional smugglers were often armed, many of the PDCs 
scaled down their operations once they became too dangerous. The Mate PDC, 
for example, ceased to participate after its repeated requests for torches and guns 
went unheeded.4**
A final factor which deterred PDCs throughout the Volta Region was their 
exposure to harassment. During 1982, Likpe played reluctant host to the Border 
Guards, Police and the Army who were either based in the community or who 
occasionally fell upon it like a plague of locusts. The high priority accorded to the 
campaign against smuggling created an environment in which extortion was 
more or less condoned. If the PDCs spoke up for the local population or simply 
tried to play by the book, they made themselves unpopular and often risked 
physical violence. A series of incidents over the course of the year revealed the 
vulnerability of the PDCs in clashes with the coercive branches of the state 
apparatus. Nsamankow. for example, reported that Border Guards from Akanu 
had threatened to shoot members of the Penyi PDC when the latter refused to 
release contraband that they had intercepted ,4^
The Deputy Regional Secretary, Kwasi Kamasa, and a number of students were 
beaten up by Border Guards at Aflao in another inglorious episode,^  Tensions 
came to a head in September when PDCs who had set up a road block near Hlefi 
were assaulted by Policemen, who were allegedly in the pay of one Alhaji
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Munaga.^1 When the news reached Ho, members of the PDC Regional 
Co-ordinating Committee staged a demonstration that culminated in the 
ransacking of the lodge houses and an attack on the Police headquarters. The 
demonstrators issued a statement purporting to dismiss the Volta Regional 
Administrative Officer, the Assistant Commissioner of Police and the head of the 
Border Guards at H onuta .^  The attempt to seize the initiative misfired. The 
Regional Secretary returned from Sekondi and issued a statement that was 
critical of the PDCs. Kamasa was summoned to the Castle and eventually 
dismissed from office. In December the Co-ordinating Committee was itself 
dissolved, as part of a campaign to root out 'ultra-leftists'. Some of those who had 
supported the tactics of Kamasa were imprisoned and at least one of them died in 
the jail-break and coup attempt of June 1983. Others were sent on courses to 
Bulgaria or Cuba, the major object of which was to remove them from the flow of 
Regional politics.^ In the months that followed the dressing down of the PDC 
Regional leadership, reports of victimization multiplied. When PDC members 
congregated at Afienya in October, they filed a catalogue of complaints against 
the Border Guards and Police. Yet Rawlings failed to respond to calls to arm the 
PDCs, because of he was conscious of military sensitivities. The Likpe PDCs 
would have been familiar with these happenings and this may explain a 
reluctance to become too deeply embroiled. It may also be no accident that the 
most active PDCs were to be found in west Likpe, where security personnel were 
less conspicuous.
Having discounted the catalytic effect of the PDCs, one is left with the 
conundrum as originally posed. It would appear as if lower rates of smuggling in 
fact resulted from a conjuncture of two other factors. The first was the closure of 
the frontier between September 1982 (starting on the day before the Ho riot) and 
March 1983. Between June and September of that year it was closed once again. 
The PNDC acted on the first occasion in order to assist the campaign against 
smuggling during the new cocoa season.^ Non-commercial quantities of 
unscheduled goods were normally allowed to cross the frontier without paying
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duties. The flow of traffic often made it difficult to distinguish legitimate from 
illicit trade. Once the frontier was sealed, however, detection was greatly 
simplified, since any movement of goods could be treated as evidence of intent to 
break the law. The second factor was the quasi-piratical behaviour of state 
personnel, who interpreted Government injunctions as an invitation to separate 
border peoples from their property. In Likpe, the Police Task Force (known by 
the revealing nickname of Aluta) was especially feared. Farmers whose plots lay 
towards the mountain risked being shot at. The Police also mounted house to 
house searches in some villages in search of Togolese goods that might count as 
evidence of s m u g g l i n g . ^  According to people in Likpe, property that was seized 
under pretext was taken away as booty. A number of respondents referred to 
Policemen who had raised sufficient capital while on border duty to buy a lorry 
or to build a h o u s e d  Whereas the Police raided Likpe from time to time, the 
Border Guards drew their profits from a steady rake-off from smugglers who 
were known to them. There was therefore a conflict of interests between the two 
bodies which almost came to blows.
The Border Guards remained the butt of criticism during the year. As early as 
March 1982, soldiers were complaining about Border Guards who deliberately 
fed them false information so as to guarantee safe passage for their clients.^ The 
Bakpele were inclined to take a benevolent view of the Guardsmen by 
comparison with Policemen and soldiers who molested them and seized their 
goods. It was the climate of fear which, more than anything, seems to have 
attenuated local involvement in cross-border exchange.
Since the heavy-handed approach seems for once to have borne fruit, one is left 
with the perplexing question of why the PNDC later changed tack. It is not 
possible to establish the answer with complete certainty, since the matter was 
never publicly addressed, but there are three likely reasons. The first is that the 
PNDC perceived a conflict between its political objectives and this particular 
solution. At a time when the regime was courting the rural population, it made
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little sense to treat border peoples in an arbitrary fashion. The vital importance of
retaining their confidence was underlined in 1983 when fears of an invasion from
Togo were realized. Having survived the coup attempt, the PNDC was more
anxious than ever to deploy an effective early warning system along the frontier,
which was contingent on local co-operation. It is in the light of these
considerations (aside from local loyalty) that one should interpret a speech given
by Dr. Obed Asamoah in Hohoe in early 1985, In it he was especially defensive of
the rights of border communities:
"I must say that in my observation of events in this District the 
attitude of some of the Police and the cadres leaves much to be 
desired. Roadblocks have been mounted more as a means of 
extorting things from people than for the purpose of checking 
smuggling or preserving security.... Goods are often wrongly seized 
from people and when seized are not accounted for; and in the 
name of checking smuggling very small quantities of items such as 
batteries, cutlasses, meat ana other food items have been seized 
from people. I have received many complaintsand many of you 
know that I have consistently attempted to check harassment and 
extortion which have causea considerable disaffection among the 
people . ’’5 8
Secondly, there was a clear incompatibility between striving to restore the 
probity (and hence the effectiveness) of state institutions, whilst tolerating abuses 
of power by the Police and Border Guards. Thirdly, the PNDC could not seal the 
frontier on a permanent basis without alienating neighbouring countries. In 
October 1982, both C6 te d'Ivoire and Togo protested that the closures were in 
breach of the protocols of the Economic Community of West African States. 
Following the expulsion of over a million Ghanaians from Nigeria in early 1983, 
the PNDC had no option but to reopen the frontiers. The Togo border was swiftly 
closed after the June invasion, but sustained pressure obliged the PNDC to give 
way the following year. Since Dr. Obed Asamoah had repeatedly committed 
Ghana to the ideal of West African integration, it would have appeared 
anomalous if the PNDC had continued to restrict freedom of movement across its 
eastern frontier. Finally, the PNDC may have under-rated its success because it 
consistently overestimated the level of cocoa production in the Region. In 
September 1982, Rawlings attributed the fall in purchases since the 1960s to the 
effects of smuggling,5^ Kwamena Ahwoi later repeated the mistake when he
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deduced that 5,000 tonnes of cocoa had been smuggled during the 1983/84 
season  60 Both failed to appreciate that productivity had fallen off markedly 
because of an ageing stock of trees and the effects of black pod. If Government 
officials had been more informed about these matters, they might have taken 
greater heart from the results. Instead they initiated a search for alternative 
strategies.
7.2. The Fruits of Pragmatism, 1983-86
7.2.1. The Shaping of Government Policy
Nobody associated with the PNDC was under any illusion that the stop-gap 
measures of the first six months amounted to a lasting solution. Having built up 
political momentum, it was inevitable that attention should turn to longer term 
recovery and development options. In the course of so doing, the regime 
unleashed the ideological tensions that had been latent within its ranks from the 
start. While there is insufficient space to explore these in detail, much of what 
follows rests on an appreciation of where the options lay.61
One point on which general agreement prevailed was that a reform of economic 
structures had to be accompanied by a substantial infusion of foreign aid, if 
recovery was not to be prolonged and overly traumatic. At an early stage, fierce 
debate centred upon the merits of seeking an accord with the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who patrolled the gateways to western 
aid. The National Economic Review Committee, which was established in 
February under the chairmanship of Dr. Joe Abbey, favoured an early approach 
to the IMF, and exploratory talks duly opened the following m o n t h .  62 This 
proved highly controversial since the Fund was bound to impose conditions 
which were unpalatable to Ghanaians across the political spectrum. Dr. Obed 
Asamoah, whose own appointment as Secretary for Foreign Affairs had been 
criticized by the militants, publicly declared that IMF pressure to devalue the
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currency was unacceptable.^^ The fiercest critics were understandably grouped 
on the ’le ft '.^  Their vision was an integrated national economy, released from 
the chains of dependency. In their eyes, an agreement on IMF terms was 
tantamount to abandoning the Revolution at the first hurdle, Chris Atim headed 
a delegation to the Communist bloc in April, but returned without any firm 
promises of economic assistance. Rawlings, who had wavered until now, was 
increasingly won over to the view that there was no realistic alternative to 
mending fences with the Fund. A more surprising convert was Dr. Kwesi 
Botchwey, the newly appointed Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning. As 
a member of the NDM, his writings had hitherto been fiercely critical of the Fund 
and its role in perpetuating western imperialism.^
By August 1982, the advocates of an IMF deal had compiled a package of 
proposals which they intended to submit to the Fund. When the details were 
revealed to a joint meeting of the NDC and PNDC Secretaries, they encountered 
a hostile reception. Challenged by Rawlings to come up with something better, 
the critics tabled their own document at short notice,^ The 'Alternative 
Economic Programme' was surprisingly accommodating towards the earlier 
Abbey report. Most notably, it accepted the case for devaluation quite apart from 
IMF conditions.67 It also conceded that austerity was unavoidable, but added 
that the brunt should be borne by the parasitic commercial class rather than by 
workers. 6 8  For the most part, however, the plan ran against the grain of the IMF 
package. It envisaged an even greater economic role for the state. For example, 
the report proposed the nationalization of Ashanti Goldfields and favoured the 
promotion of large-scale agriculture over the peasant option.69 Confronted with 
the historical association between statism, corruption and bureaucratic 
inefficiency, the architects of the plan envisaged some new departures. On the 
one hand, the mass-based P/WDCs would strive to reduce waste and to increase 
productivity, while introducing a measure of accountability into economic 
management.70 On the other, state control over the import/export trade and 
over key items of internal trade was supposed to choke off opportunities for
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speculation. If the proposals had been adopted, the PNDC would have been 
forced to concentrate still harder on perfecting the mechanisms of social control. 
However, the tide was running against the militants. By September, Botchwey 
was engaged in exploratory talks with the IMF, and the following month he was 
able to announce that full negotiations were underway.
The outcome of bitter rivalries within the regime, which turned on the political 
direction of the Revolution as much as on economic policy, was settled during a 
struggle for power in October and November7^  Alolga Akata-Pore was 
detained, Chris Atim retreated into exile and JFM activists were purged from the 
NDC. As it happened, the principal casualties were Northerners, while Kojo 
Tsikata was accused of spinning a web of Ewe intrigue which had ensnared 
Rawlings.^ It is worth noting, however, that in his letter of resignation Atim 
dismissed the ethnic version of events, maintaining that he had parted company 
with Rawlings on ideological grounds.^  Given that the Ewe 'tribal' tag would 
have been the easiest to pin on Rawlings it is significant that Atim chose not to do 
so.
Purged of its dissenting voices, the PNDC was able to proceed openly with its 
recovery plan. Botchwey unveiled the Programme for Reconstruction and 
Development in December. This envisaged a one-year stabilization phase to be 
followed by a three-year recovery program m e/^ The document contained some 
concessions to the 'Alternative Economic Programme1: notably a state monopoly 
over the import/export trade, the creation of People's Shops, and increased state 
shareholding in the leading foreign banks. When the final version of the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was published in April 1983, however, 
these items were conspicuously absent.^  But the scheme for People's Shops was 
revived in the context of the crisis of that year. The conjunction of a severe 
drought and the mass expulsion of over one million Ghanaians from Nigeria in 
January 1983 required the PNDC to seek emergency relief. The PNDC set up a 
National Emergency Relief Committee to co-ordinate the resettlement of the
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refugees and a National Mobilization Programme (NMP) to deal with the wider 
context/^ When the United Nations agreed to provide aid, it stipulated that the 
returnees should not be treated separately but handled as part of a more 
embracing recovery program m e/^ The NMP therefore promoted the People's 
Shops as a mechanism through which to channel relief items to the villages.
For the sake of simplicity, the ERP can be reduced to three core components. The 
first of these, upon which everything else hinged, was the rehabilitation of 
dilapidated infrastructure/® From 1983, the Ghana Highways Authority was 
able to increase expenditure on feeder as well as trunk roads in the Volta 
Region/^ Secondly, the ERP aimed to restore incentives to productive as 
opposed to middleman activity. In his broadcast on the controversial 1983 
budget, Rawlings summed the matter up as follows:
"Countrymen, the surest cure to our longstanding ailment as a 
nation is a set of policies that will stimulate production and at the 
same time discourage unproductive activity. We have reached a 
critical stage in our history and we need to ask ourselves serious 
questions: why has it become so profitable in this country simply to 
engage in trade instead of production? Why are the m ost 
productive and industrious people usually the poorest? " 8 0
Whereas the 'Alternative Economic Programme' envisaged the state as the
cutting edge of development, the ERP was weighted towards the private sector.
Central to the ERP was the revitalization of the export sector, which had visibly
wilted over the preceding decade. This required the PNDC to grasp the nettle of
overvaluation. The 1983 Budget introduced a system of bonuses and surcharges
that rewarded the earners of foreign exchange at the expense of its consumers. In
October 1983 the scheme was abandoned as the PNDC embarked on the first of a
series of devaluations. The official rate of the cedi fell from <£2.75 to <£25 against
the dollar. By 1986, it had reached 090 to the dollar before the PNDC finally
introduced a foreign exchange auction.
The revitalization of agriculture was a sine qua non for economic recovery. Here 
too, the PNDC aimed to achieve higher levels of output through greater financial 
incentives. Retreating from the expedients of 1982, the Government permitted
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farmers to seek the highest price for their crops. When drought was followed by 
glut, precipitating a collapse of food prices in 1984, the PNDC introduced the 
safety net of minimum guaranteed prices.®^ It also aimed to expand access to 
rural credit, through the commercial and development banks as well as through 
an expanding network of Rural B a n k s . Cocoa posed special difficulties, since 
the state could not afford to extend the world market price to the farmers. The 
PNDC did nevertheless concede that excessive levels of taxation had discouraged 
producers from planting new trees and from properly maintaining their farms.
It proposed to reverse the trend by raising the farmers' share of the world price 
from around 24% in 1983 to no less than 55%.®  ^That was a feasible target only if 
COCOBOD (as the revamped CMB came to be known) lowered its operating 
costs. By the end of 1985,16,000 workers had been retrenched and 10,000 ghost 
employees had been removed from the payroll.®^
Thirdly, as resources were channelled back into productive activity, the PNDC
aimed to squeeze the vitality out of the parallel economy. Whereas the success of
the 'Alternative Economic Programme' would have depended upon more
effective surveillance, the PNDC warmed to the idea that the market could
accomplish the desired results more effectively. Hence official statements
stressed the futility of trying to enforce unrealistic price controls:
"As regards price controls, the Government is aware that a rigid 
system not only discourages production and legitimate economic 
activities hut also promotes speculation, profiteering in trade and 
inflation ." ® 6
The aim was to expand the volume of goods in circulation, through import 
liberalization and incentives to domestic industry, whilst phasing out price 
controls. The intended effect was the elimination of a range of rent-seeking 
activities that went by the generic name of kalabule. As of July 1985, only eight 
items were still subject to price control: namely imported rice, sugar, baby food, 
textiles, drugs, matches and soap .® ' 7 Furthermore, devaluation, competitive 
bidding for foreign exchange and (in due course) the licensing of foreign 
exchange bureaux, were all designed to close the gap between the official and 
parallel rates of exchange. The PNDC calculated that as the profit margin shrank,
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more transactions would take place within the official market, thus allowing the 
state to withdraw from thankless policing activities.
Even then, the PNDC could not surrender itself immediately and completely to 
the logic of the market. It retained limited subsidies on farm inputs and on 
petroleum products, which continued to reward the enterprising smuggler*^ 
Again, the PNDC was conscious that it might take years before COCOBOD was 
able to offer cocoa farmers a price that was commensurate with prevailing rates 
in C6 te d'Ivoire or T ogo.^ In consequence, efficient border controls remained a 
priority area.
After 1983, the PNDC initiated two reforms. Following perennial complaints 
about corruption within the Border Guards, the unit was disbanded towards the 
beginning of 1985. Some of its personnel were absorbed into the Army, which 
henceforth assumed full responsibility for border duties. ^ 0 In the Volta Region, 
the Mortar Regiment (based at Ho) took command. One of the advantages of this 
arrangement was that soldiers could be rotated between border and other duties 
so as impede participation in smuggling rings.
Secondly, the PNDC learned from the experience of the PDCs when it established 
a People's Militia in 1984. The Militia was recruited locally, preserving all the 
advantages of the PDCs. Yet at any given time, most Militiamen (and women) 
would be operating outside their home villages and therefore beyond the 
influence of immediate kin. A further difference from the PDCs was that the 
Militia was responsible not to the community but to the District Secretary and the 
Civil Defence Organization (CDO). In that sense, the Militia was quite unlike the 
Sungusungu phenomenon in Tanzania, which spread as a vigilante movement 
outside the s ta te d  The Militiamen were no longer expected to counteract 
smuggling merely out of a sense of patriotic duty, but also in return for material 
reward. Contraband was to be sold and the proceeds divided between the 
individual Militiamen and the District secretariat.^ Provided the Militia bands
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were small and reasonably active, they could expect to earn a respectable sum of 
money without incurring any of the risks associated with smuggling. Finally, the 
PNDC endeavoured to forge collaborative links between the Militia and the 
Army. The CDO was headed by an Army officer, Brigadier Tehn-Addy, and 
retired soldiers were posted to the Regional and District secretariats. They 
provided basic weapons training and attempted to inculcate some military 
discipline into their recruits.
The distance the Rawlings regime had travelled by 1986 is quite remarkable. Old 
shibboleths had been recycled as canons of official belief. Radical analysts 
blamed the PNDC for capitulating to the IMF and dismissed the ERP as a ruse to
shift the burden of adjustment on to/poor.93 The PNDC claimed to have forged a
/-'
more fruitful relationship with the countryside and, to that extent, to have 
discovered the formula for a successful integration of the periphery. In the final 
section, the object is to assess this claim by examining the impact of PNDC 
policies on Likpe.
7.2,2. Producers and Smugglers in Likpe, 1983-86
7.2.2.I. The Rediscovery of Food
In Chapter Five, smuggling and the attitudes displayed towards it were linked to 
the land shortage and contracting incomes. In 1983, the Bakpele experienced real 
hardship that was matched in living memory only by the hunger of the early war 
y e a rs .94  Drought and bush fire exacted a heavy toll on food production in what 
was already a deficit area. Nobody starved, but nutrition suffered as the Bakpele 
were reduced to consuming almost anything that was e d ib le  95
Although the crops failed, farmers who had planted food were usually able to 
salvage something. Also many people were able to reclaim cocoyams from land 
which was under fallow. Moreover, active farmers were more likely to have food
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stored up from previous seasons. By contrast, those who had previously bought 
their food on the market, often with income generated from smuggling, were 
highly exposed. The youth, who were the least endowed with land, were often 
reduced to stealing foodstuffs, which superimposed social tensions upon 
personal difficulty.
In the longer term, the hunger of 1983 heightened local awareness about the 
serious implications of a recurrent food deficit. This was apparent from the way 
in which the Bakpele cleared their dead and dying cocoa farms and (where 
possible) substituted crops such as maize and cassava. It was also manifested in a 
willingness to move beyond the community in search of land. As early as the 
mid-1970s, Lolobi women were leaving their villages (where the density of cocoa 
strictly limited the scope for food farming) in order to rent plots in the grassland 
area between Kpandu and Hohoe. This low-lying land was not cultivated by 
local farmers, but was ideally suited to swamp rice cultivation, a subject on 
which the Lolobis were reputed to be especially knowledgeable. In 1984, they 
were joined by a trickle of farmers from Likpe, which turned into a steady stream 
two years later. A profile of the earliest migrants suggests that the least 
advantaged members of the community were the most likely to leave Likpe. 
Women predominated not only because rice is regarded as a female crop,96 but 
also because they were the most vulnerable. Widows and divorcees experienced 
particular difficulties in securing access to land in their home villages. Once the 
migrations began in earnest, the women were joined by young men who faced a 
land shortage of their own. People from Kukurantumi made up the largest single 
group, mainly because they had lost valuable land to Ayoma, but they were 
joined in ever larger numbers by individuals from other villages.
What began as a strategy of risk aversion came to be viewed in more positive 
terms. In the vicinity of Hohoe, yields were seldom much below 10 bags of rice 
per acre which (depending on the month of sale) could yield anywhere between
035,000 and 050,000, exclusive of production costs of about 05,000 per acre.9^
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This compared favourably with returns to smuggling. In late 1986, someone who 
purchased cocoa belonging to another farmer and headloaded it across the 
border would have needed to transport between 1 2 0  and 180 loads in order to 
earn an equivalent income (see Table 7.5). That was a tall order for anyone to 
meet in the space of a single cocoa season. By way of qualification, it should be 
noted that the two sets of activities were not entirely incompatible. Since rice was 
harvested over October and November, it was still possible to take advantage of 
the second half of the main crop season. The returns also compared favourably 
with earnings on cocoa production. A cocoa farmer would have needed to 
produce about 10 loads in 1986, in order to earn an equivalent sum. This was an 
optimistic target for most Bakpele farmers. After the drought, black pod disease 
returned with a vengeance and virtually wiped out local production. A typical 
experience was that of a farmer who lost one cocoa farm in the bush fires and 
whose yield on the remaining four farms fall from around 90 loads (270 
kilograms) to less than 20 k ilo g ram s.M an y  farmers were still mildly optimistic 
about the long-term future of the crop. They tended to regard rice farming as a 
means to raise the capital needed to replant with a hybrid variety which was 
thought to be immune to black pod. In the words of one such farmer:
"We are cocoa farmers. For the past three years, the cocoa yield has 
been declining. We put all our land under cocoa. It isn’t possible for 
us to cut our cocoa trees, and we have no land left for food 
production. So we decided to come hercTo start something with 
which to rehabilitate our cocoa farms.1' "
By contrast, the landless youth looked on black pod as something of a blessing:
"Our parents derived their income from cocoa, so the younger 
generation hardly have any land for themselves except by cutting 
out cocoa. Black pod and the other diseases are actually a blessing 
in disguise,"1^
Yet even if old farms were uprooted, everyone was conscious that there was 
insufficient land to meet the demands of an extended family. The Bakpele were 
therefore forced to look for alternatives to cocoa and it was rice that best seemed 
to fit the bill.
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It is not enough merely to emphasize a change in local consciousness. The fact of 
the matter is that the Bakpele could never have turned to rice were it not for the 
more favourable environment created by Government policy. The removal of 
price controls allowed the farmers to exploit market fluctuations in such a way as 
to maximize the financial returns on their labour. The PNDC had also resurfaced 
a number of vital roads, thereby enabling the Bakpele to travel fairly comfortably 
between the rice farms and home. This, together with the greater availability of 
spare parts and petrol, also made it feasible for southern traders to pay regular 
visits to local markets to buy mangoes and oranges as well as rice. By 1986, the 
Region was once more feeling the pulse of the national economy, as yams from as 
far afield as Nkwanta passed through Hohoe en route to Accra,
The rice boom may be seen a local vindication of the ERP, in the sense that it 
offered money-earning opportunities to the Bakpele, while assisting the PNDC to 
counter the allure of smuggling. In that way, the re-orientation of the local 
economy away from a dependence on cocoa was rendered as painless as 
possible. Nevertheless, the future of this accord remained problematic at the end 
of 1986. A return to the logic of the market was ridden with contradictions. As 
more people migrated, so the rental value of land appreciated and litigation 
proliferated. At the same time, there was a tendency for prices to fall, at least in 
relative terms, as rice production expanded. The experience of 1984, when a 
bumper harvest resulted in a price collapse, taught many people a painful lesson. 
During that year, it was not even possible to smuggle food crops, since the 
Togolese market was equally saturated.^1 By 1986, some farmers were in fact 
finding a market across the frontier, which the authorities viewed as an 
unwelcome development. Thirdly, exchange rate policies raised the cost of 
mechanized services, which were essential to successful swamp rice 
c u l t i v a t i o n .  102 The price of a tractor jumped from about £500,000 in 1984 to £2 
million in 1986, so that only the wealthiest farmers could afford to purchase new 
m a c h i n e s .  103 The majority of farmers were dependent upon them for tractor 
services in what was a sellers' market. In 1986, it was common practice for
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drivers to demand advances before the start of the season and then to renege on 
their verbal agreements. The farmers were then left to prepare the land manually. 
This was an exceptionally laborious task once the rains began to fall and 
invariably resulted in lower yields.
Since the PNDC was not disposed to interfere with the operations of the market, 
the only help it could offer was to assist peasants in acquiring their own tractors. 
In the mid-1980s, official policy aimed at grouping peasants into co-operatives 
which would qualify for bank credit. Since the commercial banks preferred to 
finance traders, because of lower risks, the farmers had to turn to the Rural 
Banks. In the case of the Kukurantumi Rural Bank, however, there was a 
reluctance to lend to food farmers because so many had defaulted on their loans 
in 1984.10^ Many Bakpele had to turn to moneylenders, who demanded higher 
rates of interest and repayment immediately after the harvest when prices were 
at their lowest.
In one noteworthy instance, peasants successfully acquired a bank loan in order 
to purchase a tractor. A group of Lolobi rice farmers at Gbi-Godenu had 
repeatedly failed to raise a loan before someone suggested affiliating to the 31st 
December Womens' Movement. This was an inspired thought since the PNDC 
desperately needed a visible symbol of its commitment to women. The Lolobi 
women joined for essentially mercenary motives as their leader explained:
"When we started farming here, we were having difficulties getting 
our fields well-prepared tor the sowing of the rice. When I saw that 
the burden was becoming too much for individuals, I called them 
together and discussed things with them, with the intention of 
getting agroup formed so that the Government could get us a 
tractor. They all accepted the idea. Then we started contributing 
towards buying a tractor and joined the December 31st Womens'
Movement, bi?
The December 31st Womens' Movement Farm subsequently became a 
Government showpiece. The women acquired credit from the Agricultural 
Development Bank, while the Hohoe District Secretary loaned them his vehicle 
as they negotiated the purchase of a tractor. As head of the Movement, Mrs.
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Rawlings came to work alongside the Lolobi women in 1985. The visit left a 
tangible mark in the form of a new feeder road that joined the main trunk road 
near Hohoe. The Lolobi women were the focus of envy in Likpe, where the 
search for credit had not ended as happily. By the end of 1986, the Bakpele 
farmers had a catalogue of complaints and worries. Whether or not they 
persevered with rice was likely to depend on the availability of alternative 
sources of income. The salient point remains that, for the moment at least, the 
Bakpele were able to exploit openings in food farming, now that cocoa was in 
decline and access to state employment had been closed off.
7.2.2.2. The Fruits of Smuggling
Cocoa had established its position as the most favoured item of contraband 
before the PNDC came to power. By 1986, the regime had succeeded in 
restricting the attractions of smuggling through a combination of higher 
producer prices and the shrinkage of the black market differential. In 1980 a 
farmer who sold his cocoa in Togo could earn 4.4 times the CMB price in real 
terms, whereas at the start of the 1986/7 season he might have received a bit 
more than double (<£5,750 as against 02,550).^  A number of additional 
overheads have to be built into the equation in order to arrive at a realistic 
comparison. An elderly farmer would have had to employ someone to headload 
his cocoa. In 1986, the cost of carriage to Dzidrame was 0500 per load or double 
that if the cocoa came from west Likpe. A further CFA 1,000 (or 0500) was paid to 
the soldiers. If the farmer was fortunate, he might therefore pocket 04,250 as 
against the COCOBOD price of 02,550. In practice, most of the operations were 
carried out by individuals who made their income almost solely from smuggling 
- at least during peak periods. They had to pay these overheads on top of the 
purchase price. In 1986, farmers were demanding 04,000 per load. At the end of 
the process, the smuggler was left with a meagre return of 0250 per load (see 
Table 7.5).
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Table 7.5!
Returns to Cocoa Smuggling in Likpe, September 1986
Category CFA Cedis
X. The farmer/smuggler:
(i) Gross earnings: 11,500 5,750
(ii) Costs:
Carriage to border 1 , 0 0 0 500
Carriage to Dzidrame 1 , 0 0 0 500
Bribes to soldiers 1 , 0 0 0 500
(iii) Net earnings: 8,500 4,250
(iv) Black market price less Ghana price: tfl,700 per load
2 . The full-time smuggler:
(i) Gross earnings: 11,500 5,750
(ii) Costs:
Purchase of cocoa 8 , 0 0 0 4,000
Carriage to border 1 , 0 0 0 500
Carriage to Dzidrame 1 , 0 0 0 500
Bribes to soldiers 1 , 0 0 0 500
(iii) Net earnings: 500 <£250 per load
(Data from informal interviews with Likpe smugglers, 1986)
The Bakpele who did not own their cocoa often specialized in handling 
petroleum products. In 1986, a lorry visited Likpe weekly and sold kerosene 
directly to the villagers. In Mate, the owner of a set of storage tanks managed to 
persuade the drivers to sell exclusively to himself. Having cornered the supply, 
he insisted that local smugglers change their CFA earnings with him. The francs 
were then used to purchase Togolese goods for sale in H o h o e . The market in 
petrol was less susceptible to manipulation. Normally smugglers bought petrol 
in Hohoe and paid a driver to convey it to Likpe. The petrol was then adulterated 
with kerosene before being carted over the mountain to Togo and sold at a profit.
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The advantage of petroleum products was that the supply was not affected by 
seasonal fluctuations or shortages of supply through disease. Moreover, the 
financial returns were almost as good as for cocoa (see Table 7.6). There was 
general agreement that the smuggling of petroleum products beat every other 
alternative. As one young woman, who made the journey daily, explained:
"The reason we are doing this work is that if you prepare food and 
sell it on the market, you won't get any money. But if you send 
kerosejjigjpr petrol you can always come back with money in your
In 1986, the golden age of smuggling appeared to be at an end. During fieldwork, 
young men contrasted their impecuniosity with the recent past when they could 
have afforded many more luxuries. For all that, smuggling remained at least a 
reliable source of income.
Table 7.6:
Profits From Smuggling of Petroleum Products 
(per 6  gallons), As of August 1986
Item Kerosene Petrol
Purchase price <£600 <£1 , 1 0 0
Transport from Hohoe - < £ 1 0 0
Bribes 50 < £ 1 0 0
Total overheads: <£650 <£1,300
Sale price in Togo 
converted into Cedis <£850 <£1,750
Net Profit: < £ 2 0 0 <£450
(Data from informal interviews with smugglers)
7.2.2.3. The Politics of Consumption
Disruption of the internal market has already been cited as the single most 
important incitement to smuggle. The PNDC was aware that unless it facilitated
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the flow of essential commodities into the border areas, the inhabitants would be 
forced to shop elsewhere. In 1983, the regime attempted to intervene directly in 
the market through the creation of People's Shops. The NMP was responsible for 
supplies, while the PDCs were expected to raise the money to stock the Shops 
and to manage their affairs. In Mate, shares in the People's Shop were sold at <£50 
and by the time it ceased operation a tidy sum of <£25,000 had been collected.1^  
In some areas this appears to have been the most valued PDC a c t i v i t y , 1 ^  but the 
Bakpele experience was not an altogether happy one. One of the problems was 
that the supply of goods was both irregular and inadequate to satisfy local 
requirements. Since goods were first despatched to Jasikan, they were often 
spoiled by the time they reached Likpe. After a while, the Shops ceased to 
function altogether for reasons outlined by the PDC Secretary in Mate:
"It [the Mate Shop] functioned when the goods were coming, but 
that was not the idea of it. The Government's aim was that it should 
be used mainly for selling local goods, but we were depending on 
Government goods* So when the commodities stopped coming, it 
became dormant ." 1 1 1
Allegations of corruption had an even more corrosive effect on local morale. It is
claimed that some monies from Likpe were misappropriated at the District level,
while in Kukurantumi suspicion fell on the PDC when it was unable to render
proper accounts.11^ Although it is probable that fraud did occur, managerial
confusion helped to breed mistrust. This very point was made by U.S. Clarke, the
Jasikan District Secretary:
"Initially the cadres were not properly educated on the concept.
Even where there was not outright embezzlement, there was a lack 
of initial education on how to keep the records. In some areas, no 
records were kept at all. So the people lost confidence in the Shops 
because they paid monies but they never received the goods.
Sometimes one individual would pay the lion's share of the money 
towards the People's Shop and then would expect most of the 
goods for himself."11^
By 1984, official enthusiasm for the People's Shops had visibly waned. Consistent 
with the tenor of the ERP, the PNDC looked to private traders to take up the 
slack once it had re-created the essential preconditions for commercial activity. 
Two years later, the results were apparent throughout the Volta Region. Hohoe
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had recovered its vitality as a commercial centre straddling the grassland and 
forest zones. Private traders and chain stores such as the Ghana National Trading 
Corporation brought consignments of every conceivable consumer item into 
town. A network of smaller traders then dispersed the goods throughout the 
surrounding villages. There was a sense here of history repeating itself in the 
mould of the recovery in the latter part of the 1920s. Many of the goods were 
manufactured in Ghana, although a wide range of imported commodities was 
also on sale.
The revival of internal commerce did not render cross-border trade entirely 
redundant. Some commodities, like clothing and sugar, remained in short 
supply. Moreover, some Togolese goods were cheaper than their Ghanaian 
equivalents. For example, a bottle of Togolese beer cost <£90, whereas the 
Ghanaian equivalent sold for <£120. For these reasons, the Bakpele continued to 
cross to Dzidrame on market days. In order to assess the volume and 
composition of this trade, several days were spent conducting an informal census 
along the bush paths in February 1986. Roughly 300 people crossed the frontier 
on market day, returning with consumer goods like clothing, blankets, sugar, 
metal pans and cigarettes. Many carried small quantities of cocoa, coffee and 
palm-nuts with them in order to earn the CFA francs. 1 1 4  Traders within Likpe 
also stocked a selection of Togolese goods. An inspection of one store in Todome
revealed that seventeen of the twenty items on display were of Togolese
• • 115 origin.11J
7.2.2A. Pledging and Contraband
One further initiative is worthy of mention. Reference has already been made to 
the presence of Togolese farmers on Ghanaian soil. In January 1983, the Jasikan 
District Secretary issued a statement reminding chiefs that it was illegal for them 
to alienate land to non-nationals without the consent of Government.11^ He was 
partly concerned about threats to territorial sovereignty, mentioning a village
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where the Togolese had built their own school and flew their own flag. He also 
argued that the Togolese were more likely to engage in smuggling. In an 
interview three years later he re-iterated the point:
"Most pledged farms are on the border. No farmer would walk one 
mile to the buying centre on the Ghanaian side to get a lower price, 
when he can walk 200 yards over the border into Ghana and then 
back to Togo where he can get a better price. That is iust expecting 
too much. All along the eastern border the Togolese nave tarred 
their roads and they have dumped a lot of goods in the towns . " 1 1 7
The farmers, who had pledged their land for reasons of financial hardship,
shared an interest in reversing the tide. In September 1986, a meeting of the
Regional and District Secretaries passed a resolution that abrogated all pledging
agreements with immediate effect.11® Henceforth both parties were prohibited
from harvesting any of the crop. The farms were to be taken over by the
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs), the Town/Village/Area
Councils and by the newly formed mobisquads. The latter would then
rehabilitate the farms in return for a one-third share of the proceeds. The
remainder was to be deposited with the District Councils and topped up with
loans from COCOBOD, to raise the money to pay off the creditors. Ultimately,
the farms were expected to revert to their owners. By mid-November, 24 farms in
the Jasikan District had been taken over by mobisquads, of which 18 had been
fully redeemed for their original owners.11^ There is, no specific data for Likpe.
Pledging of farms was common enough, but the pledgees seem to have come
predominantly from northern Togo. They did not have kin on the other side of
the mountain, but still needed CFA francs to visit home with. At the time of
concluding fieldwork, it was not yet possible to gauge the success of these efforts
on the part of the Regional administration.
7.2.2.5. The Flexibility of Control
The evidence presented thus far suggests that, while both push and pull factors 
lost much of their force, they remained sufficiently strong to pose a dilemma for 
the authorities. Consequently, reform of the coercive apparatus remained a
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matter of some importance. After 1985, a detachment from the Mortar regiment 
was stationed in Mate. Its remit was to monitor traffic across the frontier and to 
curb any illicit trade. Although the soldiers were supposed to be rotated, many of 
them stayed long enough to bring their families with them. The soldiers were 
required to live on wages which were inadequate, not least because they 
expected to live in a certain amount of comfort. Given that many had recently 
escaped from a rural environment, they were keen to distance themselves from 
anything that smacked of a peasant lifestyle. Whereas the Bakpele drank 
akpeteshie and palm wine, the soldiers insisted on consuming beer - preferably 
well-chilled. The soldiers consequently needed to look for additional sources of 
income, which drew them inexorably into the business of smuggling. Local 
smugglers would establish a relationship with a particular soldier, who they 
knew would be on duty at a specific time. They would pay a standard bribe, 
which entitled them to safe passage across the border. In 1986, the soldiers 
charged CFA 1,000 on a load of cocoa, 0100 on a can of petrol, 050 on a can of 
kerosene and 040 on a load of fruit. The fact that the Bakpele also paid bribes 
on legal consignments of fruit shows that this was essentially a protection racket. 
Smugglers could try to avoid the soldiers by using obscure bush-paths, but they 
risked physical assault and possible arrest (ironically enough, on charges of 
smuggling) if found out. Consequently, it was safer to cultivate a military patron.
The soldiers based in Mate did not confine themselves to taking bribes, but were 
actively engaged in their own illicit trade. Thus, the Sergeant in charge had a wife 
who hired local girls to carry petrol on her behalf. Many other wives traded in 
Togolese goods. Apart from the soldiers based in Mate, others passed through 
periodically on border operations. They tended to be more rapacious because 
they had less time in which to make their fortune. In short, then, the 
militarization of border security did not have the desired effects, at least as far as 
smuggling is concerned. The soldiers engaged in precisely the same subterfuges 
as their predecessors in the Border Guards. Indeed, the Jasikan District Secretary 
rated their performance below that of the much-maligned Guardsmen:
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"The old Border Guards were a bit better than now, when they have 
been joined with the military. Now the soldiers come for a short 
period of two weeks and will want to make a fortune in this short 
time. The old ones still did it, but they were around for a long time 
and so did it in bits."121
The record of the People's Militia was more encouraging. Although Likpe 
belonged to the Jasikan District, it was brought under the Hohoe District CDO 
for the sake of convenience. By the end of 1986, the District Militia contained 
perhaps as many as 120 recruits who were based in Hohoe for deployment to the 
outlying areas.122 The recruits were formally expected to belong to one of the 
existing 'revolutionary organs', such as the JPM or the 31st December Womens' 
Movement. They were also supposed to be screened by Zonal CDRs and again at 
the CDO District Secretariat, in order to ensure that petty criminals did not 
infiltrate the structure.12^ In practice, evidence of political consciousness was not 
rated very highly. The CDO actively recruited from amongst the unemployed 
youth of both sexes. These were precisely the people who, under normal 
circumstances, might be engaged in smuggling. Indeed the Commander of the 
Hohoe CDO regarded this as their greatest asset:
"Since the Militia has been on the scene, smuggling is on the 
decline. The reason is that some Militiamen were ex-smugglers, so 
they know the routes and the people who are involved. Most are 
operating in their own localities."124
The relationship between the Militiamen and the District authorities was one of 
mutual convenience. The authorities were convinced that the border villages 
remained a hotbed of illegal activity, as exemplified by the following comment 
by the Hohoe Commander:
"Likpe is noted to be full of very hardened smugglers since time 
immemorial, because of the geographical position. It would be very 
difficult to set up a border station mere because of the mountain, so 
they’re taking advantage of that,"125
Since external surveillance had never worked particularly well, the
administration was dependent on local participation. For their part, the
Militiamen were assured a source of income. They were expected to pay for their
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uniforms and to fund their period of basic training, which was conducted along 
quasi-military lines. On the other hand, once they passed out they could expect 
the full backing of the authorities as they went about tackling the smugglers. If a 
Militia platoon intercepted an item of contraband and handed it over (together 
with the offender) to the authorities the members were assured of half the resale 
value. One-sixth was forwarded to the National and Regional secretariats of the 
CDO, leaving a one-third share for the District o f f i c e .  126 Through a simple 
arithmetic exercise, it can be seen that Militiamen usually had an incentive to 
arrest goods rather than to take bribes. If a group of five Militiamen intercepted a 
load of cocoa and relayed it to the COCOBOD in late 1986, they would have 
received £255 per head. If they accepted the standard bribe of CFA1,000 (or £500), 
they would have only received £100 each. The greater the number of Militiamen, 
the smaller the individual reward, but this was still more than the equivalent of a 
thinly spread bribe. A smuggler could not realistically be expected to pay more 
than CFA 1,000 without the whole exercise losing its profitability. According to 
U.S. Clarke, the only scenario under which it paid Militiamen to collude was 
when the threat of appearing before a Tribunal induced a smuggler to offer a 
bribe in excess of the value of the l o a d .  127 This thwarted the immediate aims of 
the regime, but it promised to render smuggling unviable in the longer run.
Initially, the Militia was a bit of a disappointment to its progenitors. Until the end 
of 1985, the Militiamen were working alongside the soldiers, an arrangement 
which suited almost nobody. The District administration suspected that the 
Militiamen were being drawn into clientelistic relations with corrupt soldiers.
The latter regarded the Militia as an unsolicited intrusion on their patch. Finally, 
the Militiamen themselves derived little financial gain from tagging behind the 
military. Thereafter, the CDO detached the Militia and concentrated most of its 
activities on the second line of villages. This produced a startling transformation. 
By August 1986, seasoned smugglers were complaining that the Militia had 
become scrupulously honest and that it was raising the risks to intolerable levels. 
With characteristic cunning, some people ceased operating on their own behalf
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and teamed up with others they knew were untouchable. One young man began 
to collect bribes on a commission basis for a s o l d i e r .  1^8 Another young woman 
switched from smuggling her own kerosene to headloading petrol on behalf of 
the Sergeant's wife. Because this course of action was only open to a minority, a 
number of smugglers were forced to disengage altogether. For example, a 
Todome storekeeper, who had hitherto brought his beer from Togo, started to 
buy his stocks in Hohoe because of the risk of losing everything.
An unmistakeable sign that the activities of the Militia were beginning to bite 
was the hostility displayed by the soldiers. Since they were not offered a 
percentage of anything they seized, their interests were diametrically opposed to 
those of the Militiamen. 1^9 The Jasikan District Secretary recalled that he had 
been forced to defuse clashes between the Army and the Militia on more than 
one occasion. 130 In Likpe itself, Militiamen were subjected to harassment, as the 
PDCs had been. The difference was the authorities were more willing to 
investigate the facts of a case and, if necessary, to support the Militia. The latter 
scored a significant victory in Mate towards the end of 1986, when one of the 
most notorious soldier-smugglers was arrested following Militia complaints that 
he had released some goods they had seized.
Within the Hohoe and Jasikan District administrations, there was agreement that 
the Militia had helped to significantly reduce smuggling over 1985/86. This is 
difficult to prove, but it is consistent with perceptions in Likpe itself. But this 
came at some cost to local goodwill. A contradiction that underlay the activities 
of the Militia is that if they became too successful they risked putting themselves 
out of business. There were signs that this was happening towards the end of 
1986, at a time when the Bakpele were inclined to avoid Togo anyway for 
political reasons. 131 Together with seasonal fluctuations in smuggling, this 
sometimes left the Militiamen with little work and the threat of a reduced 
income. They were therefore tempted to seize goods indiscriminately on the
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grounds of intent to break the law. The Abrani chief spoke for many when he 
voiced his concern about Militia activities:
"If the Militia are doing honest work, they are doing the correct 
thing. But I don't think they are very sincere. They are not paid. I 
think that if the CMB paid them, the corruption would decrease. 
Recently, the Militia were complaining that they had seized loads of 
cocoa, but the buying season had_ended and they couldn't get their 
money, and they were hungry,"!32
The chiefs and village worthies especially resented the pretensions of 'small 
boys', who had often been avid smugglers up until the time they enlisted in the 
Militia. Nana Soglo Alio III was blunt on this point, tarring the CDR and the 
Militia with the same brush:
"The CDRs are interested in border checks and smuggling and 
that's all. Now the Militia is being trained by the Army and the 
CDRs are under a different set-up, but the Militia are supposed to 
be the police of the CDRs. And since the Militia have no pay, its an 
extortion unit. I think they get 50%. What I see of the CDR question 
is that its becoming a problem, because we don't get decent people 
joining the CDRs or the Militia. Its the riffraff who join the Militia.
Any new organisation like that starts with the ruffians and the 
unemployed."!33
But hostility was not confined to the chiefs. It was often as pronounced amongst 
the youth, who objected to Militiamen from nearby communities throwing their 
weight about in villages that were not their own. Matters came to a head in 
mid-1986 when the young men of Abrani retaliated against the Militia for an 
assault on one of their number. On this occasion, they were only spared a beating 
because of the intervention of the Abrani chief. ^ 34
Towards the end of the decade, the Militia were subjected to stringent public 
criticism for alleged involvement in criminal activities across the country. Much 
of this criticism emanated from PNDC officials, who even hinted that the outfit 
might be disbanded. This is indicative of a shift in the balance of power within 
the Rawlings regime. For a time, the PNDC was prepared to use parallel 
institutions, like the PDCs, the Militia and the Public Tribunals, because it could 
not rely on the existing state machinery. Having achieved some of its objectives 
and restored some order to the bureaucracy, the regime began to revert to a more
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conventional model of interaction between state and civil society. The Militiamen 
and the cadres were starting to outlive their usefulness.
7.3. Conclusion:
The evidence that has been advanced in this Chapter adds up to at least a partial 
vindication of Government policy during the Rawlings years. The regime began 
by repeating most of the errors of the previous decade in the space of a single 
year, but learned to respond more imaginatively to situations as they arose.
It has already been argued that the scope for smuggling functioned as a 
safety-valve by alleviating endemic shortages and propping up rural incomes.
Yet successive governments have failed to see it that way. In 1982, the Rawlings 
regime was more determined than ever to choke off illicit trade using all the 
coercive might at its disposal. It was more optimistic than its predecessors in the 
sense of believing that it was possible to enlist the support of border peoples. 
According to the official script, state and community were supposed to fight 
alongside each other against the kings and queens of kalabule, The regime had 
manifestly misunderstood the makeup of rural society, since smuggling involved 
the whole spectrum of border society, and the youth most of all. Moreover, the 
PNDC had not addressed the underlying causes of smuggling or solved the 
idiosyncrasies of the state apparatus. Consequently, the PDCs were able to 
deliver very little. The use of indiscriminate force had some of the intended 
effect, but undermined everything else the PNDC set out to achieve.
After 1983, the PNDC adopted a fundamentally different strategy for dealing 
with border communities and their covert activities. It relied on a devaluation of 
the currency to wring many of the financial attractions out of the black market. It 
paid the cocoa farmers a more remunerative price for their crop, whilst removing 
all price controls on food crops. And finally, the PNDC reverted to the 
performance of the most basic functions of state, such as reconstructing roads
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and building bridges. The result was that commercial activity began to pick up, 
sucking the outlying villages back into the orbit of commercial centres such as 
Hohoe, Jasikan and Kpandu, Under these conditions, the Bakpele were able to 
start adapting to the decline of cocoa as the mainstay of the local economy, by 
cultivating rice instead. The Volta Region, in short, underwent an experience 
which was very similar to the dislocation and adjustment that followed the 
partition of the Togolands.
At the same time, the PNDC reorganized the security apparatus and enlisted the 
services of the unemployed youth in the People's Militia. As a result of this 
unorthodox pincer movement, smuggling ceased to be as lucrative and became 
more risky than before. In 1990, more than three years after fieldwork, Rawlings 
was able to announce that the prevailing trend since the 1950s had been 
terminated and that cocoa was now being smuggled into Ghana - "an ironic 
reversal of what pertained in the past". 136 This is an indication that the state and 
border communities were now pulling in more or less the same direction for the 
first time in decades.
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Chapter Eight:
'People's Power' and Local Responsibility:
The Bakpele and the Matter of Democracy, 1982-86
What was lacking in the early 1980s was not the inclination on the part of rural 
dwellers to engage with the state, but the apparent inability of the latter to 
perform its side of the deal. The inauguration of the Third Republic had elicited a 
positive if guarded response in 1979, but the corruption, and more importantly 
the ineptitude, of the Limann administration had taken much of the gloss off 
multi-party politics two years later. The incoming Rawlings regime professed to 
embody something unique in the Ghanaian historical experience. As a 
revolutionary government, it claimed to belong to neither of the conventional 
moulds - military or civilian - although it embraced members of both 
constituencies. The '31st December Revolution' was intended to cut through the 
failures of the past thirty years, and to usher in a 'people's democracy' with its 
centre of gravity at the base of the social pyramid. Whereas Ghana had been 
governed under an 'administocracy' for most of the years since independence, 
and indeed before then, the PNDC aimed to open up avenues for mass 
participation at the village level. Local bodies would, in turn, would lock into 
higher tiers so as to forge a single political structure.
In 1982, the primary agents of popular power were the People's and Worker’s 
Defence Committees (P/WDCs). In subsequent years, the Rawlings regime 
downgraded these bodies and abandoned much of the revolutionary rhetoric, yet 
insisted that its aim remained one of restoring power to the grassroots. This 
glossed over a significant departure from the revolutionary phase. Instead of 
trying to reshape the local environment, the PNDC began to concentrate on 
working through the many local institutions which were already in place. This 
Chapter traces Bakpele reactions to PNDC initiatives over a five year period. 
Because the political reforms were at a comparatively early stage of
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implementation when fieldwork was completed, the conclusions are necessarily 
tentative.
8.1. From ’People's Power* to Local Democracy
The commitment of the Rawlings regime to the building of
alternative political structures was contained in the preamble to the PNDC policy
guidelines:
"The national struggle has a very important corollary and this is the 
struggle for a new democracy. The content of this struggle is to 
place power in the hands of the people and to ensure their genuine 
participation in the decisionmaking process."1
The emphasis upon mass participation was partly a defensive posture. Having
toppled a duly elected government, the onus was on the PNDC to demonstrate
that the structures of the Third Republic were in some sense flawed. It also
reflected genuine disillusionment with the operation of imported political
models. Supporters of the '31st December Revolution' argued that elections had
repeatedly paved the way for the entrenchment and enrichment of a wealthy
minority. As Rawlings saw it a couple of years later:
"In the search for a democratic system of government, much has 
been made of Western parliamentary institutions. Our experience in 
this country provides enough evidence to show that in their actual 
working, those institutions are dominated by the interest of the rich 
and influential members of society. The vast majority of the 
population, of the ordinary citizens, have always been left without 
any control over their so-called representatives... That is why the 
people, in their practical wisdom have rejected this sham 
democracy."2
As in the Libyan model, the P/WDCs were supposed to supplant representative 
institutions with mechanisms for a participatory democracy.^ The PDC 
Guidelines of April 1982 even limited the size of local executives, on the grounds 
that they might otherwise be tempted to usurp the prerogatives of the 
rank-and-file.^ The District, Regional and Interim National Co-ordinating 
Committees (INCC) were initially appointed from above, but the intention was 
that they would ultimately be democratized - presumably as a result of
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community PDCs sending delegates to higher councils. At the end of the process, 
the INCC was to fuse with the PNDC, thereby completing the political circuit.
There were other reasons why a participatory model was attractive to sections of 
the ruling coalition. One of these has already been dealt with, namely the 
invaluable contribution that politically conscious citizens could make towards 
the enforcement of social controls. A second was the importance of mass 
mobilization for meeting basic development objectives. Since the state apparatus 
was manifestly overloaded, much of the initiative for alleviating communal 
squalor and rehabilitating local amenities had to come from the 'people'
'I themselves. A final factor was the preclusion of a vanguardist alternative for the 
radical wing of the regime. Neither the June 4 Movement (JFM) nor the New 
Democratic Movement (NDM) had established much of a following outside the 
Regional capitals. Their influence within Government was also closely 
circumscribed. Although Atim and Akata-Pore sat on the PNDC, it convened 
only spasmodically, while the Ministries were in the hands of committed 
reformists.^ The INCC and later the National Defence Committee (NDC) was left 
as the epicentre of JFM activity. The leadership was aware that it could only 
strengthen its own hand by making the P/WDCs a live presence in all parts of 
the country. With the weight of the 'people' behind them, the radicals believed 
they would be in a better position to steer policy in the direction they desired.
During the early months of 1982, a veil of ambiguity surrounded the activities of 
the PDCs. The scourge of kalabule had become such a stock-in-trade of political 
debate that ideologically disparate groupings momentarily seemed to share a 
language and common concerns. It quickly transpired, however, that the INCC 
perceived the enemy in class terms and not simply as that minority which had 
misused public office or profited from the parallel economy. The first set of PDC 
Guidelines, which bore the imprint of the JFM, made this clear:
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"Chiefs, Moneylenders, Landlords, Absentee Farmers, Tractor 
Owners, Transport owners, Smugglers, discredited politicians, 
thieves, embezzlers of peoples funds, kalabule people, and such 
characters are banned from forming defence committees."6
According to Atim and Gariba this followed repeated attempts by members of
the dominant class to 'hijack' the PDCs and to remove their s tin g / In July the
INCC was replaced by an expanded NDC under the chairmanship of Rawlings,
who unsuccessfully sought to open the PDCs to all G hanaians/
As the year progressed, the debate over economic policy was mirrored by an 
equally heated exchange over the P/WDCs. Incidents such as the workers' 
takeover of the Ghana Textile Printing Company and raids on lodge houses 
provoked criticism from within the Government as well as from outside i t /  
Rawlings increasingly distanced himself from the confrontational stance of many 
P/WDCs and from the NDC militants who were suspected of incitement. 
Defenders of the P/WDCs have claimed that the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank induced the PNDC to rein in the more radical initiatives/6 
The published comments of the Bank suggest that the WDCs were indeed 
regarded as a barrier to sound economic m anagem ent/! It is also true that the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) tended to promote a technocratic 
approach to development.
From the end of 1982, when the so-called 'ultra-leftists' were purged, the political 
content of the P/WDCs was progressively emptied. Whereas the WDCs had been 
formed to represent the interests of workers, greater importance was now 
attached to raising productivity and maintaining discipline at the work-place/^ 
The PDC Guidelines were also amended in 1983 to allow anybody to join 
provided they subscribed to the objectives of the revolution and had "a proven 
record of patriotism, integrity and democratic practice"/^ Elaborating on the 
reasons for the amendment, Rawlings observed that:
"The character and commitment of the individual is more important 
than the class from which he or she comes from or the position he 
or she holds"!'*
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The new Guidelines continued to project the formation of a new ruling council 
out of a hierarchy of popularly elected PD Cs.^ But even this was set aside the 
following year. The purges of late 1982 had displaced the JFM and created an 
opening for supporters of the rival NDM, but their relationship with the PNDC 
was soon strained by the unrelenting pursuit of austerity. In 1983, Rawlings 
warned of the NDC becoming a parallel source of authority and it therefore came 
as no surprise when the entire structure was overhauled at the end of the
following y e a r .
The P/WDCs were redesignated as Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution (CDRs) in order to underline the point that the ‘revolution’ had a 
home for anybody who was prepared to contribute towards the national 
recovery effort. More importantly, the NDC was replaced by a CDR national 
secretariat (headed by an appropriately named Political Counsellor for the 
Economic Development of the CDRs) which was attached to the Office of the 
PNDC. Henceforth there was to be no doubt that the CDRs were an instrument of 
central authority rather than an autonomous political force. Finally, all references 
to the CDRs as the building blocks of a new political order were excised from the 
revised Guidelines.
Nevertheless, Rawlings and his colleagues insisted that their mission remained to 
serve as the midwife of a new political dispensation. In November 1984 the 
National Commission on Democracy (NCD) was reconstituted under the 
Chairmanship of Justice D.F. Annan, a member of the P N D C .A m o n g s t  its 
responsibilities, the NCD was mandated to collate expert and public opinion on 
the political experience of the past thirty years and to make recommendations on 
the path towards a 'truly democratic' order. Although the regime professed to 
have an open mind, it did not wait for the NCD to report before pursuing its 
decentralization plans, which had first been tabled in December 1982. In common 
with multilateral institutions and a growing body of development experts, the
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PNDC contended that the centralization of power from the colonial era onwards 
had impeded the efficiency of the state apparatus and inhibited local initiative.^ 
It proposed two remedies. The first was the reintroduction of elected local 
government, which had never really been given a chance to succeed. The lowest 
tier was to consist of Town/Village/Area (TVA) Councils. The middle tier of 
District Councils was to constitute the operational unit of local government. 
Finally, elected representatives from the District Councils would sit on Regional 
Councils which would perform a co-ordinating and planning function.^
The second remedy was to decentralize the Ministries (with some obvious 
exceptions)^ to the Regional and District levels where their operations would 
fuse with those of the respective Councils. Since the PNDC aimed at something 
more than deconcentration, it proposed the replacement of the existing national 
budget (based on the projected expenditure of individual Ministries) by a 
composite budget, representing the total cost of the District Council 
program m es.^ The 1982 version of the programme also envisaged that the PDCs 
would furnish the personnel to run the local government m a c h i n e r y .^  in its later 
incarnations, the CDRs were allotted no specific role. The modalities for the 
District elections provided a mechanism for appointing CDR members to the 
one-third share of unelected seats. But the remainder were to be filled by open 
election.^
Although there may be little excitement to be derived from the supervision of a 
village market or the construction of a KVIP toilet, the PNDC argued that it was 
real improvements in living standards that m attered.^ The reforms were also 
hailed as a step towards empowering the 'people1 to determine their own 
development priorities. Yet it was obvious that they did not add up to a 
fundamentally new dispensation in themselves. The work of the NCD in 
exploring the alternative for national structures consequently remained as 
important as ever. The Rawlings regime was, however, ensnared in a 
contradiction between the requirements of the ERP and the imperatives of open
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political debate. To encourage debate was also to invite criticism of the recovery 
programme. Under pressure, the PNDC jammed the lines of communication 
leading from its urban constituency, whilst posing as the champion of the rights 
of the voiceless rural majority. The change of emphasis was most clearly 
embodied in The Rural Manifesto, which was launched amidst some publicity in 
1984.^6 The document expounded a simplified version of the urban bias thesis, 
claiming that the urban working class had participated in the exploitation of the 
peasantry:
"As far as members are concerned, the masses of Ghana and indeed 
of Africa live in the rural areas. There is no doubt that a portion of 
the masses live in the urban areas - described mainly as the urban 
poor. The organised urban workers, because they are articulate... 
claim to speak for the working classes. The claim is grossly 
erroneous since the majority of the working classes who happen to 
live in the rural areas have little or no say in the cities where 
negotiations for salaries, wages, prices of commodities and other 
social benefits are carried out between government, management 
and the organised urban working classes. As a group, both the 
urban rk h  and poor have exploited the majority in tne rural 
areas..."27
This was an interesting commentary on the uneven dimensions of civil society: 
coherent in the towns, but lumpy in the countryside. The implication was that the 
PNDC should pay less attention to the howls of urban protest, while pushing 
ahead with decentralization and essential economic reforms. In the longer term, 
the solution was to assist the peasantry to defend its own comer. The regime did 
try to manufacture a counterweight to the Trades Union Congress in the guise of 
the Ghana Federation of Agricultural Co-operatives (GAFACO-OPS), with whom 
it chose to negotiate on producer prices.2® But GAFACO-OPS failed to attract 
significant rural support. Moreover, its leadership was dominated by 
personalities such as Martin Appiah-Danquah, who had been prominent in the 
United Ghana Farmers' Council. Their Nkrumahist schooling inclined them 
towards statist solutions that were an anathema to the PNDC In 1987, a 
committee of enquiry was set up to look into charges of corruption and four 
years later the Federation was disbanded altogether. The result was that the 
PNDC was prevented from engaging in a corporatist balancing act.
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In its efforts to iron out the contradictions, the PNDC adopted a style of 
governance which bore a striking resemblance to the ideology and procedures of 
the colonial state. The regime accused its critics of advancing vested interests 
under the cloak of the national good, much as the colonial authorities had once 
pilloried early nationalists. The PNDC also revived the conservative precept that 
political development was an organic process that could not be accelerated 
without damaging the fragile roots of a political system. The Lugardian school of 
colonial administration had envisioned the construction of a national 
government on the foundations laid by a sound Native Authority structure. The 
PNDC did not share quite the same obsession with chiefs, although the latter 
were re-admitted to local government, but otherwise the assumptions were 
strikingly similar. Consistent with the premise, the PNDC claimed that it was 
unable to specify a date for the unveiling of a new political package or to reveal 
the likely nature of its contents. In July 1987, the Government did announce that 
District Assembly elections would be held at the end of the following year. But 
the NCD was expected to distil the lessons from the performance of the 
Assemblies before carefully proceeding to the next stage. A third similarity was 
that, in spite of its professed commitment to democratic local government, the 
PNDC was determined to maintain a firm grip over local administration. The 
voluntarism of 1982 was quietly abandoned, as the PNDC settled back into a 
tested prefectoral mode. The District Secretaries, like their colonial and CPP 
predecessors, served as the operative link between rural communities and the 
state. They were expected to maintain law-and-order, communicate government 
policy down the structure and implement official directives within their Districts. 
The People's Militia and the CDRs both functioned as the eyes and ears of the 
District administration.
A final echo was an insistence on the strict limits of public expenditure. Colonial 
Governors were expected to finance administration through a combination of 
direct and indirect taxes, since the metropolitan state was unwilling to foot the 
bill. The Rawlings regime was subject to its own external restraints in the shape
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of the IMF, but had concluded anyway that the expansion of the state tended to 
stifle productive activity. In the short-term, the PNDC could enforce stricter 
financial discipline, but its ambition in the longer term was to transform 
Ghanaian political culture. The hidden agenda behind the decentralization 
scheme was the liberation of the state from many of its accumulated 
responsibilities. District Assemblies were expected to finance government 
services through improved revenue collection, except in the provision of 
education, health and highw ays.^ In 1987, Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu was explicit 
on this point:
"The District Assembly will manage part of the national 
government finances; and when this is done efficiently and 
properly, it will support the national government in the sense that 
the work load at the top will be reduced particularly with the 
implementation of the decentralisation programme. This will help 
to initiate and sustain development at the local level so that people 
do not shift the burden of developmentinto some father 'ABAN' 
who stays far away, perhaps in Accra."^
All of this begs the question of who stood to gain. It is difficult to detect a cabal of 
class or ethnic interests working through the regime. For that reason, it is 
tempting to describe the PNDC as Bonapartist. Nevertheless, Government policy 
did help to recreate an environment in which the Ghanaian bourgeoisie 
(including its Anlo component) could find its feet.
8.2. The Bakpele and the Changing Tides
Having charted the passage of the '31st December Revolution' since 1982, the 
next step is to examine how the Bakpele responded to the events unfolding 
around them. Since so much of the debate has turned on the performance and 
potential of the PDCs, it is appropriate to consider their impact in some detail.
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8.2.1. Death by Natural Causes: The PDCs in Likpe
The first year of operations divides into an early phase when the PDCs were 
being installed and a subsequent period of consolidation. The first set of PDC 
Guidelines denotes the transition. When the call to form PDCs was first issued, 
the response was decidedly patchy. They sprang up more or less spontaneously 
in the cities, but a certain amount of prompting was required in the countryside. 
In some areas such as Berekum, the Student Task Force took the initiative in 
registering members and supervising the early vetting procedures.31 In Dodowa, 
the PDCs were formed after the visitation of an official d e l e g a t i o n . ^  The PDCs 
often gained a foothold where they could attach themselves to existing 
constituencies. In Akropong, they served as a means by which the youngmen 
could strike back at the chiefs. And in the Volta Region, the PDCs of Leklebi 
Agbesia and Logba Vuinta became embroiled in a long-running land dispute 
between these villages.
In the case of Likpe, the advent of 'people's power' was fairly undramatic, mainly 
because the call to arms failed to strike a chord. In his radio broadcasts, Rawlings 
repeatedly stressed that the purpose of the PDCs was to enable Ghanaians to take 
their destiny in their own hands. Yet the community had already taken the lead 
in planning local development and even administering its own informal system 
of justice. Whereas the residual power of the chiefs in the Akan heartland lent 
itself to the mobilization of the youngmen, this was much less true of Likpe, The 
Bakpele had appropriated the overt symbols of Akan chieftaincy, but in most 
respects the institution was closer to the Ewe model. As has been noted, authority 
was not so much attached to the stool as constructed afresh by each incumbent. 
The wisest strategy a chief could adopt, therefore, was to seek the co-operation of 
elders as well as the youngmen. A trial of strength was seldom successful in the 
long-run and risked the ultimate threat of destoolment or (more commonly) the 
withdrawal of consent.
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As has been seen, the Bakpele youth was preoccupied with a struggle for 
survival when so many options had been foreclosed. Their reaction to adversity 
was for the most individualistic. That is, the youth had become used to making 
the most of circumstances, rather than engaging in political action to change 
them. A contrast between the civic consciousness of the older generation and the 
anomie of youth is one of the most striking features of Likpe at this time. 
Secondly, the Bakpele chiefs did not control any stool land, although some land 
was brought under chiefly supervision in 1982 in order to arrest Togolese 
encroachment. Thus they could not be accused of commandeering local resources 
for their own benefit. Thirdly, since the crisis had adversely affected all sections 
of the community, it was difficult to lay the blame on a class of local 
accumulators. The political dynamic was probably slightly different in Hohoe, 
where a group of wealthy individuals dominated trade, controlled local transport 
and owned much of the fixed property. Finally, the youngmen of Likpe were not 
immune to the schisms which were endemic to each village. Hence they tended 
to burst onto the scene as an organized group in response to a specific issue, only 
to disband again under countervailing 
pressures.
In most cases, PDCs were formed when the chiefs beat gong-gong and 
announced that the Government had issued instructions for changes to take 
effect. They were responding to perceived pressure from above. Although no 
delegation was received, the Regional Secretary let it be known that he expected 
a rapid response. One PDC Chairman recalled that:
"The PDC in Mate was formed in early 1982. It was constantly
announced that PDCs should be formed in every town. The
Government would step in if any town did not accept the idea."34
The chiefs responded more because they wished to avoid accusations of 
obstructionism than out of a Machiavellian desire to subvert the PDCs. Their 
influence over the selection procedure varied. In Kukurantumi, the executive was 
selected at the house of the chief and was simply submitted to a meeting of the
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village for ratification.^ in Bala four members were chosen by the people of the 
village, while the chief and elders added three appointees of their o w n .^
A distinctive feature of the early PDCs was that they mirrored the clan 
composition of each village. Although there was little enthusiasm for the PDCs, 
nobody could be sure of how much influence they might come to wield. In order 
to preserve a rough balance of power, therefore, each clan added a member to the 
executive. They typically chose educated men who would be equipped to defend 
their specific interests. In Mate, the first Secretary was a school teacher of about 
thirty years of age, while the Chairman was a retired white-collar worker recently 
back from the city. In 1983, the latter was ousted by Mensah Lemboe who had 
been the Matehene prior to his conviction. The ousted Chairman went on to 
replace Lemboe as the new Matehene,
The village of Agbozome yielded a different pattern. The impetus here did not 
come from the chiefs, but from the youngmen who had lost patience with the 
bickering between the three chiefly factions. In their view, village development 
had suffered because the chiefs were unable to put their differences behind them. 
Thus, the Vute and Basio clans had withdrawn from the Town Development 
Committee (TDC) and had refused to contribute finance or labour towards the 
construction of a new s c h o o l .T h e  driving force behind the PDC was a man in 
his fifties, who succeeded in gaining the backing of about 50 young men and 
women in the village. The PDC emerged as the one body that was able to 
straddle the divide between the clans, as he later explained:
"We would have had three PDCs, so we grouped together in unity.
Anyone who was elected was for the three towns^But we saw to it
that at least two members came from each town."^°
Thus, in spite (or because) of their desire to heal the wounds, the Agbozome 
activists themselves engaged in a delicate balancing act between different clan 
interests.
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Once established, the PDC executives needed to carve out a niche. By mid-year 
they were emboldened by NDC directives to assert their independence. The 
previous Chapter dealt at some length with the constraints upon PDC 
involvement in price control and border surveillance. It is necessary merely to 
re-iterate that the PDCs tended to moderate their activity at the point when they 
risked unpopularity. Several PDCs did, however, claim competence over the trial 
and punishment of petty offences. The theft of crops was a charged issue, and 
became steadily more so after the repatriation of many Bakpele from Nigeria in
1983. There were a number of stand-offs between the chiefs and the PDCs, which 
culminated in a resounding victory for traditional authority. In Abrani, for 
example, the PDCs established a court to try people caught growing or smoking 
'wee'. They were forced to disband after the chief made clear that they had no 
jurisdiction.^ Hence the overall record of the PDCs in the sphere of social 
control was not, on the whole, very encouraging.
The prime target for a PDC takeover bid was in the field of community 
development, which ranked highest in the priorities of almost everyone. The 
April 1982 Guidelines enjoined the PDCs to take the initiative and this they tried 
to do. However, most villages already had an active TDC, which in many cases 
had been in operation for half a century and had a long list of achievements to its 
name. As in other parts of the country, a trial of strength ensued.4^ The PDCs 
demanded that the TDCs give way because they bore the imprimatur of the 
PNDC. When the chiefs sided with the TDCs, this usually settled the matter 
because the PDCs did not have a cohesive following of their own. The humbling 
of the Mate PDC was recalled by the former Chairman as follows:
"We tried to abolish the TDC. We were not giving them a place. We 
gave them the impression that they no longer had a role. We should 
rather tell them what to do. But it didn't work because Nana Soglo 
was very strong. His argument was that the TDCs were set up 
under Nkruman's regime and were still going, so they could not be 
abolished just because a new government came to power."41
The Abrani chief similarly remembered putting the PDC in its place:
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"I didn't allow it. I surpassed that controversy. They said that the 
TDC would have to die out. I called the two parties together and 
told the PDCs that in town development matters they could help 
the TDC but they were not to take over."42
The PDCs did not always give in so easily. In Bala, the PDC organized its own
day for communal labour over and above the demands of the TDC ,4^ But as in
the Berekum District, the duplication of TDC activities was unpopular because it
placed an excessive burden on the villagers. The one category of project reserved
for the PDCs was the communal farm. In some areas, these appear to have been
quite large. The Ministry of Agriculture registered a PDC farm at Sovie-Kudzra
which covered as much as 40 acres.44 But in Likpe, because there was insufficient
land the farms were seldom much larger than an acre - dimensions that were
hardly likely to inspire awe or enthusiasm.
In 1982, the most significant initiative was the commencement of the Likpe and 
East Buem Mini-Hydroelectric Project. The plan had originated before the coup 
in the offices of the Architectural and Engineering Services Corporation (AESC), 
where an Indian employee had advocated damming the Dayi River at 
Kukurantumi. The project, which was endorsed by the Ministry of Fuel and 
Power in early 1982, was supposed to provide "electricity, pipe-borne water, fish 
farms and some recreational facilities."4^ The first phase was to electrify 
Kukurantumi, Abrani, Koforidua, Agbozome and New Ayoma. Under the 
second phase, power was to be extended to Mate, Bala, Bakwa and the rest of 
East Buem.4^ The Ministry arranged funding from the Indian Government, while 
nearby communities were expected to provide the physical labour. From April 
onwards, people from as far afield as Kute came to Kukurantumi to contribute 
their share of communal labour. Significantly, this work was co-ordinated not by 
the PDCs, but by the respective TDCs.
There were a few cases in which the PDCs fared slightly better. Where the 
relations between TDCs and chiefs were strained, the PDCs sometimes reaped 
the benefits. In Koforidua, the chief had abolished the TDC because he claimed it 
was ineffective and failed to keep proper accounts.4^ Another interpretation is
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that he perceived the TDC as a threat to his own authority. It was difficult for 
him to justify taking the reins of village development under his personal control, 
so the PDCs provided a convenient ally. In Kukurantumi, the vacillating 
character of Nana Agyeman n  bred confusion about the division of 
responsibilities. Before the revolution, the chief had accused the TDC of usurping 
his authority and of failing to keep proper accounts.^ The TDC Chairman 
replied that he was paranoid about a possible destoolment plot.^9 When the 
village PDC was formed, Nana Agyeman claimed that it was intended to replace 
the TDC and he proceeded to steer all development work through the new body. 
The TDC then lapsed into inactivity until 1985.
These early victories did not, however, work to the ultimate advantage of the 
PDCs. For a start, the latter did not endear themselves to the villagers by allying 
with unpopular chiefs. Moreover, they soon came in for criticism in their own 
right. In Kukurantumi, the PDC inherited the revenue derived from fines placed 
on stray animals in the village. Before long, villagers were complaining that the 
PDC had slaughtered many of the animals and could not account for money that 
had been collected. The PDC also became embroiled in a bitter dispute between 
the chief and his subjects. The catalyst was an incident towards the end of 1982, 
in which the asafoatse had incited local youths to take revenge against some 
Policemen for repeated harassment. The asafoatse was arrested and later died in 
Police custody. Nana Agyeman was blamed for having handed him over instead 
of assisting his escape to Togo.^O When a new asafoatse was chosen, he used his 
position as leader of the youngmen to countermand the authority of the chief. As 
a result, the youngmen of all clans refused to obey requests for communal labour 
which emanated from the chief and the PDC. Most of the work carried out on the 
dam was organized by the asafoatse instead.
Agbozome arrived at the same destination through a very different route. For the 
first time in many years, the leadership provided by the PDC made it possible to 
involve the whole village in development work. This prepared the ground for
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reconciliation in 1984, when a Grand Council for Agbozome was set up. It 
consisted of the three chiefs, together with three elders from each side. The 
Chairman was elected for a year, during which time the whole village was 
expected to obey calls for communal labour. Alongside the Grand Council a new 
TDC was established, consisting of five members from each side. The PDC, 
having performed its mediating function, thereafter assumed an auxiliary 
function.
One other PDC activity which was highlighted in the PDC Guidelines and which 
deserves mention, is political education. By mid-1982, a political infrastructure 
had been put in place. Beneath the appointed Regional and District 
Co-ordinating Committees, the branches united to form a Likpe Zonal PDC. This 
was manned by a Chairman from Agbozome and two other executive members 
from Mate and Abrani. The limbs of the structures did not, however, receive 
enough exercise. It does not seem as if Likpe was visited by cadres from the 
Regional or District offices (although the Regional Secretary was once invited to 
Mate). The onus was on local activists to explain the objectives of the revolution. 
Since the JFM had not enlisted support outside of Ho, and certainly none in 
Likpe, the PDCs were unclear of the message they were expected to convey. As 
often as possible, they travelled to Jasikan and reported back, but they generally 
refrained from initiating political debate. Their dilemma was re-iterated by a 
CDR member some years later:
"Really we've not been giving political education as such. Even 
though we are literates, we consider it a bit dangerous to give 
political education without a mandate from the senior people. If we 
had guidelines from the top we could work. Otherwise people will 
say that is w hat you have to say and that is not the policy or the 
Government." ^ 1
The evidence from Likpe suggests, therefore, that the PDCs had failed to sink 
roots long before the PNDC redefined the meaning of 'people's power'. They 
failed to offer anything the Bakpele did not already have, and they found it 
difficult to win the support of the youth. When they came into conflict with
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existing sources of power at the village level, the verdict was never in doubt. 
Whereas the weakness of the rural PDCs has commonly been attributed to
between urban-based conceptions of revolution and the everyday concerns of 
communities such as Likpe. If there was a failure, it arguably lay with the 
revolutionaries rather than the rural population.
Nonetheless, the PNDCchd certainly did little to assist the PDC/CDRs to 
overcome their teething troubles. Often they were encouraged to take a lead in 
planning local development, only to be reminded that they were expected to 
concentrate on outlining Government policy. The confusion over roles helped to
establishment of TV A Councils towards the end of 1985 sealed the fate of the 
CDRs. The Chairman of the Western Likpe Area Council was Nana Akototse and 
his counterpart in Eastern Likpe was Emilson Kwashie, an influential school 
inspector from Mate. The Bakwa Village Council was similarly run by local 
'heavyweights'. In 1986, the CDRs lacked not only a following but increasingly a 
leadership as well. In Kukurantumi, the CDR had effectively been reduced to a 
single individual. In Mate, the elderly brother of the Matehene had to be drafted 
in because nobody else was willing to serve as Chairman. In Agbozome, the 
subsequent collapse of the Grand Council had not only divided the TDC, but 
split the CDR as well. In many cases, the most diligent PDC members defected to 
the TDC. In two villages where the CDR still functioned, namely Bakwa and 
Todome, this was mainly because of an overlap in membership. The CDRs were 
therefore no match for the combined strength of TDCs and Area Councils, a point 
that was driven home through a series of incidents in 1986. In Bala a CDR 
Chairman who refused to participate in communal labour was brought before the 
Area Council court and fined. In Mate the CDR members were pointedly 
excluded from TDC finance meetings. When the young Secretary suggested that 
the CDRs should have a say in the appointment and destoolment of chiefs, he
deficiencies of political consciousness/ ^ 2  it is essential to observe the disjunction
perpetuate a struggle for power in some communities,^^ But in Likpe the
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was formally reprimanded before a village meeting and fined for his 
presumption.
The CDRs were only saved from extinction by the intelligence requirements of 
the regime. In successive stages between 1983 and 1985, the CDRs were 
re-organized in order to solidify the base of the structure. The Likpe Zonal PDC 
was dismantled and two new secretariats were created - one for west Likpe and 
the Buem villages of Old and New Baika, Teteman and Nanankor, and the other 
for the rest of L i k p e . E a c h  Zone was allocated a number of paid officials whose 
task was to collect information, through five sub-committees, and to forward 
regular reports to the District authorities. Those who filled these positions 
understood that their function had fundamentally changed:
"Formerly we were defending the communities; now the CDRs are 
defending the revolution. So sometimes the CDRs don't mind so 
much the affairs of the community. They are now for the 
Government." 5 5
Yet the expropriation of the CDRs does not necessarily imply the extinction of 
avenues for local participation.
8 .2 .2 . Two Cheers for the PNDC: Bakpele Reactions to 
Reform
After 1984 Government policy began to strike the right kind of note. Whenever 
officials expatiated on the need to reform local government, they met with a 
receptive audience. The Bakpele were particularly aggrieved at their treatment by 
the Jasikan District Council, which was accused of commandeering local revenue 
- a criticism that was endorsed by the District Secretary, U.S. Clarke The 
partition of the Kpandu District in 1979 had reopened the debate about the 
intensity of historic and economic links with Hohoe. Nana Agya Mensah and 
Nana Soglo Alio had opposed joining a new Hohoe District on the grounds that 
they were not Ewe, but this counted for much less once Akpafu and Lolobi made
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the move. In October 1982, therefore, the Likpe Traditional Council formally 
announced its intention to join the Hohoe District, explaining that Jasikan was 
too remote and that the community had been starved of its rightful share of 
resources.5^ Much of the animus towards Hohoe was henceforth directed at 
Buem. The breakway of the Buem villages from the United Rural Bank was one 
source of irritation. Another was the revival of the hegemonic pretensions of 
Buem. In 1986, the translation of the Bible into Lelemi was at an advanced stage, 
fuelling demands for the replacement of Ewe as the language of the church in 
this part of the Region.5** During the same year, Nana Akototse (who was under 
attack in Abrani) alerted his former rival, Nana Soglo, to the expansionist 
ambitions of the Buem Paramount Chief.
The PNDC postponed a final decision on an administrative home for Likpe until 
the demarcation of 110 new Districts had been completed, but it did make one 
concession. From the end of 1985, Likpe shared a member on the Hohoe District 
Council in rotation with Santrokofi, while retaining representation on the Interim 
Management Committee of Jasikan District Council. The uncertain future of the 
community further weakened its claims on District finance, as U.S. Clarke 
observed:
"We at the Jasikan District now feel reluctant to spend money on 
development in Likpe area, because we are aware that it might be 
leaving to join Hohoe District. So they should make up their mind 
what they want."™
Yet the PNDC did provide the community with greater leverage in its dealings 
with the District headquarters. At the end of 1985, Likpe acquired three new TVA 
Councils: Bakwa Village Council, East Likpe Area Council (Mate, Avedzeme,
Bala and Todome) and West Likpe Area Council (Agbozome, Koforidua, Abrani 
and Kukurantumi). These Councils were guaranteed half of the revenues 
collected within their localities. This enabled them to put hard cash behind the 
plans of the respective TDCs, whose membership often overlapped. In September 
1986 the TVA Councils received their first remittances from Jasikan, consisting of 
<£27,000 for the East Likpe and <£23,000 for the West Likpe Council.^ Although 
these were modest beginnings, they engendered a mood of optimism for the first
302
time in years: for once at least the flow of resources seemed to be in the right 
direction.
Although all eyes were firmly fixed on development within Likpe, most Bakpele 
harboured opinions on the wider performance of the Rawlings regime. During 
innumerable informal discussions as well as more structured interviews, 
informants expressed a broadly favourable attitude towards the PNDC and what 
it was seeking to achieve, although many were still hedging their bets - "its not 
wise to praise a day in the morning-time" as one sceptic put it. Whereas the First 
Republic was treated as a golden age, the PNDC was credited with making the 
most of an imperfect world. It was perceived as a government of action, 
contrasting with the unfulfilled promises of the Acheampong years and the 
paralysis of Limann. On the other hand, there was no indication that the PNDC 
was viewed (positively or negatively) as an Ewe regime. This was as much due to 
the behaviour of the PNDC as to the fracturing of identity. Apart from the 
Nkrumah regime, there was no other serious contender in the Bakpele popularity 
stakes. (Table 8.1).
Table 8 . 1
Response to Question: ’’Since Independence Which Government 
Has Had the Most Creditable Record in 
Office ?"
Regime First Choice Second Choice
Number % Number %
CPP 188 65.5% 83 28.9%
NLC 0 0 .0 % 5 1.7%
PP 0 0 .0 % 3 1 .0 %
SMC 1 0.4% 6 2 .1 %
PNP 0 0 .0 % 3 1 .0 %
PNDC 93 32.4% 182 63.4%
Don't know 5 1.7% 5 1.7%
Total 28 1 0 0 .0 % 287 99.8%
(Source: survey of Likpe, 1986)
303
There was even some sympathy for the contention, which was bandied about by 
Government officials, that the military had to be a full partner in any future 
dispensation (see Table 8.2).
Table 8 . 2
Response to Question: "Which Political System Do You Think 
Would Be Best Suited to Ghana ?"
Civilian Military Mix Don't Know Total
Number 37 1 0 0 147 3 287
Percent 13% 34.8% 51,2% 1% 1 0 0 %
(Source: survey of Likpe, 1986)^
Although the Bakpele response was positive, there was a clear divergence of 
opinions on fundamentals aspects of the reform programme. The first concerned 
the funding of community development. Although the District Councils (later 
Assemblies) were supposed to establish a solid foundation for the entire political 
structure, they were subjected to acute financial hardship in 1986. The TVA 
Councils began to absorb a share of local government revenue at the very 
moment when central government was clawing back its financial commitments. 
After a decision to halve the state contribution to District Council salaries, the 
Jasikan District Council was forced to restrict its staff to a four-hour working day, 
while other Councils resorted to summary d i s m is s a l s . ^  Not surprisingly, the 
morale of Council employees greatly suffered. Since the Bakpele were 
ill-disposed towards District authority anyway, these difficulties provoked little 
anguish, but the impact upon Government objectives was potentially serious.
Ultimately, the only solution was to raise the ceiling on local taxation. At first 
glance, the burden in the Jasikan District may appear slight. In 1986 the basic rate 
for adults over the age of 18 years was 0 1 2 0  per head: the price of a bottle of beer. 
But many were forced to pay up more than once since the Militia was in the habit
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of mounting surprise road-blocks and demanding to see tax receipts. This was a 
time when most people Bakpele were already shouldering additional 
responsibilities. An increase in school fees in mid-1986, backdated to the 
beginning of the year, required parents to pay an extra <£2,300 per ch ild .^  
Similarly, market-oriented reforms had escalated the cost of medical services. 
Towards the end of 1985, consultation fees at Hohoe hospital stood at £50 for 
adults and <£30 for children. The comparable charges at Bakwa health clinic were 
<£30 and <£20 respectively.^ These did not include separate charges for laboratory 
tests and drugs.
Furthermore, the Bakpele were making 'voluntary contributions' towards a series 
of local projects. For example, <£200 was levied on each man and <£100 on each 
woman in Bala in order to finance extensions to its Middle S c h o o l .  6 6  The Likpe 
Traditional Council had also earmarked three projects of its own in June 1985.
One was a new block of classrooms for the Likpe Secondary School, at an 
estimated cost of <£2 million. By the end of the year, that target still seemed a long 
way off (see Table 8.3). A second was the construction of an operating theatre for 
the Bakwa clinic, at a cost of <£500,000, which was required for upgrading to 
hospital status. An equivalent sum was needed to build new offices for the Likpe 
Traditional Council. The total of <£3 million could only be raised within the 
community. To that end, a further <£100 was levied on each adult male and <£50 on 
each woman in Likpe. In short, the existing burden was such that the Bakpele 
could not sustain significantly higher tax obligations. The Jasikan District Council 
attempted to square the circle in 1986 by requesting each TVA Council to 
cultivate 50 acres of cassava.*^ The Ghana Export Promotion Council was 
supposed to export the cassava chips to neighbouring states and to divide the 
proceeds between the TVA and District Councils. Yet the Bakpele were almost as 
saturated with demands for labour as for money, quite apart from the shortage of 
land. Thus the villages of Mate and Todome only managed to cultivate 4 acres 
between them, out of a target of 25 acres.
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Table 8.3
Financial Contributions Towards LISEC From Likpe Villages, 
April 1981-December 1985 (tf)
Village Target Amount raised Arrears
Agbozome 1 0 , 0 0 0 2,700 7,300
Bala 1 0 , 0 0 0 3,001 6,999
Mate 1 0 , 0 0 0 1 0 , 0 0 0 0
Bakwa 1 0 , 0 0 0 2 , 0 0 0 8 , 0 0 0
Nkwanta 5,000 580 4,420
Todome 5,000 5,000 0
Kukurantumi 1 0 , 0 0 0 1,150 8,850
Abrani 1 0 , 0 0 0 2,400 7,600
Avedzeme 3,000 1,500 1,500
Koforidua 6 , 0 0 0 0 6 , 0 0 0
Total 79,000 28,331 50,669
(Figures from "Likpe Traditional Council Affairs", personal files of 
Nana Soglo Alio III)
Although the Bakpele were not averse to self-help, as the record clearly shows, 
they retained a conception of development as a partnership between community 
and state. The expectation was that once the community had demonstrated its 
willingness to make sacrifices, central government would step in to reward local 
efforts with additional finance or expert advice as appropriate. Instead, the 
PNDC repeated a message which was familiar from the days of British 
administration, namely that it was beyond the ability of the state to commit 
limited resources to projects that could best be carried out by the villagers 
themselves. In 1986, it even appeared as if the PNDC was reneging on existing 
commitments. The fate of the mini-hydroelectric project was a case in point. A 
coffer dam had been completed by communal labour in 1984 and the following 
year it was reported that equipment had been imported from India in time for the 
commencement of the next phased® At the end of 1986, the project remained at a
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standstill. While the AESC blamed the villagers for failing to build secure
premises to house the equipment, the Secretary for Fuel and Power suggested
that the entire project might have been m is c o n c e iv e d .^  This experience, together
with the slow progress on other fronts, exacted a heavy toll on morale. According
to Nana Akototse, the Chairman of the East Likpe Area Council, there were
definite signs of development fatigue:
"At the time of LISEC, we were all eager to build it to the standards 
set by the Ministry of Education and men to put the ball in the 
Government’s court. But now the Government says there is no 
money to build anything and the people are no longer interested.
Despite the fact that the Government is educating us on mobilizing 
ourselves for communal labour, people are fed up with all these 
things. People expect the Government to put up new buildings.
Local people are fed up with having to do so many things. They 
attend for fear of being fined, but the enthusiasm was not what it 
used io be. And because of black pod, people have no money to 
pay."7^
Although the PNDC was mining for an authentic indigenous tradition on which 
to build, there was a strong leaning towards statist solutions in Likpe. The 
Bakpele had ceased to produce much cocoa, and so were less affected by 
government taxes on that crop. On the other hand, because the local economy 
remained in crisis, the Bakpele felt they deserved government assistance. The 
harsh realities partly explain why mention of the CPP evoked such fond 
memories during fieldwork.
The second area of misunderstanding, which was not quite as bruising in its 
implications, concerned the appropriate conduct of Government officials. 
Although much political baggage had been discarded at the end of 1982, the 
PNDC remained determined to break the mould of clientelist politics. Political 
appointments were made in such a way as to establish a rough balance between 
ethno-regional, gender and occupational constituencies, but the incumbents were 
expected to remain aloof from special interests. This explains why the PNDC 
failed to tackle the devastating effects of sea-erosion at Keta in spite of the family 
origins of Kojo Tsikata and Rawlings himself.
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When Dr. Obed Asamoah was appointed Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1982, 
apparently on the advice of Tsikata, he was expected to obey the rules like 
everybody else. On the other hand, the Bakpele hoped that he would intercede 
with central authority and they still saw that as his duty four years later (see 
Table 8,4). In local perceptions, this was not tantamount to endorsing corruption 
since what was wanted was for Dr. Asamoah to oil the wheels of a sluggish 
bureaucracy. The Government had after all conceded the existence of a problem 
by nominating PNDC members and Secretaries to oversee the completion of 
specific projects. Dr. Asamoah had himself been given custody of the 
Kukurantumi mini-hydroelectric project.
Dr. Asamoah was placed in a predicament. If he was over-zealous in taking up 
local issues, he exposed himself to allegations of abuse of office. Yet to ignore the 
pleas of his people risked the destruction of a political base that he had cultivated 
over two decades. Dr. Asamoah erred on the side of caution, intervening only 
when he was unlikely to attract adverse publicity. He was credited with the 
introduction of a daily bus service between Kute and Ho via Mate. But because 
he was reluctant to expose himself further, he was blamed for the 
non-completion of the mini-hydroelectric scheme and of the Likpe Water Supply 
Project, which had been on the verge of fruition since 1983.7  ^The scrupulous 
honesty of Dr. Asamoah and other PNDC officials is noteworthy in the annals of 
recent Ghanaian history. But the implications for his own political career were 
potentially serious. One informant offered the following prognosis:
"Asamoah says he is not playing party politics now, so he won't do 
anything about these local concerns. As a result, the people are 
angry with him. He will be sorry since Government will have 
nothing to show for itself over here... We were just worrying about 
ongoing projects which had never been completed, but because of 
his reaction we don't go to him anymore . " 7 2
Behind this tale rests a serious political point. The PNDC had suspended politics
at the national level in an effort to divert attention to local theatres. But important
though local government might be, people in Likpe understood that it was an
ability to unravel the mysteries of the central state machinery that really counted.
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The Bakpele were demanding of Dr. Asamoah no more than was reasonable to 
expect of an elected representative, which he once had been: that is, to hold the 
centre to its promises. Their approach was more in tune with the realities of 
bureaucratic inertia than the some of homilies that emanated from the centre.
Table 8*4
Response to Question: "'If Someone From Likpe Is Not Elected to 
Represent the Area, But Is Nominated to a Ministerial Post, It 
Would Be Wrong for Him to Use His Influence to Benefit His 
Area . 1 Do You Agree?"
Agree Agree
Strongly
Disagree Disagree
Strongly Total
18 9 96 164 287
6.3% 3.1% 33.5% 57.1% 1 0 0 %
(Data from survey of Likpe, 1986)
Finally, the Bakpele were deeply concerned about control over the means of
coercion, an issue which seldom intruded in official discourse. In spite of genuine
efforts to come to terms with the aspirations of border peoples, there remained a
tendency to regard the latter as habitual criminals. In 1985, Dr. Asamoah himself
felt compelled to make a public speech at Hohoe in defence of the rights of
border communities.7^ The crux of the matter was that there was often little that
villagers could do if they were assaulted or deprived of their possessions,
because the Government was still chary of subjecting the Army to public scrutiny
- although they were more likely to be brought to book than before. Aside from
issues of national security, the PNDC remained acutely aware that its authority
was underpinned by the military. Thus, in the words of one informant:
"We are exposed to disturbances and harassment by the Policemen 
and so on. People are beaten and their movement is restricted. For 
example, they detain you when you go to farm. They beat first, ask 
questions later. We don’t normally drag these matters up; we just 
forget them because they will only tell you they are sorry ." 7 4
The deployment of the Militia as tax-enforcer and as deterrent against smugglers
may have been astute but it further alienated local opinion. There was more at
stake than the methods employed by the Militia. What baffled members of the
309
older generation, in particular, was that the Government should seek an alliance 
with 'small boys' who were often regarded as little more than petty crooks. In 
their view, the function of the state was to arrest criminals and not to unleash 
them on the innocent.F eelings often ran deep. The last word is left with a 
characteristically pugnacious Nana Agya Mensah, who has served in the course 
of this thesis as the bell-weather of Bakpele attitudes:
"We are not in occupied territory, so what are the soldiers supposed 
to be doing? They are misusing their power. If they abided by their 
regulations, there would be no trouble. But now we are under 
military occupation... We know a man by the imprint he bears. Who 
appointed the CDRs? It was a military government. And their first 
born is the Militia... They have legalized these people to rob us.
Who put them there? They did and nett the people. The only 
solution is to have a general election." 7 6
8.3. Conclusion:
In 1982, there was a widespread feeling that the drift in national affairs could not 
be allowed to continue. Whereas rural dwellers could grow their own food and 
even find alternative markets for their cash crops, urban wage-earners were 
caught in a spiral of falling incomes and mounting shortages. The revolution 
therefore began in the cities, from where an attempt was made to spread the 
message of national salvation to the villages. In 1982, the regime was not content 
merely to ensure the passive consent of the peasantry, but wanted to implant 
new political structures in the smallest of villages and to draw the latter into 
centre.
This Chapter has demonstrated that communities like Likpe did not necessarily 
respond as the leadership of the NDC imagined they would. The PDCs certainly 
came to Likpe, but they did not conquer. For the most part, they were redundant. 
Although they were supposed to channel the energies of rural youth, the latter 
tended to exhibit the least interest in political solutions, particularly when these 
got in the way of the struggle to make a living. There have been precious few 
studies of the PDCs, but it is likely that the pattern in Likpe recurred across the
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countryside and especially along the borders. The PNDC seems to have received 
the message. It did not abolish the PDCs, but turned them into the long-arm of 
the District Secretary. However, the centre of activity consisted of a familiar 
coalition of chiefs and TDCs, the uses of which the PNDC came to appreciate.
In place of the revolution, the Rawlings regime endeavoured to sell the vision of 
a decentralized governmental structure, in which rural communities would 
control decisions over key areas of their lives. The Bakpele were enthusiastic 
about financial support for local initiatives, but were sceptical about the grand 
vision. Although the PNDC postulated a conflict of interests between the noisy 
urbanites and the long-suffering peasantry, the reality was that the latter shared 
many of the same attitudes towards the state. The Bakpele wanted the 
Government to provide better amenities, motorable roads and employment. The 
PNDC wanted to cut back on public spending and to shoulder as many 
responsibilities as possible onto local government bodies. In 1986, one had a clear 
sense of d&ja vu, listening to a dialogue of the deaf between government officials 
and local residents. The echoes came from piles of correspondence in the files of 
the Togoland administration. Nevertheless, the PNDC had done enough to 
address local concerns for a dialogue still to be possible.
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Conclusions:
"Since Britain was not sure what would become of such 'Trust 
Colonies' the British were obviously not interested in its 
development for fear that it might be taken away from them. The 
net result of this lackadaisical attitude of the British led to the 
Region being starved of development which also led to the massive 
migration o f the enterprising people to other parts of the country 
where conditions were relatively better, to seek greener pastures... 
Then came the 1956 plebiscite and the question was finally resolved 
but then the harm had already been done. The success story of 
those who had left came trickling in and provided the stimuli for 
others to leave. Perhaps this explains why today Voltarians are 
found in every nook of the country. After Independence in 1957 
also came the secession threat; the echoes of which are still being 
heard today. This also contributed in no small measure to the 
lacking behind [sic] of the Region in terms of development of 
infrastructural base for any meaningful economic development... 
[Let] me take this opportunity to disabuse the minds of some 
people who think that the people of the Volta Region are 
smugglers, litigants and prone to violence and who on the slightest 
provocation resort to arms as a means of settling scores... I would 
like to take this opportunity to assure all Ghanaians and the whole 
world that the People of Volta Region are peace-loving and law 
abiding just like any other people in this country ." 1
As with every research project, this study proceeded on the basis of a set of 
working assumptions - in this case, derived from an emerging literature on the 
relationship between African states and societies. This literature portrayed the 
state variously as disaggregated, personalized (as opposed to 
rational-bureaucratic) and 'soft'. On the other hand, it depicted African societies 
as localized, relatively cohesive and 'uncaptured'. The composite picture was one 
of fragile centres desperately fighting to overcome the centrifugal forces at their 
respective peripheries.
The problem was that this picture did not conform to the realities encountered in 
the field. The Ghanaian state appeared to be in better health than recent reports 
might have led one to expect. Governmental institutions were much in evidence 
at the District level and seemed reasonably effective in straddling the physical 
and mental distance from Accra. Nevertheless, it became apparent in the course 
of research that, while administrative breakdown had never been imminent, the 
previous decade had indeed seen a hardening of the institutional arteries. What I
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was witnessing, therefore, was a regeneration of the state machinery, which was 
by no means complete in 1986.
What was more noteworthy was the strong sense of belonging to a national
community. The Bakpele seemed to exhibit no particular aversion to dealing with
local embodiments of the state. Moreover, they clearly operated within a frame of
reference with was common to their compatriots at the opposite end of the
country: they often supported the same football teams, attended the same
churches and waited every Saturday for the same set of lotto results beamed out
of the capital by the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation. After a couple of months
of posing carefully crafted questions that elicited incomprehension or vague
amusement, it became obvious that the starting assumptions were in need of
closer scrutiny. Having retraced my steps, I found that earlier researchers had
recorded similar observations to my own. Dunn and Robertson, for example, had
remarked of Ahafo that:
"The affairs of the nation as a whole are followed keenly on 
transistor radios and a in a town like Goaso 200 to 300 
English-language newspapers may be sold daily. There can be few 
Ahafos who lack an awareness of the geographical and political 
unity of Ghana...."2
The authors had also noted en passant that the citizens of Ahafo described both 
the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta as 'French territory', an insight into the 
’otherness' created by colonial boundaries.3 Again, Fred Hayward had occasion 
to remark on advanced levels of national awareness, even in comparatively 
remote rural areas.4 In a survey conducted in 1970, he found that 43% of 
respondents received news regularly by means of the mass media, and in 
particular by radio.5
Yet these studies were published before the onset of the most intense phase of the 
economic crisis, and the attenuation of state power which accompanied it in the 
second half of the 1970s, If the same features were still in evidence a decade later, 
then one had to ask more searching questions about the importance of the state to 
the process of national integration: did central authorities ever 'build' the nation,
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had the state merely created the pre-conditions for the emergence of more 
embracing identities, or did integration taken place outside (and perhaps even in 
spite of) the state? This line of questioning underlies the issues examined in the 
body of this thesis. By way of conclusion, it remains to draw together the threads 
of the component sections, which addressed a number of subsidiary questions 
along the way.
1. The State and the Politics of Integration
The study was divided into three Parts, each of which corresponded to a broad 
phase in the trajectory of the Ghanaian state.
Part One, which examined the struggle between unificationists and 
integrationists, was set against the backdrop of a transformation in the ideology 
and structures of the state. For the greater part of the colonial period, an 
incumbent Governor was expected to administer his realm on a virtual 
shoe-string. Where possible, responsibility was devolved onto Native Authorities 
which, in the Indirect Rule tradition, were expected to administer justice, raise 
their own taxes, and finance their own local 'services'. It was shown in Chapter 
Two that British administration was more than usually parsimonious in 
Togoland, because the future of the territory was in question and because it 
promised less reliable returns upon the outlay of public finances. Yet the United 
Nations territory was fused administratively with the Gold Coast and subjected 
to a common tariff structure. This required the construction of basic 
infrastructural links to the west of the Volta River, in order to reorient the 
territory which still faced towards Palime in 1919. The prime objective was to 
administer Togoland as cheaply as possible and not (until the 1940s, anyway) to 
inculcate new modes of consciousness. Nevertheless, the environment created by 
British rule drew the territory inexorably into the economic, social and ultimately 
the political orbit of the Gold Coast. With time, it became possible for 
Togolanders to conceive of themselves in new ways.
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The reality of creeping integration on inferior terms, lies behind the confusing 
array of political platforms which emerged after the Second World War. The 
unification movement originally arose to protest against partition of the Ewe 
people, but significantly the All-Ewe Conference remained wedded to the 
principle of continuing membership of the Gold Coast. This betrayed its 
following amongst the Anlo elite. The movement ran aground in the Trust 
Territory on account of a belief that the Gold Coast Ewe were monopolizing 
access to scarce scholarships and jobs, as well as reaping the benefits associated 
with the expansion of the cocoa industry. The Togoland Congress could 
plausibly claim that a precondition for greater prosperity was to establish a 
healthy distance from the Gold Coast and to restore links with French Togoland. 
Yet the Congress was vulnerable to a flanking action by the Convention People's 
Party which joined in blaming the British for uneven development, but was also 
in a position to promise Togolanders a better deal in return for an acceptance of 
full integration.
A desire to catch up explains why the statist solutions of the CPP found a 
receptive audience in the former Trust Territory. As was seen in Chapter Three, a 
similar logic applied to politics within the Region. Many communities had been 
punished for their refusal to co-operate with British am algam ation policy. The 
minorities had been especially reluctant to do so, because what the authorities 
counted as an administrative convenience raised emotive issues of group 
identity. In several instances, minorities vigorously asserted their distinctiveness 
vis-a-vis the Ewe; the Bakpele were unusual for having split down the middle. 
The end result was the same, since resistance to the Atando Native Authority 
hardened the attitude of the administration. By the early 1960s, the constraints of 
a land-short economy created an additional imperative for employment beyond 
the confines of Likpe. The enthusiasm with which the minorities seized upon 
expanding educational opportunities is remarkable. Already by the time of the 
1960 census, the Central Togo groups had the highest rates of literacy (48.2% as 
against a national average of 23.2% and 31.4% for the Ewe) and the highest levels
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of school attendance in the country . 6  This provided a springboard for entry into 
state employment, which expanded markedly under the CPP: in the schools, the 
civil service, the auxiliaries of the Cocoa Marketing Board and the Army. It was 
at this time that Likpe also produced its first cohort of University graduates, 
several of whom made their mark as professionals. This array of factors, all of 
which were firmly grounded in material circumstances, best explains the 
instrumentalist political behaviour to which Maxwell Owusu has drawn 
attention in another context.
Yet it is important to note that unification politics involved much more than a 
struggle over economic spoils. Many members of the older generation gravitated 
towards the Ablode camp because of a desire to recapture a golden age associated 
with the era of German rule. In Likpe, several Congress activists had participated 
in the Togo Bund during the 1930s for the very same reason. On the other hand, 
the most avid CPP supporters were younger, better educated males for whom the 
Gold Coast was the focus of attention. Personal ambitions played a part, but at a 
more mundane level these educated youngmen simply filtered their experiences 
through a lens which had been appropriated from the colony. Rival 'imaginings' 
therefore competed and did not always come with the price tag attached. That 
the second steadily gained ground was to have been expected. The robust tactics 
of the Nkrumah regime after independence merely accelerated the 
decomposition of a movement which was unable to outgrow its original social 
base. As was argued in Chapter Four, the 1969 election results are perhaps more 
significant for signalling the death-knell of the unification movement than as a 
measure of the depth of ethnic cleavage.
By the 1970s, the shrinking fiscal base of the state created a gulf between official 
ideology and the practical realities that confronted Ghanaians every day. Part 
Two examined the net impact upon interactions between state and community in 
the Volta Region. The Acheampong regime bought short-term support by 
embarking on high profile development programmes, of which Operation Feed
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Yourself was but the most famous example, and by making lavish promises of 
state assistance to the Regions. Most of the schemes came to grief, as the 
operating procedures of the state became increasingly warped by the 
demoralization of underpaid government employees and the abuse of public 
office. The Ghanaian state eventually ceased to perform a number of its most 
basic functions, such as the maintenance of trunk roads and bridges, which even 
the minimalist incarnation of the colonial state had seen to.
/
Chapter Six used the case of Likpe to illustrate the decline of the state as a 
credible source of patronage. Following the frustrations of the Second Republic, 
the elevation of Major-General Utuka to a position on the Supreme Military 
Council understandably raised expectations. Yet in the end Utuka proved 
incapable of cutting a path through the maze of vested interests which hindered 
the completion of government projects. From this episode the Bakpele derived
If political behaviour had been entirely instrumental, one would have expected 
the citizens of the Volta Region to exhibit renewed interest in union with Togo, 
where economic and social conditions were showing distinct signs of 
improvement. In fact, TOLIMO singularly failed to re-activate the networks that 
had once serviced the Togoland Congress. It fell victim to many of the same 
contradictions which had undermined the latter and was ultimately unable to 
develop a programme with broad popular appeal. The eclipse of TOLIMO was 
the final act in the unificationist saga. Smuggling certainly proliferated along the 
eastern frontier, which it is tempting to interpret as a covert expression of 
popular protest. It was argued in Chapter Five, however, that smuggling was 
more of a substitute for political expression: it furnished a much-needed source 
of indome for the landless youth and made available a range of essential 
commodities which were otherwise unobtainable. Even then, what is striking is 
the level of ambivalence displayed towards smuggling in Likpe, especially on the 
part of older farmers and chiefs who blamed its incidence for theft and moral 
decay.
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the lesson that there were limits to what an individual patron could achieve in 
the midst of such a free-for-all. They then proceeded to apply the lesson to the 
1979 elections. Dr. Asamoah was deserted by many of his people, who calculated 
that the People's National Party was most likely to succeed in putting the affairs 
of state back on even keel. The Bakpele participated in this poll less out of an 
expectation of material reward (an unlikely prospect by now) than an interest in 
the trajectory of national politics. By way of qualification, it has nevertheless to be 
noted that civic consciousness was more fully developed amongst members of 
the older generation than the youth, whose scepticism was not tempered by 
memories of better times. This anomie may have posed a danger over the linger 
term were it not for the coup of 31 December 1981.
Part Three dealt in some detail with efforts to recast the relationship between 
state and society during the Rawlings years. The PNDC was not content simply 
to govern a quiescent rural population, but equally it had limited resources with 
which to entice the latter into taking a part in the revolution. Indeed the PNDC 
needed to tap the energies and resources of the countryside more successfully if 
it was to find a way out of the crisis it had inherited. During 1982, the PNDC 
relied on political measures to cope with a bewildering range of pressing 
problems. In the villages, the PDCs were expected to act as political watchdogs, 
to eradicate ’economic crimes' and to mobilize local resources for the purposes of 
development. In important respects, the PDCs were a substitute for an integral 
state. Chapter Seven examined the campaign against smuggling and concluded 
that the PDCs had failed to make a lasting impression. Whereas the PDCs were 
supposed to galvanize the rural youth, the latter were the most likely to be 
implicated in smuggling and other infringements of the law. The PNDC had 
done very little to redress the conditions which nurtured the panoply of 
'economic crimes'. Furthermore, the Border Guards and Police subjected the 
PDCs to persistent harassment. Chapter Eight went further and demonstrated the 
inability of the PDCs to offer anything significantly new in competition with an 
alliance of chiefs and Town Development Committees. In sum, the PDCs failed to
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deliver to central government a secure foothold in the villages.
From 1983, the PNDC embarked on a political experiment which amounted to a 
retraction of the state whilst persisting with the effort to bind centre and 
periphery. The campaign against smuggling involved judicious use of the market 
to wring the vitality out of the parallel economy and to attract trade back into 
officially sanctioned markets, at the same time as recruiting the unemployed 
youth into the People's Militia. Through this pincer movement, the PNDC was 
able to establish a firmer grip over the frontier economy, without incurring the 
difficulties associated with more direct methods of state control and without 
alienating border peoples. On the political plane, the PNDC endeavoured to 
build structures through which the rural population could articulate their own 
interests in competition with the more vocal urban population. In other words, 
the PNDC was aiming to deepen civil society in the countryside. Paradoxically, 
this meant stifling the political expression of a range of institutions perceived as 
obstructive, including the trade unions, the press and even the churches. There 
were some indications in 1986 that the Rawlings regime had overestimated the 
conflict of interests between town and country. In Likpe, at least, the ongoing 
crisis within the local economy fostered an outlook which was sympathetic to 
statist solutions. There was broad support for the local government initiative, but 
mainly because it was seen as devolving responsibility from the District to the 
locality. The ability of the PNDC to have its cake and eat it - that is to create a 
more articulated polity around a minimalist state - still had to be proven in 1986.
The principal conclusion, therefore, is that the growth and reproduction of a 
national community that embraced Togoland, was not contingent upon the state. 
The latter merely set the parameters within which new social bonds could be 
forged by local elites. This conclusion has more in common with the perspectives 
of Kimble and Benedict Anderson than it does with the modernization paradigm 
and most of the recent literature, with the exception of Bayart. It is heartening, 
since it suggests an in-built element of cohesion that could compensate for the
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decay within formal institutions. Lest this appear an excessively sanguine 
conclusion, it would be appropriate to return to some of the factors which 
academic analysis has conventionally regarded as subversive of the integrity of 
African polities.
2. African Societies: The Strength of Centrifugal Forces 
2.1. Localism as Parochialism
A staple of many local studies is the depth of attachment to lineages, villages and 
stools in Ghana. At different junctures, this study has found itself in agreement 
with and dissenting from some of the generalizations that have been drawn from 
this corpus of material. Where I have parted company with Brown, Coleman and 
others is over the implication that local attachments are not only deep but 
determinant. It was argued in Chapter Three that, while Likpe (like Kpandu) 
may be viewed as a seething mass of factional struggles, these did not determine 
the positions which the Bakpele adopted on the unification question. To be sure, 
party politics broadly replicated the pattern of alignments in the Atando dispute, 
but the latter turned on issues of communal identity which transcended earlier 
cleavages. If there was continuity, that was because cognate sets of issues were 
involved in the first instance. Later, the battle came to be fought along lines that 
were roughly speaking generational, rather than factional. Indeed, it was only 
after the unification question had been decisively settled that succession to the 
Likpe Stool became a serious bone of contention.
To suggest that the Bakpele selected their political preferences on the perceived 
merits of the case clearly does not imply that local attachments were 
insignificant. The writings of Naomi Chazan are anomalous in that they appear 
to have forgotten some of the key lessons that were taught by local studies. 
Although central government ceased to command access to substantial material 
resources during the 1970s, the state remained the repository of information and
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procedures for deciding between rival claimants for chiefly office. It is no 
exaggeration to suggest that 'traditional’ institutions were validated by official 
practices. Chazan mistakes vitality for autonomy. If for no other reason, it made 
little sense for rural dwellers to withdraw from the state. In the case of Likpe, for 
example, the Acheampong regime was required to arbitrate in a series of local 
disputes, most notably in Agbozome. The correspondence hoarded by Nana 
Soglo Alio III is tangible evidence that the 'exit option' was never seriously in 
contention. In a nutshell, then, national politics has always consisted of more 
than the sum of its factional parts, although the latter have been weaved into the 
fabric from time to time.
(b) 'Hereditas Damnosa?: The Perils of Ethnicity
Ethnicity is often regarded as a serious threat to the cohesion of African states, 
even if few analysts would accept that 'tribes’ are in any sense primordial. A 
recognition that 'tribes' have been manufactured, often with a striking degree of 
audacity, arguably does not make ethnic conflict any less cause for concern. In 
the case of Ghana, the 'Ewe problem' has been the most frequently debated 
variant on the national question. The reason is not just that the Ewe are divided 
by a frontier, but also that they are perceived as unusually solidaristic. This 
image of the Ewe has been convincingly disputed by David Brown.7 The 
evidence tabled in this thesis carry his argument one step further.
What is striking about the 1940-50s is precisely the lack of a clear sense of Ewe 
solidarity, for reasons that have already been alluded to. Although the behaviour 
of the Volta Region electorate in the 1969 elections has commonly been explained 
in ethnic terms, some of the most eminent Ewe politicians were in fact rebuffed. 
Conversely, those who were elected to constituencies in the former Trust 
Territory were the representatives of a newly emergent elite (often graduates) 
who were precisely the most cosmopolitan in outlook. And while the 
Acheampong regime was happy to exploit Ewe stereotypes, there is no evidence
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to suggest that they were any more cohesive in the 1970s than they had been two 
decades before. The internal politics of the Region divided along a north-south i 
axis which cut through the Ewe. There is more mileage in the notion of Anlo 
solidarity, but even this has revolved around ties of kinship and friendship j 
forged in Keta - the operative units being face-to-face rather imagined /
communities. ‘
Where this study has broken new ground is in examining the dilemmas of the 
Central Togo minorities. From the time of British amalgamation policy onwards, 
these communities have struggled to define themselves in relation to much larger 
(albeit notional) ethnic blocs. There were many Bakpele in the 1940s who were 
prepared to claim they were close cousins of the Ewe in terms of history, 
language, political institutions and a patrilineal social structure. Nana Agya 
Mensah took issue with this and largely as a result of the campaign launched by 
the Likpe Grand Council, it became fashionable to claim an entitlement to the 
Akan mantle. During the early 1960s, Likpe actually imported an Akan model of 
wing chiefs and linguists. A decade later, the Bakpele were involved in a further 
process of ethnic redefinition. The experience of the Second Republic 
discouraged the Bakpele and their neighbours from identifying too closely with 
groupings which were perceived as either Ewe or Akan. Some chiefs and 
intellectuals flirted with the idea of membership of a Guan culture. At the same 
time, the Buem and the Bakpele took steps to translate the Bible into their 
respective languages, which is often seen as the first step towards ethnogenesis. 
The salient point is that the vagaries of national politics and the deflation of state 
capacities have combined to fragment the ethnic map of the Region. The fluidity 
of political attachments, and even of something as basic as identity, have in turn 
imparted a flexibility to the Ghanaian system which is not always appreciated.
(c) Artifice and the Artificiality of Boundaries:
Two observations are commonly made about African boundaries. The first is that
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they are artificial in the sense that even where they do not cut across pre-colonial 
polities, they often segment discrete culture areas. 8  The second observation is 
that African boundaries have demonstrated a remarkable resilience, Jackson and 
Rosberg have explained this apparent paradox by invoking the norms of 
international relations. Often the movement of populations and the trafficking of 
goods are taken as evidence that African boundaries retain a dubious legitimacy.
At several points along the way, this study has had occasion to question 
conventional wisdom. The paradox is more apparent than real. Although the 
Ghana-Togo boundary is clearly a construct, it has acquired a permanence that is 
rooted in popular consciousness as much as in the codes of practice prescribed by 
the Organization of African Unity or the United Nations. The original frontier 
between the Gold Coast and German Togo, which had existed for no more than 
thirty years, proved devilishly difficult to redraw. The network of infrastructure 
and patterns of trade had been moulded to fit the geographical limits of Togo. 
Moreover, there were many Togolanders who had acquired an attachment to that 
territorial unit. If this had not been so, the Togoland unification movement would 
never have posed such a barrier to integration.
Sylvanus Olympio and his allies asserted that the frontier was an affront to the 
Ewe, but as members of the Working Party on the Conventional Zone were to 
discover, they were not complaining about a physical barrier. Indeed, there were 
many Ewes who had a vested interest in the maintenance of the frontier, which 
was highly porous. Throughout this century, border populations have valued the 
freedom of action which their location has bestowed upon them. They have been 
able to buy the cheapest consumer goods and to sell their agricultural products at 
the most remunerative prices. Contemporary academic literature interprets this 
kind of behaviour as a cunning ploy to exploit the weakness of the state. What is 
less often appreciated is that the same communities also use the state to secure an 
advantage at the expense of neighbours on the other side of the frontier. 
Governments tend to be infinitely malleable on account of their sensitivity to
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questions of national sovereignty. Following Ghanaian independence, 
communities on either side of the frontier attempted to expel 'strangers' from the 
lands, which they had hitherto been guaranteed access to. The Bakpele villages of 
Mate, Todome and Bala had been deprived of land in this way. In the 1980s, the 
Bakpele enlisted the support of the military to arrest further Togolese 
encroachment. Conversely, the villagers of Danyi exploited the vulnerability of 
Bakpele smugglers and often robbed them of their wares. Although members of 
the two communities intermarried and visited each other's markets, the 
relationship was often fraught. In this way, arbitrary lines on a map have been 
etched into popular consciousness. Frontiers like the one between Ghana and 
Togo survive precisely because they have been translated into mental frontiers.
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Appendix:
Questionnaire Conducted in Likpe, November 1986
L The Rationale:
What follows is the text of a questionnaire which was administered to 320 people 
across Likpe towards the end of 1986. The object was to gather information across 
a wide range of subjects, from details of educational background, through data 
on farming activities, to political attitudes. Of the total, 287 sets of responses were 
utilized. The rest were excluded for a variety of reasons:, some were ambiguous, 
incomplete or contradictory. Others were not used because it transpired that the 
respondents belonged to the same immediate family, which would have 
distorted the results.
2. Text of Questionnaire:
"This survey for a Ph.D Degree in Politics, is divided into two sections. Section A 
is concerned with questions about agriculture proper, while Section B is designed 
to elicit the views of farmers about national politics and their role in Ghanaian 
society. Answers should be ticked unless something more is called for.
NAME:...............................................
HOME TOWN:................................ .........
AGE:................................................
SEX*
DATE OF INTERVIEW............... ...................
Section A
1 . What is your level of education?
(a) None................. (b) Secondary................
(b) Primary.............  (e) Post-Secondary...........
(c) Middle.............. (f) University................
2. Do you have sources of income outside farming?
If so, what are they?...................................
3. Which of the following crops do you have on your farms 
this year?
(a) cocoa................. (b) maize............
(b) coffee................ (i) rice (swamp or upland?),..
(c) oil palm  (i) groundnuts...............
(d) plantain  ( k )  vegetables........... ....
(e) cocoyam   (1) others (specify).........
(f) cassava  (g) yams.....................
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4. How many acres ("16x16") do you have under food crops at home?........
How many acres do you have under food outside the area?
(Specify type of crops)................................
5. Fo you have sufficient land for your food crop needs?....
6 . Do you think you would have coped with the 1983 shortages better if you had 
more land for food?................
7. If you have a land shortage, when did it start?.........
8 . Have you rented or bought any land outside the area? If so, where and for 
what purposes?........................
9. Do you employ labour regularly for your food crop farms?...
If so, what type of labour do you employ and for what tasks?................
1 0 . How would you describe the adequacy of the food you produce?
(a) self-sufficient  (c) have a regular shortfall.......
(b) need only to buy the crops you domt produce.........
11. Do you sell food crops regularly?...................
If so, what crops do you sell? and to whom?.....
12. In relation to other goods on the market, such as cloth and roofing sheets, 
would you say that food prices since 1970 have
(a) risen...  (b) risen steeply............
(c) stayed more or less the same  ..... .....
(d) fallen  (e) fallen sharply.........
13. What would you say is the greatest constraint on your ability to increase food 
production?
(a) lack of land  (b) infertility of land.......
(c) difficulty of finding markets  ...... .
(d) lack of credit  (e) lack of labour  ....
(f) other....,......
14. If you are a cocoa farmer, how many farms do you have in each of the 
following categories, and how large are they (in local acres?)
(a) inherited...............  (...........acres)
(b) planted yourself  ( acres)
(c) by dibi, as landowner  ( acres)
(d) by dibi, as labourer.... (........... acres)
15. When did you first start planting cocoa?
(a) before 1930.............................. .......
(b) between 1930 and the end of the War.
(c) between the end of the War and independence.......
(d) between independence and 1970...........;........
(e) since 1970.......................................
When did you stop planting cocoa?....  ...........
16. Do you still have sufficient land to make new farms?....
17. How did you acquire the land on which you have planted cocoa?
(a) inherited family land   (b) purchased land.......
(c) stool land   (d) dibi land............
(e) other............ .
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18. Do you have a permanent cocoa labourer?.........
If ves, how many do you have. and how are they paid?
(a) fixed price per load................
(b) one-third..........................
(c) one-half...........................
(d) other............................ .
19. This year will you employ any daily   or contract labour?
20. What work do you yourself do on the cocoa farms?
(a) look after complete farm (s).....................
(b) help in clearing  ..........................
(c) help in spraying.................................
(d) help in harvesting...............................
(e) nothing.. ...................................
2 1 . At your peak labour time, on average how many days per week and
hours per day do you spend on your cocoa?
22. Have your farms been badly affected by the 1983 drought.... and black 
pod?.........
What yield did you receive last year from your farms?....
What yield would you have received around 1980?.........
23. Have any of your cocoa labourers recently left because of drought and black 
pod?..,...........................................
Do you now offer any incentives for them to stay that you 
were not offering before?
(a) palm trees for tapping............................ .
(b) more land for food crops  ........
(c) other (specify)......................................
24. Are you rehabilitating your cocoa farms?  ....
if yes, what will you use?
(a; own labour  (b) hired labour..........
(c) mobisquads.........
25. Are you now having to pay more attention to your cocoa because of the 
departure of labourers and/or the need to rehabilitate?...........
If so, does that mean that you have less time to spend on 
food crops?...............
26. What has been the main reason for cocoa smuggling in recent years?
(a) low prices in Ghana (b) better prices in Togo..
(c) people have farms on both sides of the border.........
(d) lack of goods........................................
(e) shortcomings of buying system........................
(f) other............................. .........
27. What would you say is the greatest advantage of cocoa 
over other food crops?
(a) brings more money.................................. .
(b) cocoa trees bear for many years......................
(c) enables permanent use of land........................
(d) other................................................
28. which do you think was the most efficient system for buying cocoa?
(a) the old buying firms.................................
(b) the old co-operatives................................
(c) the United Ghana Farmers1 Council....................
(d) Cocoa Marketing Board................................
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29. Do you think the Farmers' Council protected the interests of Ghanaian 
farmers efficiently?
(a) yes......  (c) no...............,
(b) don't know......
30. Do you think the conduct of Marketing Board operations has improved since 
the present government came to power?
(a) yes    (b) no............. .......
(c) don't know...........
31. Do you think Acheampong's Operation Feed Yourself Programme was 
successful in boosting food production?.....
If not, why not?..................
32. How successful would you say VORADEP has been in assisting farmers to 
increase their production of food crops?
(a) successful  ...................
(b) not very successful  ..... .
^  (c) a failure............................
(d) a failure............................
(e) don't know anything about VORADEP.....
Section B
33. Before independence in 1957, which political party did you support? 
(a) CPP  (b) Togoland Congress/Ablode...........
(c) None......
34. Were you a formal member of either party? Yes... No...
If yes, where did you first become involved in the party?
(a) at home  (b) elsewhere in British Togoland
(c) in French Togoland (d) in Gold Coast.........
35. Why did you support that particular party?
(a) felt strongly about unification/integration..........
(b) felt strongly about amalgamation with Atando.........
(c) most people in town supported it....................
(d) other...........
36. If you supported unification, why did you do so?
(a) British ana French Togoland used to be one.,........
(b) similarity with the Ewes...........................
(c) difficulties created by the border.................
(d) development of Togoland was too slow................
(e) other .
37. If you supported integration with the Gold Coast, why 
did you do so?
(a) Bakpele are not Ewes................................
(b) French Togoland was a poor country.................
(c) integration would speed up development.............
(d) would achieve independence quicker  ..........
(e) other
38. Why do you think the Togoland Congress faded so quickly after 
independence?
(a) lack of leadership..................................
(b) supporters were not really committed  ........
(c) coercion by CPP.....................................
(d) Ablode people were willingly converted to CPP........
(e) other...............................................
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39. Do you think the overthrow of the CPP government was justified?...........
40. After the overthrow of Nkrumah by the NLC military government, elections 
were held in 1969. Which party did you vote for?
(a) Progress Party (S.K. Aboagye)..............
(b) NAL (Obed Asamoah)........................
(c) other.....................................
(d) can't remember............................
(e) none......................................
41. Why did you support that particular party?  ....
42. Did you think the military coup by Acheampong against Busia was justified? 
Yes  No.......
43. Did you support Acheampong's for a Union Government of soldiers and 
civilians?
(a) yes  (b) no......... (c) can't remember 
44. What is your opinion on the coup of June 41979 and the events that followed?
(a) coup was unjustified...  ...........
(b) coup was justified, but need not have been so bloody...
(c) both the coup and the shedding of blood were unavoidable............
45. During the 1979 Parliamentary elections which party did you vote for?
(a) PNP  (b) PFP  (c) UNC.........
(d) none  (e) can't remember................
46. Why did you support that particular party?.............
47. Do you think the overthrow of the PNP Government was justified?
Yes.............  (b) No...................
48. As far as you know are the CDRs
(a) bodies to represent government.................
(b) bodies to represent the people  .......
(c) bodies to represent the chiefs..................
(d) don't know their functions.....................
49. How satisfied are you with the work of the CDRs?
(a) they are working well...............................
(b) like the concept, but they are not working well......
(c) don't like the whole concept........................
50. Imagine that someone stole crops from your farm. Who would you be most 
likely to take the matter up with?
(a) the chief............ (b) CDRs..................
(c) Militia............. (d) Police................
51. Compared to the period before the PNDC came to power do you think that
(a) you are more able to make your voice heard to those in 
government  ....................... ...........
(b) less able to make your voice heard..................
(c) no difference.......................................
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52. Since independence which government has had the most creditable record in 
office? (Tick 1st and 2nd choices)
(a) CPP...............
(b) NLC...............
(c) PP................
(d) SMC...............
(e) PNP...............
(f) PNDC..............
(g) None has performed well........
Which government has the worst record?....
53. What political system do you think is best suited to Ghana?
(a) civilian rule..........
(b) military rule..........
(c) a mixture of the two....
(d) "If someone from Likpe is not elected to represent the area, but is nominated 
to a ministerial post, it would be wrong for him to use his influence to benefit his 
area"
Do you:
(a) agree.................
(b) disagree...............
(c) agree strongly.........
(d) disagree strongly......
Note:
In carrying out this survey, an effort was made to establish as representative a 
sample as possible, although the selection of respondents was not strictly 
random. Interviews were conducted on the basis of three major criteria. The first 
was that, since there was a significant variation of political attitudes and 
economic conditions across Likpe, the survey should reflect that diversity. With 
the exception of Nkwanta (which is a stranger village dominated by labourers) 
and Avedzeme (which is very small indeed), the whole of Likpe was included in 
the exercise. Secondly, a conscious effort was made to interview both men and 
women, although there was a bias towards the former for a variety of reasons, 
including the greater political activism of men and their dominance over the 
cocoa sector. Table 7.4, which presented data on the cocoa holdings of male 
farmers, was derived from this survey. Equivalent data was gathered for the 
women cocoa farmers, but the data was not presented in a tablular form since 
only slightly over 40% of women claimed any ownership of cocoa. Their holdings 
were typically small and were mostly inherited. Nevertheless, the interviews
pele women were especially fruitful with respect to information on food 
tivation. The third criterion was that the respondents should adequately 
he generational make-up of the community, since this seemed to be a 
salient divide within Likpe through time. In the end, 11% of the respondents 
were below the age of 30 ; 46% fell between 30 and 49; 32% fell between 50 and 
69 and 11 % were over 70 years old. With these criteria in mind, individuals from 
different households were selected on the basis of their willingness to co-operate 
with what was a lengthy interviewing process.
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C. List of People Interviewed:
1. Likpe:
(a) Abrani:
Nana Akototse IV 
Godfried Akorli 
Matthew Kodzo Akorli
E. Akoto 
Yao Akuamoah
Nana Mensah Ambor II, head of Gudeve clan [died 1986]
Edward Balappa, former PDC Chairman
Irenius Balappa, Chairman of TDC
Jacob Egbeadzo, CDR Chairman
Arnold Gidiga
Joseph Mensah
(b) Agbozome
C.K. Akoto, first PDC Chairman for Likpe 
Anthony Anyageh
O. Bonsi
Lawrence Gisam 
Marcus Goodman 
Richard Okpeteh, CDR Chairman 
Anastasius Udzuson
(c) Avedzeme 
Nana Agya Mensah III 
Christian Kwashie
(d) Bakwa 
Hedita Adjei 
Killian Afenyo 
Daniel Akototse 
Lakata Dente 
Conrad Denyo 
A.K. Djarson 
Josephine Mawusi 
Ralph Kofi-Asare 
Oscar Kugblenu 
Emmanuel E.K. Lartey 
Herman Norgbe 
Kwaku Ofori, CDR Secretary 
Teddy Ofori 
K.M. Onai
Christian Osei, CDR Chairman 
Fidelia Sraku 
Grace Sronipah 
Thomas Kwame Sronipah 
Celestine Venya
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(e) Bala 
Oscar Bonsi 
C. Bulley
R. Dogbe, mobisquad leader 
Winfried Dogbe 
Phillip Dorleku 
Traugott Dumelo 
John Edjesi
F.Y. Etu 
Simon Etu 
Matthew Kakraba 
Anthony Kumi 
Pascal Kumi 
Paul Kofi Kumi 
Albert Onai 
Nicholas Onai
Eusebius Ottah, former PDC Chairman 
Ernest Yao Poku 
Godwin E.Y. Yawotse
(f) Koforidua 
Nana Dzamboe
Emmanuel Tano, former TDC Chairman
(g) Kukurantumi 
Nana Agyeman II
G.Y, Abiti, Chairman of TDC
M. Agbetornyo, mobisquad leader 
Moses Aglidza
Gustav Aniewu, CDR Zonal Secretary
F.M. Aniewu, former TDC Chairman 
Winand Aniewu
K.K. Foli, Manager of United Rural Bank 
Alex Kota 
Alfred Okyerefo 
Christina Okyerefo
(h) Mate
Nana Soglo Alio HI 
Kwame Agbavie
C.K. Agblobi, Chief Farmer 
Amatus Adela 
Gladys Akla 
Emmanuel Bonsi 
Anthony Broni
C.K. Broni
Nana Oforite Dzahene, Matehene and former PDC Chairman 
Lucy Ekudi
G.K Foli
Michael Gborgbortsi 
Godwin Honu
S.K. Honu 
Emilson Kwashie 
Joseph Kwadzode
Mensah Lemboe, former Matehene and PDC Chairman 
G. A.N. Noamesi, former PDC and CDR Chairman 
Nichodemus Oloto 
Lucy Onai
Seth Osei, CDR Chairman 
Emmauel Osiboe 
Sam Quist, TDC Chairman
G.M.K, Soglo
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Deborah Yawotse
(i) Nkwanta 
Darameni Aboagye, labourer 
Kwame Agbalenyo, labourer 
Klutse Akatsi, stranger farmer 
Kodzotse Aresina, labourer 
Musa Atsawazam, labourer 
Aruna Azumanu, labourer 
Mr. Bidjake, labourer 
Alafia Kabr£, labourer 
Damasi Kabre, labourer 
Matheus Kabre, labourer 
Fuseini Salifu, labourer 
Alfonse Wowoyi, labourer 
Amadu Zame, labourer
(j) Todome
Mansa Dorothy Akakpo
Yao Kwame Agbovor
Margaret Ameaodzi
Antonia Asabli
Herman Asabli
Christine Asorkor
Theodore Asorkor
Boniface Deku, leader of mobisquad
Raphael Deku
Heniy Kwame Doe, Chairman TDC 
Leo Asorkor, Treasurer TDC 
Christian Kofi Kadzangla 
Afua Kyenkyen, Queen Mother 
Albert Tippah Kofi 
Augustine Billy Letse 
Alfred Sorkpan
2 . Rice Farmers (Total: 53):
Martha Kwame, leader of Lolobi December 31st Womens’ Movement Farm
Sebastiana Abiti
Paulina Agbeduamenu
Matthew Agbenyo
Emmanuel Agblo
Justine Addae
Johanna Abrey
Christina Agble
Josephine Abiti
Angelica Akonto
Emmanuel Akoto
Epiphania Akotor
Elias Aniewu
Pauline Aniewu
Magdalene Apatey
Agnes Asare
Martin Ashiaman
Margaret Atsu
Martina Aya
Seth Aya
Anna Bribi
Christina Dogbe
Freda Dzamboe
John Egbetah
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Aurelia Egbetorke 
Veronia Edzidzro 
Philomena Gborgblorgbe 
Elias Kalai 
Augusta Kalate 
Justine Kalate 
Silas Kalate 
Christian Kofi 
Henry Kofitse 
Theresa Konutse 
Victoria Kofi 
Aurelia Kota 
Agnes Kwaku 
Mary Kwaku 
Pete Kwaku 
Gabriel Mensah 
Jacob Modjah 
Cletus Nyalagbedzi 
John Ogbey 
Theodore Ogbey 
Florencia Onyipayede 
Agnes Oye 
Faustina Owusu 
John Owusu 
Justina Samba 
Martina Sokoto 
Elizabeth Sunu 
Stephen Tsra
3. Others:
Ms. R.E. Ababio, District Agricultural Co-ordinator 
Mr. Adortsey, Ameyi farms, Gbefi 
Lawrence Akoto, CDO District Commander 
Harry Asimah, CDR Regional Secretariat 
U.S. Clarke, Jasikan District Secretary 
Frank Gyamwodie, Hohoe District Secretary 
Kofi Kwakye, PNDC Secretary for Information.
Mr. Kponglo, Agricultural Development Bank, Hohoe 
Laida Obideabah, Jasikan District Liason Officer, NMP 
M. Owusu-Ansah, Deputy Secretary-General GAFACO-OPS 
R.K. Nti, Manager of E.P. Model Farms
Frank Tsaku, Former Member of Parliament and Regional President of 
GAFACO-OPS.
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